

**SRI VENKATESWARA INTERNSHIP PROGRAM
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“Understanding Idealist-Realist Debate in India’s Foreign Policy”





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
Certificate

This is to certify that the aforementioned students from Sri Venkateswara College have participated in the summer project SVP-2240 titled, “Understanding Idealist-Realist Debate in India’s Foreign Policy.” The participants carried out the research project work under our guidance and supervision from 21st June 2022 to 25th September 2022. The work carried out is original and carried out in an online mode.

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Jita Mishra', on a light background.

(Dr. Jita Mishra)

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADMM+:	ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting-Plus
AEWCS:	Airborne Early Warning and Control System
AIDS:	Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
AIPAC:	The American-Israel Political Affairs Committee
AK:	Avtomat Kalashnikova
ARF:	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN:	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIMSTEC:	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BJP:	Bharatiya Janata Party
BRI:	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS:	Brazil, Russia, India, China & Sri Lanka
CLMV:	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam
CPI:	Communist Party of India
CTBT:	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
FOIP:	Free and Open Indo-Pacific"
G2G:	Government to Government (G2G
GAIL:	Gas Authority of India Ltd
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GLONASS:	Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System
HIV:	Human Immuno Deficiency Virus
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
INSAT:	Indian National Satellite System
IORA:	Indian Ocean Rim Association
JINSA:	Jewish Institute on National Security Affairs
LCA:	Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)
LPG:	Liquefied petroleum gas
MIG:	Mikoyan-Gurevich
MSME:	Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises
NAM:	Non-Alignment Movement
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCGUB:	National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma
NDA:	National Democratic Alliance
NER:	North-Eastern Region
NPT:	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG:	Nuclear Suppliers Group
OBOR:	One Belt One Road

ONGC:	Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
PLO:	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC:	People Republic of China
PSUs:	Public Sector Undertakings
QUAD:	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RCEP:	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RIC:	Regulated Investment Company
SAARC:	South Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO:	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SEANWFZ:	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
SEATO:	Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation
SEZ:	Special Economic zones
ULFA:	United Liberation Front of Asom
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
USA:	United States of America
USD:	United States Dollar
USINPAC:	US-India Political Action Committee
USPACOM:	US Pacific Command
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

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Abstracts of the Chapters

Chapter I: Sustained Fides? The pertinence between India and Russia: India and Russia have continued to share a consistent relationship with symbiotic relations across various fields. This can be attributed to the leadership of both countries, the relations have been a mixture of both idealism and realism where the Indian support on the issue of Chechnya and the Russian position of Kashmir stands for idealism which calls for non-interference in internal issues of a country and realist actions in terms of trade, cultural relations and nuclear and space diplomacy.

The relations are political, economic, socio-cultural, and technological. With the changing times, countries have worked together in the fields of research and development. Majorly Russia has been one of India's greatest defense partners, and India until the 2000s was mostly dependent on Russia for military hardware and types of equipment. As many political philosophers mention the International regime functions in anarchy and there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies but just permanent interests. Indian foreign policy has gone through several dynamic changes and currently, the realist stand has been more prominent. The research paper traces the developments in the diplomatic relationship between India and Russia chronologically and concludes with the recent development and certain observations to bifurcate stances in the idealist and realist categories.

Chapter II: Strategic Culture and Geopolitics Dynamics in India-China Foreign Policy

Debate: From a low-cost “factory to the world” to a global leader in advanced technologies, China has traveled a very long way. As China continues to explode as a global power, it has given a new definition to growing trends like foreign policy and diplomacy, especially with India. This rise of China, as the upcoming world power, has grabbed large attention in recent times. Its wisely devised strategies and policies, rightly termed “The Long Game” by Rush Doshi, have often been a subject of extensive debate and scrutiny. The relatively consistent hard realpolitik strategic culture of China has been one of the major factors behind its rise and growth. The Chinese century led by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been one such policy that has garnered international attention. Using Silk Road as the metaphor, the nation aims to enhance overland trade in the Eurasian landmass. Both, the metaphor and the aim

aren't anything new or unknown. But it is the methods, implementations, and repercussions that are quite unforeseen. This paper aims to follow the trajectory of events and track the Idealist-Realist debate in India-China Foreign Policy. Through this chapter, an effort is made to understand the Strategic Culture of both nations and the Dynamicity of Geo-politics happening in the region, in terms of the foreign policy debate.

Chapter III: Genuine Interest or Well-thought-out Strategy? Indo-US relationship: For 75 years, India's relationship with the United States has been one of a mixture of alienation and commitment. The two countries have never been entirely alienated, nor have they enjoyed the kind of deep engagement they had with the other countries of Russia in the case of India and Britain and Western Europe in the case of the United States. India-US relations spanning seven decades can be divided into four brief periods: from 1947 to 1974; 1974 to 2001; 2001 to 2009; 2009 onwards. The first period encompassed the classic Cold War interactions between the two countries and Nehru's response to the East-West conflict. The second period marked the end and collapse of the Cold War and the beginning of a new phase in world politics in which the US became the sole superpower. The third period, to characterize it accurately, opened new horizons with the inauguration of the Bush administration, which typically unraveled the hyphenated India-Pakistan relationship. The fourth period is too recent to describe in detail, but the relationship has matured to a phase where both countries have forged new relationships and alliances on bilateral and multilateral levels.

Chapter IV: Tracking the Trajectory: India-Myanmar Foreign Policy Relations: India and Myanmar share an inextricably intertwined relationship guided by multiple factors ranging from internal to external. Initially, India and Myanmar premised the bilateral ties on idealist notions forging a relationship based on mutual trust and friendship but it took a turn with the onset of the military regime in Myanmar and India's reluctance to foster a relationship with the junta. However, towards the end of the 20th century, India prioritized its interests and formed a friendly relationship with Myanmar. The discourse also involves various factors which govern the ties like the increasing Chinese influence in the region, the security implications since both share a long border, and most importantly the implication of establishing close ties with Myanmar in the North Eastern Region of India. The bilateral ties between the said countries are multi-dimensional - both have faced many challenges- nevertheless, the relationship has been constantly evolving to suit the modern contexts and interests of both nations.

Chapter V: Soaking The Sunrise: How India Greets Japan: Historically, India and Japan have had a strong spiritual connection. The spread of Buddhism and its moral values have strongly influenced Japanese and Indian thought for centuries. In the modern era, Japan's unwavering support for India's freedom struggle, Japanese influence in Netaji Subhash Bose's Indian National Army, and Justice Radha Binod Pal's dissenting judgment at World War 2 trials have created friendly ties based on idealistic values of peace, harmony, and compassion. During the Cold War, while India's policy of non-alignment and Japan's engagement with the USA meant a difference in the political realm, economically the relations grew. Japan's Official Development Assistance in form of yen loans, India's exports of iron ore, and joint manufacturing ventures like Maruti Suzuki kept the economic momentum going. During the 1990s, when India's economic approach moved from protectionism to liberalism, engagement between the two countries grew manifold. Countries no longer seek power, but security, both economic and territorial. This stood true for India and Japan too. There was a brief yet intense lull in ties when India conducted nuclear tests in 1998. However, with diplomatic efforts, the bonhomie was back on track. The decade is also significant for it heralded the rise of China. Chinese aggression, the need to restrict unilateral change of status quo, and the creation of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, have brought India and Japan further closer. While ideological principles continue to guide India's foreign policy, it has grown to be more realpolitik influenced, based on practical principles, and current situations. The signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (2011), Civil Nuclear Pact (2016), and Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (2020) is testimony to the depth of engagement and trust that the two countries have for each other. The announcement of "Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the world", further signals their long-term cooperation and mutual goals that strongly tie them together.

Chapter VI: Analyzing India-Israel Relations through the Prism of Idealism and Realism: Initially India-Israel relations were not as cordial and friendly as we see today. It was in the 1990s that India extended its hand for friendship with Israel on the pretext of establishing diplomatic relations but the actual cause was purchasing arms and ammunition from Israel after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since then both countries have joined hands in other areas of cooperation like technology, agriculture, etc. Both nations are working towards

the welfare as well as the development of their respective states and these bilateral relations have gone far. But at the same point in time, this relationship is also driven by recognizing a common rival or foe which is radical terrorism. Even the current international scenario is favoring the deepening of India-Israel relations. The people of both countries have civilizational ties with each other and henceforth it becomes important to cooperate on various other fronts like terrorism, trade, and cultural ties so that both nations can thrive towards excellence.

Chapter VII: Scope For Cooperation or Continued Conflict: India-Pak Relations: India-Pakistan relations form an important share of geopolitical underpinnings in South Asia. From the perspective of international politics, both countries since their inception conflict. Pakistan's policy has always been reactionary to what India does and India's policy transcends itself from initial cooperation to hardcore strategic politics. This chapter talks about the shifts in India's foreign policy in dealing with a neighbor like Pakistan and the major theories explored are Idealism and realism as dominant. The chapter follows the periodical timeline of events covering almost all the major domains of discussions from 1947 to the most recent scenario.

Chapter VIII: Strategic and Security Aspects of India-ASEAN Relations: India and ASEAN share historical, social, cultural, and ideological ties. They are bound together by shared history and colonial experiences. While these factors should be enough to assume that both sides would have cordial and one-of-a-kind relations, it is not the case. It has been a turbulent journey for India's relations with ASEAN (from its initial engagements with southeast Asia to the present-day ties with ASEAN). This chapter aims to analyze the history of India-ASEAN relations through the lens of idealist realist debate in international relations. the paper maps out the trends of idealist and realist tilt in Indian foreign policy towards ASEAN at various points in time. Further, it attempts to link the theoretical debate of idealism/realism to the recent development in the region by analyzing the "China factor" and the creation of QUAD and the notion of Indo-Pacific.

Objectives of the Project

- i. To examine the idealist-realist debate in India's foreign policy in general.
- ii. To analyze idealist-realist factors in India's policies towards other countries.

Statement of the Problem

One of the most difficult things about grasping the different approaches to understanding and judging International Relations is the variety of labels. There has been a debate since the Second World War between the realists and the idealists reviving from time to time. Theorizing tends to become bogged down in a perpetual and never-ending argument between apparently opposed but complementary positions. Idealism emphasizes international norms, cooperation, and interdependence among states that reflects moral or ethical principles in conducting foreign policy. Realism, on the other hand, predicts that states will act in their national interest in conducting the foreign affairs of a country. India's foreign policy has been a mix of idealism and realism since independence. However, neither approach on its own can serve India's interests. India should adopt a realist policy but with a blend of idealism. This idealism is not against the national interest of India and would pay off for India in the long run. Therefore it can be stated that from the above two factors, India's foreign policy stance is more appropriate to understand under the purview of Realism and Idealism. This project would attempt to explain that no single approach can capture all the complexity of India's foreign policy. Therefore, India is better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom. Although one should take care to emphasize inventiveness over invective, one should also welcome and encourage the heterogeneity of contemporary scholarship.

Data and Methodology

The methodology adopted for the study is descriptive and analytical based on data collected from primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include documents and reports of ASEAN Document Series, Publications and Reports of the Governments of Myanmar, Israel, China, Japan, Russia, USA, and Pakistan, and Speeches, Interviews, Commentaries, Keynote

Address, of The Presidents, Military leaders, State Counsellor, External Affairs Ministers and other Cabinet Ministers, Ambassadors, Foreign Secretaries, etc. The Secondary sources include Books, Articles from Journals, Seminar Papers, Occasional Papers, Working Papers, Discussion Papers, Monographs, Unpublished M.Phil dissertations, and Ph.D. Theses, Magazines, Weeklies, and Newspapers.

Qualitative content analysis is undertaken with the data and information collected through the above-mentioned primary and secondary sources, and major findings and conclusions were drawn.

Review of Literature

India-Russia Relations

There is little or no doubt that India and Russia have had the steadiest of relationships in the past seventy years. The countries share a friction-free relationship, Both countries share a common strategic role of trying to make a polycentric international system. Harsh V Pant¹ mentions that the realistic ties between India and Russia are also due to the potential rise of India and hence, the Russia-India-China trilateral initiative can pose an alternative to the US Hegemony. The relevance of the relations is visible in the domestic domain due to the need for rapid industrialization and to development of scientific potential, also in the international domain for defending territory.

B. M. Jain² mentions four eras of the bond: the cold war geopolitics, the Gorbachev Era, the Boris Yeltsin era, and the current Putin's Pragmatic Policy. The Foreign policy between them has been largely dependent on the type of leadership the countries have had. India signed a treaty of friendship with the USSR in August 1971 and both countries have been largely favorable to each other. Russia has also played the role of peacemaker between India and Pakistan in 1966 after the war in 1965.

Prashant Dikshit³ in his recent article on defense relations states some issues like material inadequacies, cost escalations, and delayed delivery from Russian ends with Gorshkov now costing almost twice its earlier purchase. There has been a decline in this industry soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union which led to economic turmoil, and complex, and skill-selective out-migration. As the markets have gone open India has reached out to several alternatives to purchase defense equipment from Israel and France and even Russia has diversified its market to countries like Venezuela, Indonesia, and even Pakistan.

R.V.R Chandrasekhara Rao⁴ mentioned the joint commission on economics, scientific and technological cooperation in New Delhi in 1973, inspired by the treaty of friendship between both parties, one of the reasons for this treatment towards India was its policy of

¹Harsh V Pant, "India- Russia Ties and India's Strategic Culture Dominance of a Realist Worldview.", *India Review*, 12:1, February 2013, pp.1-19.

² BM Jain, "India and Russia: Reassessing the Time-Tested Ties", *Pacific Affairs*, Fall, 2003, Vol.76, No.3, pp.375-397.

³ Prashant Dikshit, "India and Russia: Revisiting the Defence Relations", *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No.52, 2008, pp.2-8.

⁴ RVR Chandrasekhara Rao, "Indo-Soviet Economic Relations", *Asian Survey*, August 1973, Vol.13, No.8, pp.793-801.

socialism, though India had adopted for a mixed economy certain domestic developments have led to Russia consider us as states with the goal of “socialist transformation of the society.” This justifies the difference between Russia’s strong relationship with China, given its loyalty towards communism and state capitalism, and comparatively lesser strong ties with India since it has the potential to transform itself into a socialist nation.

As Badrul Alam⁵ mentions that USSR has always advocated India’s permanent position in the United Nations security council and also to make India a part of NSG, India has reciprocated by silently supporting Russia in the Afghanistan issue and its certain other invasions. In contemporary times during the Ukraine conflict, India chose to abstain from voting against Russia, owing to the longstanding partnership, especially in science.

Archana Upadhyay⁶ states in her article that while Russia has maintained that Kashmir is an internal issue of India and shared an understanding over it, India has reciprocated the same on the issue of Crimea and Chechnya. Both the countries have made joint statements on the issues of Kashmir and Chechnya where it has been met that “the violent movements of the self-determination being waged in both of the regions are acts of terrorism and demanded an end to ‘cross border terrorism’”.

Nirmala Joshi⁷ highlights that (Narsimha Rao in Russia 1994) terrorism, drug trafficking, and the illicit trade of small weapons were reasons for the signing of the Collective security treaty. The common goal of creating a multipolar world to maintain arch stability has endured their association.

India China relations

The success and failure of a nation’s foreign policy are largely a function of its power and how that power is wielded. A state’s power in the international system can be defined as a function of the material capabilities that it possesses.⁸ The Indian political establishment is fond of arguing that there is a distinct continuity that defines Indian foreign policy. One can relate this easily to the standard structural-realist theory of international politics, according to which

⁵ Mohammed Badrul Alam, “Contextualising India Russia Relations”, *World Affairs*, January-March 2019, Vol.23, No.1, pp.48-59.

⁶ Archana Upadhyay, “India and Russia in a Changing World”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.50, No.33, August 2015, pp.23-26.

⁷ Nirmala Joshi, “India and Russia: Enduring Partnership”, *India Quarterly*, Vol.58, No.34, December 2002, pp.113-128.

⁸ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton, New York, 2001, pp. 57-60.

states fashion their foreign policies in response to the systemic constraints imposed by the international system, and domestic politics is not an important variable in this process.⁹ A nation's foreign policy, to be effective, should ultimately rest on philosophical assumptions as to the nature of world order and the relationship of order to progress and national interest. In the absence of such a conceptual framework, incoherence would loom large as the diplomatic back and forth would become an end in itself, and rather than shaping events, the state would end up reacting to developments around it as in the case of Indian foreign policy.

The period from 1947, when India became independent, too (1947-1964, when Jawaharlal Nehru died is marked in modern Indian history as the 'Nehru era'. Nehru's era was a crucial period in the history of Sino-Indian relations, during which Sino-Indian relations underwent a tortuous course marked with dramatic ups and downs. Chinese scholars usually divide this tortuous course into two main stages: The friendship Stage –58) and the Hostility Stage (1959-64). The Friendship Stage is further divided into the Initiation Phase (1947–53) and Honeymoon Phase (1954-58). The Initiation Phase witnessed the beginnings of friendship between India and China over several major historic events and issues.¹⁰ This was pursued further through India's support to China in the issues of Tibet, Taiwan, the Korean crisis, Geneva and Bandung Conferences. The India-China relations were warmer and sweeter with cheers of 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai' spreading all around. The Kongka La Pass incident of October 1959 became the turning point in India- China. This incident as explained by Mullick marked the end of the period of friendship between India and China, though he was accused by the External Affairs Ministry and Intelligence Bureau of 'Aggression' and 'expansionism'.¹¹

S. D Muni¹² furthers the argument of Realism taking command in the post-Nehruvian period, by quoting the example of India's silence on the Tiananmen Square Massacre keeping in mind the prospects of improving relations with China. Zhu, further enlists the other constraints, the protracted boundary dispute is as a major source of irritant between Beijing and New Delhi. India largely sticks to a de facto boundary based on the McMahon Line, drawn by

⁹ The seminal text on structural realist theory in international relations remains Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1979.

¹⁰ S. Quanyu (2005). Sino-Indian Friendship in the Nehru Era: A Chinese Perspective. *China Report*, 41(3), pp.237-252.

¹¹ T.R. Ghoble. "Some Aspects of Sino-Indian Relations During the Nehru Era (1959)." *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* 56 (1995): pp.833-45.

¹² Muni, S. D. *India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension*. Foundation Books, 2009.

the British Indian administration had imposed on the Tibetan authorities in 1914 under the Shimla Accord which the successive Chinese governments never recognized as a boundary.

Kanti Bajpai¹³ says that the increasing complexity of the bilateral relationship is evidenced by the sometimes-contradictory signals that have been sent out by both governments. Several third parties have contributed to the profound mistrust between China and India. Pant elaborates that, India's China policy is in many ways symptomatic of a larger misunderstanding in the Indian political establishment concerning what the nation's foreign policy should be, i.e. the disagreements between the left and right factions. . Chietigj Bajpae¹⁴ notes that the Sino-Indian relationship cannot be viewed as purely competitive or cooperative. Both countries' expanding military capabilities have also served to deter the outbreak of an all-out war, though this has also fuelled the proclivity for limited stand-offs along their contested border. Chietigj Bajpae¹⁵ gives a concept of a "nested security dilemma" based on the idea that security dilemmas involving major states have externalities beyond their bilateral relationship, with implications for regional and global security.¹⁶

Alastair Ian Johnston¹⁷ argues that China has historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard realpolitik strategic culture that has persisted across different periods and continues to persist even in its present context when, according to him, China faces a threat environment that is most benign in several decades. China's strategic behavior exhibits a preference for offensive uses of force, mediated by a keen sensitivity to relative capabilities and Chinese decision-makers seem to have internalized this strategic culture.¹⁸ As noted by JN Dixit, Indian foreign and security policy is hybrid, encompassing both realist and idealist ideational lineages, which are both consciously and subconsciously efficacious. He argues that 'Kautilyan realism' is the predominant endogenous ideational feature of Indian strategic

¹³ Kanti Bajpai, "China-India Relations If Narendra Modi Wins the Indian Elections," China-India Brief (Singapore), no. 27, 27 April-13 May 2014, <http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publication/china-india-brief/china-india-brief-27>; and Rup Narayan Das, "Modi Faces Pressing Questions about India's China Policy," China Brief: A Journal of Analysis and Information 14, no. 10 (23 May 2014).

¹⁴ Bajpae, Chietigj. "China-India: Regional Dimensions of the Bilateral Relationship." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (2015): 108-45. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271280>.

¹⁵ Bajpae, Chietigj. "China-India: Regional Dimensions of the Bilateral Relationship." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (2015): 108-45. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271280>

¹⁶ For definition of security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214.

¹⁷ Alastair Ian Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995.

¹⁸ For sources of Chinese realpolitik strategic culture, see Alastair Ian Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Ronald Jepperson et al, no 14, pp. 216-268.

culture relative to endogenous 'idealist' and exogenous ideational inputs. However, Kautilyan realism is not 'pure power politics' but intrinsically rooted in political normativity (*rajadharma*). India's National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon says that "A simple realist theory is insufficient to explain or even describe the complex course and state of India-China relations". We seem to use multilateralism for our values and bilateralism for our interests.

India is a rising power in Asia and it needs to demand its rightful place in the inter-state hierarchy. Even if a rising India does not have any intention of becoming a regional hegemon, China will try its best to constrain India as it has already done to a large extent. Jairam Ramesh¹⁹ a member of the Indian Parliament and a former Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, coined the word "Chindia" in his 2005 book *Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India*. It denotes synergy between the two Asian giants. China is not a malevolent, sinister international entity out there to demolish India but a state which is simply pursuing its strategic interests in a hard-headed fashion on its way to its status of great power. It is time for India to realize that India's great power aspirations cannot be realized without a similar cold-blooded realistic assessment of its strategic interests in an anarchic international system where there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.

India-US Relations

Kanti Bajjal²⁰ has dephased, i.e. and categorized India-US relations in three broad periods, calling it one of constant engagement or estrangement. The first phase spanned 1947 to 1981, corresponding to the Cold War years and the Nehruvian policy of non-alignment. The second phase spans 1982-2001, corresponding to the period when the US became the sole superpower. And, the third phase spans from 2001-present times. This period brought new dimensions to the relations unfolding positive interactions in all spheres.

Karamatullah K. Ghori²¹ decodes the role of the United States in the 21st century India-Pakistan relations and the hyphenated relations between the three nations. He talks of the US being wedged between the two during 1947-50 and eventually tilting towards Pakistan due to

¹⁹ Jairam Ramesh, *Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India*, India Research Press, New Delhi, 2005.

²⁰Kanti Bajpai. 'The U.S. and US.' *India International Centre Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3/4, Winter 2006-Spring 2007, pp.101-102.

²¹Karamatullah K. Ghori. "The Role of the US in 21st century Pakistan-India relations." *Pakistan Horizon*, 2014, Vol.67, No.1, pp 23-41.

India's position of non-alignment. He focuses on the Kashmir issue and the change in the United States position of openly supporting India post the 9/11 attacks. With the coming of the Bush administration, India was favored and a Civil Nuclear Deal was signed between the two nations. The author concludes and highlights the continuation of the same efforts by the Obama administration.

Nicholas Burns²² presents his views on the key areas that can bind India and the United States relations and reach greater heights. This can be done by increasing bilateral trade, strengthening military cooperation, working together to combat threats to homeland security, stabilizing a post-American Afghanistan, and, most importantly, finding more common ground on transnational challenges such as climate change. It is an ambitious agenda, but pursuing it would place India where it belongs: at the heart of US regional strategy.

T.V. Paul²³ discusses the implications of the India-US nuclear accord of July 2005 and further the Civil Nuclear Deal of 2006. He highlights the procedure followed, the various meetings held leading up to the signing of the deal, the roadblocks in the timeline, strategic benefits achieved by both sides, and the power transition logic. Mahruk Khan²⁴ analyses the last 15 years of India and the United States' relations, which have seen an increase in the convergence of their interests. However, a new shift in relations occurred shortly after Narendra Modi took office as Prime Minister of India in 2016. It focuses on the growing strategic convergence between the United States and India. Furthermore, a brief analysis of the potential growth of the US-India strategic partnership under the Trump administration will be presented, as will an examination of its potential as a strategic liability or a partnership for India. Furthermore, it investigates the United State's growing reliance on India in the aftermath of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as well as India's role as a global partner and ally at various strategic levels. Arun K. Singh²⁵ writes a detailed analysis of the changes in the Biden administration and draws policy comparisons with Obama's time as the President because Joe Biden was an essential part of his cabinet.

²² Nicholas Burns. "Passage to India: What Washington can do to Revive Relations with New Delhi." *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2014, Vol.93, No.5, pp.132-136.

²³ T.V. Paul. "The US-India Nuclear Accord: Implications for the Non-proliferation Regime." *International Journal: Sage Publications*, 2007, Vol.62, No.4, pp.845-861.

²⁴ Mahruk Khan. "Growing India-US Strategic Cooperation." *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, 2017, Vol.37, No.4, pp.97-117.

²⁵ Arun K. Singh. "India-US Relations." *India Foreign Affairs Journal*: 2020, Vol.15, No.4, pp-286-96.

India-Myanmar Relations

Rimli Basu²⁶ remarks that in realist terms countries with greater power determine the outcomes according to their interests and demonstrates this by underlining the international/political developments which impact India's foreign policy. The author also highlights the importance of regional groupings shortly in terms of conflict resolution or conflict management. Binoda Kumar Mishra²⁷ entails the historical background of Indo-Myanmar relations and highlights the factors that have 'renewed' India's interests in its neighborhood mainly the shift of international attention to Asia and India's longing to increase its reach in the continent and to counter 'certain misplaced paradigms' in India's North-East.

Yogendra Singh²⁸ provides an overview of the India-Myanmar relationship and analyses the 'paradigm shift in India's 'neutral' and 'disinterested' approach towards Myanmar due to its belief in democratic values to its decision to engage with the military regime in the 1990s. Singh has also highlighted some security concerns related to India's northeast region where India expects cooperation from Myanmar to curb the insurgent groups and other issues like drug trafficking and the spread of HIV/AIDS. Marie Lall²⁹ analyses the India-Myanmar relations in the terms of economy and the role of energy security in the geopolitics of the region through 'pipeline diplomacy.' Rajiv Bhatia³⁰ analyses that Myanmar's foreign policy mainly rests on three pillars: China, India, and ASEAN. The author establishes the theoretical understanding of bilateral relations in terms of 4 aspects and discusses 'the multi-dimensional relationship'.

Tran Xuan Hiep, Nguyen Tuan Binh, Tran Hoang Long, Duong Quang Tra, Nguyen Quang Son³¹ have laid the theoretical framework to track the idealist and realist traits in Indian Foreign Policy towards Myanmar from 1948 to 1992. From independence till 1962 India

²⁶ Rimli Basu, "Reconciliation and Redefinition of the Indo-Myanmar Relations", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 71, No.2, April-June, 2010, pp.663-676.

²⁷ Binoda Kumar Mishra, "Security Implications of Greater India-Myanmar Interaction", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 4, No.2, April-June, 2009, pp.81-96

²⁸ Yogendra Singh, "INDIA'S MYANMAR POLICY: A Dilemma between Realism and Idealism", *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No.37, March 2007, pp.1-5.

²⁹ Marie Lall, "Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.28, No.3, December 2006, pp.424-446.

³⁰ Rajiv Bhatia, "Myanmar-India Relations: The Way Forward", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol.6, No.3, July-Sept. 2011, pp.315-326.

³¹ Tran Xuan Hiep, Nguyen Tuan Binh, Tran Hoang Long, Duong Quang Tra, Nguyen Quang Son, "India - Myanmar Relations (1948 - 1992): From "Idealism" to "Realism" in India's Foreign Policy towards Myanmar", *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol.10 No.3, May 2021, pp.168-176.

strictly based its orientation on idealist notions based on Ashoks's Dhamma, Gandhi's non-violence but after the coup of 1962 India reduced its engagement due to its ethical commitment to fostering democratic values in neighbouring countries and the military regime's negative policy of neutrality reduced the engagement further and meanwhile china took the stage in Myanmar. The transformation happened in 1987 after a visit of then PM Rajiv Gandhi which set the stage for the realpolitik notion this mainly happened to curb the influence of china, improve relations with Myanmar in non-traditional security areas, and have a better position in South-East Asia according to its Look East Policy.

Balachander Palanisamy³² examines India's interests with Myanmar 'through realism and constructivism lenses' and states geostrategic interests as the dominating factor. To demonstrate this the author uses the level of analysis framework. Azman Ayob³³ has analyzed India-Myanmar Relations from the perspective of 'modified structuralism' which can be understood in terms of ideational and material factors. Ideational connotes India's commitment to promoting democratic values in its neighbouring countries and putting its 'self-interest' at the backseat whereas in material factor India was guided by the realpolitik notion and started to have government-to-government cooperation with the junta to promote its geostrategic and economic interests.

Fahmida Ashraf³⁴ has analysed the changing nature of India-Myanmar relations in three phases and observed that currently India in its third phase since 1992 has been in constructive engagement with Myanmar despite reservations from the western nations and has been cooperating on various fronts. Harnit Kaur Kang³⁵ seeks to explain the importance of Myanmar as a significant partner to India due to its economic and strategic position in South Asia. India's trade relations have been steadily increasing with Myanmar under the special impetus of the Look East Policy. The LEP entails collaboration both bilateral and multilateral and seeks to increase India's influence in East Asia. In doing so the LEP hopes to prevent any one country from having a monopoly in the Southeast and Asia Pacific region. Baladas

³²Balachander Palanisamy, "A Geostrategic Explanation of India-Myanmar Bilateral Relations since the 1990s, *E-International Relations*, 31 March 2020.

³³ Ayob, Azman. "Myanmar in India's Intertwined Idealism-Realism Foreign Policy: A 'Modified Structuralism' Perspective." *Journal of Management Research*, Vol 7, No.2, 1 February 2015, pp.47-54

³⁴ Fahmida Ashraf, "India Myanmar Relations", *Strategic Studies*, Spring 2008, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring 2008), pp. 223-233

³⁵ Harnit Kaur Kang, "India and Myanmar: Looking East through a Strategic Bridge", *IPCS Issue Brief*, No.144, March 2010, pp.1-4.

Ghosal³⁶ has anatomized India's stance on the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar which has two aspects- economic development in northeast India and balancing China's influence. Any criticism by India would undermine its influence and pave a clear way for China.

India-Japan Relations

Arpita Mathur³⁷ gives a detailed study of the political, strategic, and economic factors of the India-Japan bilateral relationship. The article traces the historical and cultural links between the two nations right from the reign of Emperor Kimmei and the spread of Buddhism in Japan to the Japanese role in Subhash Chandra Bose's Azad Hind Fauj and Justice Radha Binod Pal's lone dissenting judgment in favor of Japan during WWII trials. She discusses how China's rise, shared belief in the neo-liberal international order, permanent seats in the UNSC, and economic complementarities have strengthened India-Japan ties. She invokes political scientist Joseph Nye's observations that "It is in the interest of US, Japan, and India that China's rise be peaceful and harmonious. The strategy of integration plus a hedge against uncertainty makes sense for both US and Japan."

Joshy M Paul, Rupakjyoti Borah³⁸, in their articles also traces the history of India-Japan relations, and how the relations suffered a setback during India's Pokhran nuclear tests, but revived when PM Yoshiro Mori visited India in 2000. Paul emphasizes how foreign policies of the two countries now emphasize long-term national interests than short-term economic considerations, and Borah stresses economic ties, maritime security, the China factor, and future collaborations in the field of nuclear energy between India and Japan.

Lalit Mansingh³⁹, stresses the findings of political scientist Henry Kissinger that the unipolar world is being replaced by a more classical balance of power system. The end of the Cold War has created an atmosphere of freedom for countries seeking new relationships without disturbing older friendships. According to the author, India must carry on the strategic dialogue with China and a strategic and global partnership with Japan, and if forced to choose between the two, India must go with Japan.

³⁶ Baladas Ghosal, "India's Responses to the Complex Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar", East-West Centre, 9 November 2017

³⁷ Arpita Mathur. "India-Japan Relations: Drivers, Trends and Prospects," *S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies*: Singapore, 2012.

³⁸ Rupakjyoti Borah. "Japan and India: natural but wary allies", *New Zealand International Review*, Vol.36, No.4, (July/August 2011), pp.23-28.

³⁹ Lalit Mansingh. "India-Japan Relations", *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No.43, (January 2007).

Hayoun Ryou⁴⁰ offers Chinese perceptions of the security cooperation between Japan and India. The outlook of the Chinese media on the Quadrilateral Alliance (India-Japan-US-Australia) is not positive as it believes that it is a target of this alliance and that deepening India-Japan relations are an effort to contain its rise. Ryou concludes that in the process of adjusting and re-structuring geopolitics, this cooperation will influence China and at the same time, China will influence the shape of this relationship.

Titli Basu⁴¹ critically analyses the nuances that are shaping this bilateral relationship through Indian and Japanese prisms both. The trade volume between China and US and pressure by the US to shoulder more responsibilities than be a passive free rider on the US-Japan alliance have propelled Japanese policymakers to strengthen the security alliance and explore new partnerships. Japan's inherent strength in capital-intensive long gestation projects and India's budgetary constraints concerning infrastructure, complement the India-Japan relations. Basu also discusses how India's quest for multi-polarity, great power identity, and non-alignment, can be impediments to India-Japan ties.

Takaaki Asano⁴² highlights policy objectives of developing security cooperation between India and Japan, expanding economic interaction, and cooperating on regional and global issues based on universal values. Asano also lists the challenges to achieving these objectives, notable discrepancies in terms of policy priorities, and India's strong quest for strategic autonomy. He concludes by listing certain recommendations like revising economic partnership agreements and coordination at RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), cooperation in defense equipment procurement and development, and increasing information exchange on emerging economic governance structures in Asia like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS Development Bank.

Srabani Roy Choudhury⁴³ brings into perspective the economic relations between the two nations beginning in 2005. The article also explores recent developments on the domestic front. Choudhury gives a glimpse of Abenomics, an economic model by the late former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe which focuses on the revival of the economy by strengthening

⁴⁰Hayoun Ryou. "India-Japan Security Cooperation: Chinese Perceptions", *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No.89, (January 2009).

⁴¹Titli Basu. "India-Japan Relations: An enduring partnership", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol.9, No.3, (July-September 2014), pp.266-279.

⁴²Takaaki Asano. "Japan-India Relations: Toward a Strategic Special Partnership", *Stimson Center*, 2015, pp.33-41.

⁴³Srabani Roy Choudhury. "India-Japan Relations: The Economic Advantage", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol.10, No.3, (July-September 2015), pp.268-283.

exports and increasing manufacturing. She also explores how India, due to its young workforce can be the destination for Japanese companies and service industries, allowing Japan to regain its economic viability.

Bharti Chhibber⁴⁴ suggests that the India-Japan-US trilateral must move beyond symbolic gestures to more substantive cooperation. India and Japan's strong foothold in the service and manufacturing sectors respectively, India's abundance of natural resources and Japan's excellence in advanced technology, and India's huge market coupled with Japan's surplus capital for investment, are all complementarities that must be fully utilized. She also highlights the breakthrough 2016 signing of the Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Pact, which allows Japan to transfer nuclear technology-related components and help build reactors in India. India being the first non-NPT member to achieve this deal with Japan underscores the paradigm shift in foreign policies of the two countries. She also briefly talks about the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which signals new avenues for the two countries to collaborate.

Astha Chadha's⁴⁵ article is the most recent. She, through analysis of India's Japanese strategy, security and infrastructure agreements especially since 2014, seeks to address how India's foreign policy towards Japan has undergone changes to allow India's greater role in Asia and what factors have led to these changes. The paper argues that the realist perspective of the balance of power as well as the constructivist approach of non-alignment, have been base of India's Japanese policy. Constant friction with Pakistan and China has led India to shift its foreign policy stance towards countries like Japan in search of greater cooperation that transcends into security concerns. Moreover, Civil Nuclear Arrangement in 2016 and Acquisition and Cross Service agreement in 2018 for mutual access to each other's navy to share bases, fuels, and ammunition, herald a new era of India-Japan ties. Universal values of freedom, humanity, democracy, tolerance, and non-violence constitute the basis of their relationship and the two countries need to work together for the benefit of the Indo-Pacific region and the world at large.

⁴⁴ Bharti Chhibber. "India-Japan Relations: Breaking new ground in the strategic partnership", *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, Vol.22, No.3, (July-September 2018), pp.94-103.

⁴⁵ Astha Chadha. "India's Foreign Policy towards Japan: Special Partnership amid Regional Transformation", *Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies*, Vol.38, Issue 1, (2020), pp.19-37.

Takenori Horimoto⁴⁶ draws attention to the fact that India is moving beyond the balancing of power, toward assuming a leading role in world affairs. He details India's foreign policy matrix at the local, regional, and world levels. While India's objective at the local level (South Asia) is the achievement of hegemonic status with an orientation towards status-quo, at the regional level (Indo-Pacific), it attempts to strengthen its presence and status as a maritime power, advance cooperation with East Asia and ASEAN, and counter China-Pak Axis including Belt and Road Initiative. At the global level, its goal is the creation of a multipolar system (revisionist orientation) and acquiring the capacity to build international order. According to the author, India and Japan need to look beyond their mutually complementary relationship and recognize it as a new international asset to the Indo-Pacific at large.

Muthiah Alagappa⁴⁷ explains the role of international theories and how they seek to understand international interactions and arrangements on basis of which war, peace, conflict, and cooperation can be understood, predicted, and fostered. India's foreign policy of non-alignment constituted the first stage of India's international relations. Power politics and the pursuit of security defined the orientation of the second phase. Lastly, the third phase (post-1990), focused on security, the search for global status, and economic growth and development.

Sumitha Narayanan Kutty and Rajesh Basru⁴⁸ analyze three pillars of India's foreign policy strategy: security, economic development, and status, under the leadership of PM Narendra Modi. It talks about the advantages of strategic partnerships over alliances. They allow greater policy autonomy by inhibiting dominance by major powers and offer flexibility in negotiating with adversaries. PM Modi's Act East policy and PM Abe's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy converge in the Northeast of India- the bridge between south and southeast Asia. This has led to Japanese investment in the region. Collaboration through infrastructure development in third countries, for example, East container terminal at Colombo port or Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, signal a new dimension in India's foreign policy. However, this hasn't inhibited India's interaction with China. It engages through bilateral

⁴⁶Takenori Horimoto. "Relations between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific Age-Transcending the Quad Framework", *Japan Review*, Vol.3, No.2, (September 2017).

⁴⁷ Muthiah Alagappa. "International Studies in Asia: distinctive trajectories", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol.11, No.2 (2011), pp.193-230.

⁴⁸Rajesh Basru, Sumitha Narayanan Kutty. "Modi's India and Japan: nested strategic partnerships", *International Politics*, Vol. 59 (2022), pp.67-89.

meetings, BRICS and RIC summits. While possession of nuclear weapons and closely linked economies induce restraint, India has continued to hedge against an increased Chinese threat.

KV Kesavan and Srabani Roy Choudhury⁴⁹ conclude that Neo-classical realism best explains Japan's external policy since it allows for a balance between the international structure and domestic variables as against classical realism which is centered on structure alone. Both anarchy, as well as domestic considerations of anti-nuclearism, have guided Japanese foreign policy. Japanese private sector's interest to reduce its dependence on China, increasing crude prices, and global warming which has forced Japan to rethink its nuclear commitments, have brought India and Japan closer.

Sandeep Kumar⁵⁰ mainly focuses on memorandums of understanding and cooperation (MoU and MoCs) signed between the two countries during state visits. In 2014, five pacts were signed for defense exchanges, cooperation in clean energy, roads, and highways, healthcare, and bullet train project. MoUs on cooperation in heritage, conservation, city modernization, art, culture, and academics were also signed. In 2016, the range of themes of MoUs was further expanded in the field of outer space, earth science and marine technology, agriculture and food industry, transport and urban development, and textiles. In the words of the late PM Abe, "A strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India."

PG Rajamohan, Dil Bahadur Rahut, and Jabin T Jacob state how India and Japan share a special relationship as fellow democracies without hegemonic interests and have ideal values like humanity, peace, and tolerance at their core. Changing internal order which includes the emergence of China and the declining US role, along with economics and population dynamics has brought the two countries closer, both politically and economically. They are engaging in making alliances for national interest and keeping long-term goals in mind. However, there are also challenges like lukewarm interaction at the people-to-people level and changing political leaders and personalities.

⁴⁹Srabani Roy Choudhury. "India-Japan Relations: The Economic Advantage", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol.10, No.3, (July-September 2015), pp.268-283.

⁵⁰Sandeep Kumar. "Resetting India-Japan relation in Modi Government", *International Journal of Research*, Vol.4, Issue 8, (July 2017).

India-Israel Relations

India's foreign policy has been a blend of realism and idealism. The role of India in international politics has been very significant since the era of 1960s when India was actively taking part in NAM and at the same moment was trying to emerge as a leader in South Asia. India has been an idealist on various issues, especially on Humanitarian grounds but at the same time, India has been vocal about its interests on the International ground. India's foreign policy can be categorized into three concentric circles, the first or the outermost circle is related to the superpowers, the middle circle is related to Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the last circle relates to India's most immediate neighbors in South Asia.

Sunil Kumar⁵¹ states that Israel occupies a special space in India's foreign policy making. Owing to geostrategic factors in general and domestic factors in particular, the Indian leadership has been hesitant to extend its full support to Israel. Whereas P.R. Kumaraswamy⁵² states that since the early 1920s the Indian nationalists have found a common cause with the Arabs of Palestine and were reluctant to endorse any Jewish aspirations for a national home in Palestine. India recognized Israel in the year 1950 and it was in 1952 that the opening of the Israel consulate in Bombay took place. Israel was born in 1948 and it took two years for India to officially recognize Israel. It was because of the following reasons India was not in a position to compromise its relations with the Arabs, India's proximity to Israel could have deterred India from NAM as Israel was very strongly backed by the US. We observe a paradigm shift from idealism to realism in India's foreign especially under the regime of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. There were many complications in the India-Israel relationship during the phase of the Cold War like the growing personal friendship between Pt. Nehru and Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser and there were growing economic ties with the Arab world adding to this there was the subsequent flow of Indians to the oil-rich countries of Arab. Israel had received a lot of opposition and criticism from the world while Palestine received a lot of support and the Palestine Liberation Organization became a symbol of a progressive world. At the end of the cold war, various radical changes took place in world politics, after the disintegration of the USSR a strong anti-Israel rationale was removed.

⁵¹ Sunil Kumar, "India- Israeli Relations: A Quest for Great- Power Status Since 1991", *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Vol. 28, No. 3/4 (Fall 2017), pp. 38-45

⁵² P.R. Kumaraswamy, "India-Israel Relations: Quo Vadis?", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (July-September, 2006), pp. 72-84

Then it was in the year 1992 that India established full diplomatic relations with Israel and the year 2000 was the high point of the bilateral relations between both countries. There has been a lot of criticism of India-Israel relations on various grounds there were constant demands by the opposition that India should abandon its military ties with Israel. The Communist Party of India also demanded that the Israeli Ambassador in India should be declared as the persona non grata.

Over the years we have realized that India's stance over Palestine has been marginalizing and one such cause is that many Arab countries which were once a supporter of the Palestinian cause have started distancing themselves to pursue diplomatic ties with Israel. India-Israel relations have never been an issue for Saudi Arabia but there are fundamental differences in perception between India and Iran as far as India-Israel relations are concerned. Iran has been very much against Israel, both Iran and Israel are strategically important to India. Israel is very important from the military and security perspective whereas Iran is important for the energy supplies. India - Israel - Iran triangle allows India to strategically act as a diplomatic mediator and a dialogue partner as both countries are very important to us. Apart from purchasing critical equipment and participating in R and D projects, there are interactions between the two armed forces. The national security apparatus on internal security, non-proliferation, and other issues, there has been an increase in the trade relationship since the bilateral relations, the top three imports are natural diamonds, electrical machinery, and fertilizers and the two exports from India are mineral fuels and natural diamonds. But still, the trade between the two countries has been limited to a few products only but the countries are negotiating a free trade agreement for increasing this bilateral trade. Cooperation in the agricultural sector has been the most important aspect of the India-Israel relationship as most of the people in India are engaged in the agricultural sector and the Israeli advanced technology will add expertise to the bilateral relationship. The tourist linkages are another significant aspect of bilateral relations; officials from both countries have visited each other's countries to build an understanding of each other's culture. Both countries have cooperated on high technology and water management as well as waste management.

Fatih Kiliç, Aabid M. Sheikh⁵³ in their paper stated that when India Israel's defense alliance is examined, it is seen that this cooperation is very compatible with the theory of offensive realism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, India's largest source of military technology weakened, due to the anarchic nature of the international system the uncertainties about the capabilities of the other states forced India to become a dominant force and it has resulted in to search for ways to increase its military capability to protect oneself or for self-defense. Mearsheimer⁵⁴ assumes that all great powers possess military capabilities and they are capable of using them against other states. The Kashmir issue has not been resolved between India and Pakistan and it has been a bone of contention between the two nations due to which there is a lot of disturbances and turbulence between the relations of the two countries. To control the border crossing India has to set up a surveillance system with Israel and has to become better equipped to counter Pakistan as Pakistan has always been increasing its military capabilities. India is very much aware of Pakistan's nuclear threats as well as of its military capabilities. To keep oneself safe India needs to upgrade its technology and strengthen itself so it can be done with the help of arms trade with Israel. Zahid Ali Khan⁵⁵ states that for India the friendship with Israel would make her more powerful to play an effective role in South Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia with the sole objective to undermine the rising influence of Pakistan in these regions. India and Israel's friendship will be posing a threat to Pakistan as India and Israel's relations are capable of altering global politics, especially in the region of South Asia.

India-Pakistan relations

In all of the sources available, this topic specifically is not highlighted. A huge literature is available mostly on the historical interaction and peace establishment efforts taken by the two countries. A critical analysis of this prospect is not fully discussed. As a result, the consideration of these ideas is taken into account from analyzing the steps and incidents that had happened or are in the stage of occurrence between these two geopolitically complex nation-states.

⁵³ Fatih Kiliç, Aabid M. Sheikh, "India and Israel Defense Relationship in the context of Offensive Realism" *J. S. Asian Studies*. Vol.06, No.02, 2018, pp.93-98.

⁵⁴ John J. Mearsheimer. "The tragedy of Great Power politics" 2001. pp.9-12.

⁵⁵ Zahid Ali Khan, "Development in Indo-Israel Defense Relations Since 9/11: Pakistan's Security Concern and Policy Options", *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* Vol. 26, No. 1, January-June 2011, pp. 131-151,

Stephen P. Cohen⁵⁶ provides a very Eurocentric evaluation of India-Pakistan relations in which the reasons for their constant clash and lack of trust that is created due to their strategically bound geo-political location which has in turn influenced and made South-Asia, a region for the world, or west in the particular matter for mediation. His work emphasizes how the course of interaction of a country with other nations influences its neighbours policies in long run.

Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad and Fahmeda Naheed⁵⁷ on the other hand tried to interpret India-Pakistan relations from a realist perspective. They made a point on how the constant insecurity and fear, mistrust due to various military face-offs and long-standing territorial disputes have further depleted the chance of peace established between the two countries. For them, the persistence of the 'realist' approach to IR in South Asia is something of an anomaly in the modern world and for the two countries to improve their relationship, it will require an end to viewing each other through the prism of realism.

Varun Vaish⁵⁸ covers India-Pakistan relations and traces the reason for the conflict concerning Kashmir. It points out the irredentist claims on Kashmir by Pakistan and the maintenance of the Status Quo by India as a barrier in negotiation. Also, the prospect of territorial gain of Kashmir has become a major basis for continuous mistrust and security dilemma which has eradicated a lot of bilateral efforts made to settle the issue.

Midatala Rani⁵⁹ highlights the role of nuclear power acquisition, its history of development in both countries, and their response to each other's policy concerning external security threats that lead to an arms race in South Asia.

Muhammad Sajid Malik⁶⁰ provides a very 'Pakistan-biased purview' of the whole situation going with India. A very basic bit of Pakistan-centric viewpoint, defying the already facts. His analysis is based on the hypothesis of how third-party mediation has been more successful in resolving issues between the two countries. Here the role of hegemon power or International organization can be traced in an anarchical system.

⁵⁶ S. P. Cohen (1983). Geostrategic Factors in India-Pakistan Relations. *Asian Affairs*, 10 (3), pp.24-31.

⁵⁷ Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad and Fahmeda Naheed. "India-Pakistan Relations in the Prism of 'Realist School of International Relations.'" *Politeja*, No.59, 2019, pp.27-37.

⁵⁸ Varun Vaish. "Negotiating The India-Pakistan Conflict in Relation to Kashmir." *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol.28, No.3, 2011, pp.53-80.

⁵⁹ Midatala Rani. "Nuclear Issue in Indo-Pakistan Relations." *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Vol.68, 2007, pp.1204-14.

⁶⁰ Muhammad Sajid Malik. "Pakistan-India Relations: An Analytical Perspective of Peace Efforts." *Strategic Studies*, Vol.39, No.1. 2019.

Abhinav Pandya⁶¹ elaborates on the post-Pulwama Indo-Pak standoff and its strategic change which is a much more assertive Indian state in response to the terrorist activities of Pakistan-sponsored non-state actors. This affirms the determination that violating the sovereign space of Pakistan and risking a full-fledged war affecting the long-standing bilateral agreements incurring sanctions along with the issue of Kashmir will have strong international ramifications.

K. Shankar Bajpai⁶² highlights the issue of terrorism and skirmishes that affects the scope of peace which will pump the already frustrated India to be left with few options short of full-scale war. India is not having any liberal attitude towards terrorism and this will likely be a reason for continued disturbance and instability. Even internal conflict in India and growing extremism will also be affecting India's policy outlook in terms of Pakistan.

M.V Naidu⁶³ provides a detailed account of the Kashmir conflict, quite descriptively and explained the whole course of action from the purview of cold war diplomacy specifically and how it has also contributed to the current positively of this issue. It also emphasizes the importance of civilian rule and democratization in Pakistan as the work is framed within 2000.

Muhammad Imran Mehsud⁶⁴ highlights the aspects of realism that are still supreme in explaining relations between India and Pakistan over the liberal ideas of democratic peace thesis, trade brings peace thesis, complex interdependence, etc.

Khan⁶⁵ describes the history, objectives, principles, factors, and determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy. The author highlights the Indian factor as a major determinant of Pakistan's foreign policy. The paper covers almost all aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy towards India but it lacks recent developments in bilateral relations between India and Pakistan.

Basrur⁶⁶ evaluates changes in the principles of Indian foreign policy during the Modi regime. His study shows that there is no important change in the use of power derived from the

⁶¹ Abhinav Pandya. "The Future of Indo-Pak Relations after the Pulwama Attack." *Perspectives on Terrorism*. April 2019, Vol. 13 Issue 2, pp.65-68.

⁶² K. Shankar Bajpai. "Untangling India and Pakistan." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No.3, 2003, pp.112-26.

⁶³ M. V Naidu. "The Kashmir Dispute and India-Pakistan Relations: The Untold Story of Cold War Diplomacy." *Peace Research*, Vol.32, No.2, 2000, pp.1-30.

⁶⁴ M. I. Mehsud. "Liberalism in India-Pakistan Relations: a critique of realism." *Cambridge Journal of China Studies*, 2017, 12 (1).

⁶⁵ Adnan Sarwar Khan. "Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changing International Scenario." *The Muslim World*, Vol.96, Issue 2, April 2006, pp.233-250.

⁶⁶ Rajesh Basrur. "Modi's foreign policy fundamentals: a trajectory unchanged," *International Affairs*, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 January 2017, pp.7-26.

“Hindu” context in Modi’s foreign policy and no substantial change as a whole and future India is likely to remain foreseeable and moderate.

Ganguly⁶⁷ analyzed India’s foreign policy from its inception to its current phase in globalization. He categorized it in periods of a gradual shift from early idealism to the adoption of an increasingly “self-help” approach retaining few elements of Nehruvian rhetoric and finally a more pragmatic & closely related to the principles of realism. The article did not much touch upon Pakistan & its role in framing India’s foreign policy.

Zahid Ali Khan⁶⁸ assessed the increased India-Israel partnership as a means of India’s foreign policy to counter Pakistan’s position in South Asia. The enemy’s enemy is a friend, this show how alliances in an anarchic system maintain the balance of power.

Wardah Gull, Muhammad Ali, Asma Khan⁶⁹ covers the India-Pakistan relation and foreign policy in the light of globalization concluding how in the current global context India Pakistan foreign policies are not solely idealist or realist but rather work on situations and conditions. What the article lacks was proper analysis s it includes so much that the actual essence was lost.

E. Sridharan⁷⁰ described how the deterrence theory and other major theories of International Relations do not explain the dynamics of India-Pakistan relations and stressed Muhammad Ayoob’s subaltern realism in justifying the cause of conflict between the two nations. Though his ideas are unique, they should be expressed in a more comprehensible manner.

India-ASEAN Relations

Chietigj Bajpae has ‘depahased’ i.e., divided India’s Look East/Act East Policy into several phases with an attempt to classify the developments in the relations between India and ASEAN from the early 1990s to the Modi years. The first phase corresponds with the Congress years of the 1990s, particularly during the tenure of PM Narasimha Rao. The second phase is marked

⁶⁷Sumit Ganguly. *India’s foreign policy: Retrospect and prospect*. Oxford University Press: New Delhi.2009.

⁶⁸ Zahid Ali Khan. Development in Indo-Israel Defence Relations Since 9/11: Pakistan’s Security Concern and Policy Options. *South Asian Studies A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* Vol.26, No.1, January-June 2011, pp.131-151.

⁶⁹ Wardah Gull, Muhammad Ali, Asma Khan. “Competitive analysis of foreign policies of India and Pakistan impact of globalization.” *Sadiq Journal of Pakistan Studies*. SJPS) Vol.1, No.2, (July-Dec. 2021).

⁷⁰ E. Sridharan. “International Relations Theory and the India–Pakistan Conflict.” *India Review*, 16 Feb 2007, pp.103-124.

by the developments in the early 2000s under the BJP government of PM Vajpayee. It continued under the subsequent Manmohan Singh government and was finally rebranded as the Act East Policy under the BJP government of PM Modi. Bajpae has provided an in-depth study of the evolution of India's approach towards ASEAN nations over the past couple of decades and has highlighted various watershed moments that define the shifts in the approach and policies from both ends. Later, he provided us with perspectives from economic, defense, and geo-political viewpoints which highlight the realist tilt of India's ASEAN foreign policy.

Caballero-Anthony⁷¹ analyses the strategic importance of India to ASEAN and identifies the mixed views and ambiguities within the relations between the two. Ajaya Kumar Das⁷² (2019) analyses Indi- ASEAN relations in terms of the concepts of soft power which is an important concept in realism (hard and soft power). Das assesses India's soft power projections in the region and how well they have fared for India in terms of improvement of its relations with ASEAN.

M. Ganapathi⁷³ gives an account of India's cultural imprint on the region and highlights the soft power components of India's approach towards the region. Shared culture and history and mutual beliefs hint towards the long-existing idealist policy components in the relations between the two. Thongkhohal Haokip⁷⁴ traces the evolution of India's Look East Policy by keeping in account India's domestic and regional environment, and its political compulsions for rethinking its engagement with Southeast Asian countries. The idealist conceptions of a conflict-free region and cooperation on shared issues were the defining characteristic of India's engagement with the region for much of our recent history. However, there was an observable shift in this approach from 1991 onwards which he describes in detail.

Vinay Kaura⁷⁵ presents a strong case for the need for India to step up its geopolitical game in the Southeast Asian region by being a part of the QUAD and the larger Indo-Pacific discourse. He highlights the importance of such moves while reflecting on the rise of China at a global level and especially in the Southeast Asian region. He provides a comprehensive

⁷¹ Mely Caballero-Anthony. 2013. 'Asean's Strategic Perspectives of India'. in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*. Ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

⁷² Ajaya Kumar Das. 2013. "Introduction." in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*. Ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

⁷³ M. Ganapathi. 2019. 'Act East in India's Foreign Policy: India-ASEAN Relations'. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 14 (3): pp.195–206.

⁷⁴ Thongkhohal Haokip. 2011. 'India's Look East Policy: Its Evolution and Approach'. *South Asian Survey* 18 (2): pp.239–57

⁷⁵ Vinay Kaura. 2019. "Incorporating Indo-Pacific and the Quadrilateral into India's Strategic Outlook." *Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India* 15 (2): pp.78-102.

account of the origins of the QUAD in 2007 to its revival in 2012 and the developments up until 2019. Kaura also provides insight into the apprehensions that ASEAN has with the minilateral grouping and how it is trying to underscore its centrality and relevance.

C Raja Mohan⁷⁶ in his detailed analysis of India's role in Southeast Asian security notes India's initial reluctance to engage in southeast Asia's security issues with China to not provoke the already hostile neighbour. From the 1950s onwards several treaties of friendship and cooperation have been signed between India and South East Asian countries with provisions for defence consultations. India also supported Vietnam in its conflict with Cambodia, albeit under pressure from the USSR. From a realist perspective, defence ties were not a priority for both India and ASEAN for a very long time as India had accumulated a lot of mistrust during the cold war years due to its proximity to the USSR.

⁷⁶ C. Raja. Mohan. 2013. "An Uncertain Trumpet?: India's Role In Southeast Asian Security." In *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*. Ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Chapter-I: Sustained Fides? The pertinence between India and Russia

Jayita Pal

“Every Child in India knows that Russia is our Best Friend.” - Mr. Narendra Modi.

Idealist Perspective

Nehru was an idealist and by his policy of NAM chose to maintain friendly ties with both parties in the cold war. Nehru also had a bias to develop a scientific rationale for the newly independent nation. Russia was one of the first nations to aid in developing various PSUs and help India with military equipment advancements. Nehru sympathized with the planning model of the USSR; hence, he adopted FYPs as a model of development in the initial years of development. Though Stalin was not a big fan of NAM and Nehru's decision of being part of the commonwealth countries.

Ideally, it must be acknowledged that Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) has provided us with the crucial political, economic, military, and moral support needed to put India on the way to economic prosperity and political and military strength. The most prominent of these sectors was the military where the Soviets had a share of 75 percent of the total army hardware possessed by India till 1991. Though it cannot be guaranteed that it will remain in the same way as there have been apprehensions that Israel might soon take over as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India in a few years. Also, the budding relationship with the US might see a de-escalation in the stable relationship with Russia.

R.V.R Chandrasekhara Rao mentioned the joint commission on economics, scientific and technological cooperation in New Delhi in 1973, inspired by the treaty of friendship between both parties, one of the reasons for this treatment towards India was its policy of socialism, though India had adopted for a mixed economy certain domestic development have led to Russia consider us as states with the goal of “socialist transformation of the society.” This justifies the difference between Russia's strong relationship with China, given its loyalty towards communism and state capitalism, and comparatively lesser strong ties with India since it has the potential to transform itself into a socialist nation.

The NAM policy has cost us an eye of suspicion in Stalin's time when any non-communist state was considered to be anti-socialist. But later Khrushchev regarded many of the

third-world countries that have adopted mixed economies, as gradually moving towards socialism.

Realist Perspective

Realpolitik is governed by rational decision-making and the relationship between both countries is also based on a loyalty exchange basis. As Badrul Alam mentions that USSR has always advocated India's permanent position in the United Nations security council and also to make India a part of NSG, India has reciprocated by silently supporting Russia in the Afghanistan issue and certain other invasions. In contemporary times during the Ukraine conflict, India chose to abstain from voting against Russia, owing to the longstanding partnership, especially in science. Also, Archana Upadhyay states in her article that while Russia has maintained that Kashmir is an internal issue of India and shared an understanding over it, India has reciprocated the same on the issue of Crimea and Chechnya. Both the countries have made joint statements on the issues of Kashmir and Chechnya where it has been met that "the violent movements of the self-determination being waged in both of the regions are acts of terrorism and demanded an end to 'cross border terrorism'".

On Russia's side due to friction with the west and opposition to the massive authority of the US over the UN, its look east policy was to co-opt with India and China in a *strategic triangle* to form a new thrust. The Strategic Partnership was all-encompassing the sectors of economic, and cultural scientific cooperation along with defense and geostrategy as part of an understanding of security partnership. This furthermore broadened the concept of security and balanced the earlier relations that gave primacy to defense-related security. (2001)

Both countries have largely united in terms of opinion on limiting American influence in South East Asia and the Indian Ocean region. On the Indian side, the only option to counter Chinese influence in its territory is to match technology and Russia is a key player in that sector. Nirmala Joshi highlights that (Narsimha Rao in Russia 1994) terrorism, drug trafficking, and the illicit trade of small weapons were reasons for the signing of the Collective security treaty. The common goal of creating a multipolar world to maintain arch stability has endured their association.

Economic Realism? "Mutual investments between Russia and India currently average around 11 billion dollars and both sides have targeted to increase them to 30-50 billion dollars

by 2025. However, Russia's deteriorating ties with west India may soon be “upgraded” in Russia’s investment “priority list”, which is of long-term benefit to India given its not-so-friendly relationships with its immediate neighbors. The Chelyabinsk oblast region is ready to initiate a joint venture in the field of agro-business. The region is self-sufficient in terms of food security and Russia seeks reciprocation in terms of investment as part of its agricultural production could be exported to India. It can serve as a long-term tie between Moscow and New Delhi. India is also highly dependent upon Russia for the sustenance of its “hospitality industry” or tourism. In return for it, India has been invited to invest in infrastructure projects, agro-industrial clusters, the pharmaceutical industry, and shipbuilding in Crimea. All of this can be linked to strengthening the strategic autonomy in the world system of both Russia and India.

Russia speculates on India’s emancipated rise in the global domain, on which it is no longer dependent. Hence the strategic partnership declaration between both parties in 2000 is a thoughtful move to nurture space diplomacy, nuclear diplomacy, energy security, military diplomacy, and currency arrangements. India also has been quite active in the development of the far eastern region of Russia, in 2019 it extended a 1 billion \$ concessional loan. It suggests India’s shoulder-to-shoulder approach while maintaining its foreign policy.

On the whole, one can state that states' actions are often led by their interests as mentioned by Kenneth Waltz and there has been a concurrence of interest between India and Russia on issues concerning multi-polarity in the International System, combatting terrorism, and certain territorial disputes which are discussed in international forums. The relevance of relations spreads across the Military sector, economics which includes trade and investments, People to people ties which concern the cultural aspect of the relationship, and the field of science and technology. Out of these, the military sector has been the most prominent one till 1991 and has seen a slight decline since then which suggests India’s Realist stand as they cannot compromise on technology especially when it comes to defense. The friendship between India and Russia has stood the test of time and has been mostly stable due to mutual concerns and wants and it is still relevant on the issues of Terrorism and a strict stance on “cross border terrorism”.

The Inception of ties

Pre-Independence Era

Historically, the relations between the two nations go back to the epics of Ramayana, The Volga- Ganga relations date back to the 1500s. The India- Russia Relations go back to the pre-independence era when many communists in India like MN Roy who had links with the USSR led to the ideas like labor rights, socialism, and revolution in the thinking of leaders like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. In response to the developments in USSR, Jawaharlal Nehru said that “It was a victory of self-confidence, the faith, the self-sacrifice and the unflinching determination of the Russian people.” It is an undeniable fact that the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 led to India’s leaning toward Socialism and Marxism. In that era, both sides, the British empire, and the Tsarists viewed each other with mutual suspicion and due to that Afghanistan became a buffer state for both parties, the British Government in India and USSR. Also, there has been a significant role played by Russian ideas of revolution and freedom struggle on India’s Constitution, the relation between the Hindu culture and the history of socialism on family redistributive justice, and the idea of the mind being an institution.

Post-Independence Era

Soon after Independence India was inclined toward NAM (Non-Alignment Movement), and under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, the world order became bipolar. The Stalin period saw India with close suspicion and scrutiny. After the demise of Stalin, the engagements were more progressive and fruitful. The relations between the two countries after 1953, became more symbiotic as India criticized the US for the Korean war and supported China’s seat to enter UNO. Another development was Pakistan’s alliance with the US in SEATO (1954). India adopted a way toward defence modernization which was the need of the hour given the potential threat from the China-Pakistan Axis. Even in the 1970s when there was a tilt of China toward the US after the meet-up of Mao and Henry Kissinger, this action led to the signing of the 20-year treaty of friendship between India and Russia in 1971 under the leadership of Indira Gandhi.

After the disintegration of the USSR, Boris Yeltsin’s visit to India was with concluding the treaty of friendship. Later both countries vowed to fight against the Taliban which has become a global threat. India further signed a strategic partnership with Russia in 2000 which now

elevated to a special and strategic partnership in 2010. The leadership of Putin has led to a strong sustained bond with India and the mutual stand on Kashmir is an internal issue of India, India abstaining from the vote against Russia in United Nations is a clear depiction of the realist dimension of seeing “only partners in Central Asia” as neo- relations in the world order are based on common interest and balance of power. Also, the friendship of India and Russia was motivated by the USSR’s desire to use India as a counterweight to China and US and hence cannot be considered permanent.

Role of leadership and fluctuating interests

Interests- Defence, Strategic, Energy, and Space

The Relationship encompasses various domains like space diplomacy, nuclear diplomacy, military diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and defence equipment diplomacy. The interests are historical, economic, geopolitical, security-related, territory related, and cultural. To speak of the strategic importance of Russia to India is Russia’s permanent seat in UN Security Council. And for a long time, India has imported military hardware and types of equipment from Russia be it for counterbalancing Pakistan or China. Russia has been a time-tested friend by backing India on the Kashmir Issue and also it supports India’s bid to get a permanent seat in UNSC, and inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In terms of trade, Russian territory provides easy transport and communication to regions with resources like Gas and Uranium.

Through technology transfers and joint research and development, Russia is India’s most favorable defence partner as it sources the material technologies in a much easier manner than the USA. Reversible, India is a great market for defence equipment, given its hostile neighborhood and alliance in fighting global terrorism. Also, with the numerous conflicts with nations like the USA, Japan, and countries in Europe, relying on a sole neighbor China may prove to be childish hence the cooperation of India is an important task for Russia. The geopolitical location of India and India’s engagement in the Indo-pacific along with the USA acts as a motivating factor for Russia to keep itself with India and not be isolated from the region.

Areas of Cooperation- Political, Economic, Cultural, Defence, Terrorism, cyber threats, Technology (Space and Nuclear)

India and Russia have enjoyed a friction-free relationship with a realist dominant bilateral relationship between the two sides but with little evolution of sustenance of the relation. Politically, joint statements have been issued on “Partnership for Global Peace and Stability” during the bilateral 17th Annual summit.

Economically, Russian investments in India account for about 16 billion USD whereas Indian investments in Russia account for 13 billion USD. Also, the major import items are defence use and nuclear energy use. From a cultural angle, student exchange programs often take place between both countries and also joint science and research programs funded by the government, and India receives the highest number of foreign tourists from Russia. India’s cemented defence relations with Russia have evolved from a simple trade relation to incoherent joint development and research relation. The Brahmos Missile, a fifth-generation aircraft, SU-30 Aircraft, and T-90 tanks are examples of cooperation. Karnov226T has also become one of the first joint projects between the two countries under the “Make in India” Programme. They also signed up for a joint venture in Amethi, Uttar Pradesh for manufacturing 6 lakhs of AK-203 rifles.

Recently (2021), the two countries signed an agreement for cooperation on military technology from 2021-2030 and also the “India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation.” The subset of the association includes military relations, economics, people-to-people, Science (to cooperate in the health sector, atomic projects, hydrocarbons), and technological relations. There has been a vibrant trade and commerce relation in the defense sector, space sector (GLONASS, INSAT), creation of smart cities, and also for energy efficiency. (Majorly due to helping India with developing Nuclear Technology)

Leadership

During Krushchev’s leadership, the Russian relationship with China was strained as he stood neutral in the Sino-India border conflict in 1962. Khrushchev stood with India on one of the principles under Nehru’s Panchsheel, which was mutual non-interference and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, by calling Kashmir India’s internal issue and also India’s claim over the Goan territory. It was in 1962 itself that the Soviet Union decided to

make a technology transfer to India in the wake of the war of Mikoyan-Gurevich MIG 21 fighter jets.

Leonid Brezhnev had a career spanning over two decades and one of his biggest achievements was the treaty of Friendship for twenty years signed in 1971. His doctrine stated that it was the right of the USSR to interfere in the socialist states, which was very orthodox. The treaty of 1971 proved to be essential for India when India engaged in a conflict with Pakistan in the liberation war of Bangladesh.

Mikhail Gorbachev was a staunch supporter of strong ties between the two countries. “The meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev was seen by the US and the west as an event of global magnitude.” He was the last leader of the former Soviet Union later after the disintegration Boris Yeltsin came to power. Even then the relations between India and Russia maintained stability even though Russia was internally suffering from a ruin of the economy. It was during Gorbachev’s tenure that the foreign policy of Russia took a massive turn by formally engaging in the globalized world.

Yeltsin was the first leader of the Russian Federation; his main intention was to integrate the Russian economy with the western economy. He pushed forward his agenda of making Russia a liberalized economy. It was around the same time India too started liberalizing its economy with the LPG Policies.

Idealist Proclivity

Nehru is also known as the chief architect of the Indian foreign policy, the context in which India designed its foreign policy was in the wake of Independence, prevailing poverty, and widespread hunger in the country. India’s hard-earned independence was revered by the idea of non-alignment. Though he reaffirmed that “wherever freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be silent.” Nehru imposed heavy faith on the UN. The Indian idea of non-alignment was to ensure we keep our interests first and refrain from edging on either side as we were already an underdeveloped nation. The inception of India- Russia ties goes back to 1955 when Nehru made a visit to the Soviet Union and it was marked by a return visit by Khrushchev. Before him, Stalin viewed Gandhi, Congress, and Nehru in a skeptical manner considering them to be tools of British capitalism.

The brief period of Lal Bahadur Shastri was marked by a slight inclination towards the USSR. It was in 1965 when India was engaged in a confrontation with Pakistan which was when Russia helped India with military hardware while the US was aiding Pakistan. Also, it was important for India then to improve or fasten its ties with Russia since the increasing partnership between China and Pakistan was aimed at isolating India from the region. It can be inferred from his doctrine that the first realist action was taken by Shastri Ji by putting our national interest first and seeking aid but by maintaining a safe distance by not formally picking up sides.

Realist Proclivity

Indira Gandhi assumed power soon after the demise of Lal Bahadur Shastri and though she was on the path of non-alignment, her idea of it was more realistic than an idealist. Her foreign policy aimed toward regaining India's lost position in the world. It was during her tenure India fought the Bangladeshi war of liberation and successfully registered a win with slight help from Russia. She played a remarkable role in the international arena and aided in the strengthening of the relationship with the Soviet Union. Various domestic policies of Indira Gandhi which aimed toward establishing a socialistic pattern in society impressed USSR and that led to the signing of the treaty of friendship for 20 years. The Soviet Union played a huge role in the growth of India's economy by becoming the second-largest purchaser of Indian goods and helping India establish heavy industries. Indo-Soviet relations were also very significant in the fields of technology, science, and trade.

Rajiv Gandhi conducted one of the best relationships with the USSR, and numerous efforts were made to strengthen SAARC. Rajiv Gandhi strongly voiced concern for keeping the Indian Ocean region out of conflict and making it an arena of peace, stability, and cooperation and insulating itself from the cold war situation. It was a strong statement against the infiltration of the US into the Indian Ocean region. Narasimha Rao 1991 introduced the LPG reforms in the country. There were wide-ranging impacts even on the foreign policy of India. It was a tough time for India since it was the same year of the disintegration of the USSR, which has been the biggest exporter of arms and technology, spare parts, which has acted as a diplomatic state on the issue of Kashmir and was of geo-strategic importance to India. Due to the newly unipolar world order, Indian Foreign Policy became more multi-

aligned as India started engaging with the US on a greater scale since it had to adapt to the globalized world. 123 Agreement with the US was signed which was a nuclear deal when before major nuclear deals were being made with the Soviet Union. Now India started engaging not just with the big powers but also with small regional powers and neighbors.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his Economic Diplomacy helped India establish stronger relations with India. He has a muscular realist foreign policy. India opposed the international treaties of nuclear non-proliferation as they were very discriminative, thus India formally criticized the CTBT and NPT. India conducted its nuclear test which was rewarded by sanctions from the US, but Russia still supported India on this. Manmohan Singh was welcomed by an era of the more outgoing and friendly foreign policy of India, there was a strengthening of ties in terms of the military sector, and missile and aircraft purchases. Russia also decided to strengthen India's Nuclear policy by giving four more nuclear reactors in Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu. Indo-Russian Relations improved to a great level.

International Regime and sustained allegiance

BRICS, RIC, SCO, 2+2 Dialogues

BRICS is a platform that brings out Russia and India as dedicated partners on issues of trade and investment, infrastructure, energy security, clean energy, terrorism, and others. Ethekwani Declaration is one of the approaches toward good governance. The declaration was much in favor of India as it called for a reorganization of the UNSC structure and supported India's aspiration of being a larger player in international politics and the UN in particular. RIC, Includes China and that makes the countries share common interests in the issues like economic globalization but are dedicated to protecting their domestic markets or reconciliation of regional demands. As the world economic order has been shifting due to the rise of China, the region of Asia Pacific is emerging as a hotspot for international influence and India's location could prove to be beneficial for both countries.

Russia can be accredited for India being a part of SCO, which was essential for regional political dynamics. India became its full-time member and Russia is using India as a counter-China, strategic partner in the Eurasian region. India coming into the organization makes it more inclusive and challenges the dominance of China in decision-making. Again, it involves issues like terrorism and India successfully participated in a military exercise called

“Peace Mission 2018” which was conducted in Russia for the same. The external affairs official and defence officials of top order discuss matters of bilateral cooperation. It is not unique to Russia but it is a clear indication of the changing Indian political narrative which says that there are no permanent partners but only permanent interests and India’s dedication toward multi-alignment.

United Nations - Issues and Support

Russia and India share a symbiotic relationship when it is about to give and take support on the international stage. Russia has always believed that Kashmir is India’s internal issue and similar is the position of India on Russian territorial disputes in the Crimea region and Chechnya region. Russia has always backed India in the United Nations and also advocated for India to get a permanent seat in the UNSC. Though the purpose is two away since Russia sees India as a China counterbalancing power and emerging world power. India has maintained that peace must be restored but abstained from voting on any resolution against Russia.

Russia’s Aggression towards Ukraine and India’s Position

In the recent developments following its expansionist policy, Russia, engaged in a territorial conflict with Ukraine. The Conflict has proven to be fatal to the global economy pushing USA's inflation rate soaring to 9.1% and the economic sanctions against Russia. The Indian economy faces similar inflation with the consumer price index making commodities expensive, at a time when the young economies are already recovering from the hit caused due to the pandemic. India’s decision to abstain from voting against Russia in the UNSC is not a disagreement with peace but rather a clear signature move from the Muscular Foreign Policy.

Geo-Political Relevance in contemporary times

High-level interactions in the fields of Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC- TEC)

It is one of the apex forums Government to Government (G2G) for reviewing sector-wise economic cooperation. There are others such as business councils, trade councils, investment windows, and channels to promote the technology. There has been an India-Russia business dialogue, a chamber of commerce with a special focus on the MSME sector to build up

business ties. In June 2015, there has been a St. Petersburg International Economic Forum where India was a signatory to a joint statement to study Free trade agreements between India and Eurasian Economic Union.

Other Meetings on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC- MTC)

The Intergovernmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation was signed during the seventeenth meeting which took place between the two parties in June 2017. The meeting concluded with a basic document of contacts as India moves forward as a leading defence importer of military hardware with a slight heavy dependence on Russia. It was a high-level meeting with the top defence ministers and working groups and subgroups.

Idealist intention and Realist actions? A way forward.

Idealistic are only intentions and Realist are the actions. Narendra Modi came to power in 2014 after a massive win. “India First” was one of the major highlights of his foreign policy. The main ingredients were partnership, realism, and co-existence. His idea of it was multi-alignment from Non-alignment. It was guided by the principle of Vasudhaiv Kutumbkam. India started to look toward its core interests and guided its action with them. The time-tested ties between India and Russia can be judged from the “very clear support” of Russia on the Article 370 abrogation and India's abstaining to vote on any resolution against Russia in the UN.

Expansionist Foreign Policy, the future?

S Jaishankar, the current External Affairs Minister of India, in his book “The India Way”, mentions that India has started keeping its national interest at the core of its foreign policy. That is how it is been since 2014 since Narendra Modi came to power, there were high-level visits to various countries which aimed at establishing relations outside of the Asian subcontinent. A slight Hindu touch was given with the establishment of Yoga on the global stage which was portrayed as a Hindu practice rather than a national one. India has continued to maintain brotherly relationships with Russia and a lot has been achieved with the continued loyalty but India securely shifted to multi-alignment by not upsetting Russia.

Putin is one of the strongest leaders globally and has been since the inception of his tenure. The relations between him and his Indian counterpart have been sailing well. India becoming a permanent part of SCO is an outcome of great diplomacy by Russia. Also, Russia

investment in energy security mechanisms in India and support in India to be a part of NSG has been the achievement of their relations. Though under Putin, Russia is under an expansionist policy that seeks to expand in terms of territory, thus Russia expects sanctions and no economy can survive in total isolation in the globalized world, hence a huge market like India may prove to be very beneficial to Russia.

Chapter II: Strategic Culture and Geopolitics Dynamics in India-China Foreign Policy Debate

Sandra Thachirickal Prathap

Introduction

From close cultural and economic partners in the ancient and pre-independence period to Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai, to Enemy No.1, Indo-Sino relations have dramatically transformed over time. Although it is quite difficult to divide the India-China relationship into watertight compartments of idealist and realist foreign policy, one can observe significant trends in the process of transition from the Idealist phase until the Nehruvian era to the post-Nehruvian Realist Phase.

These transitions have greatly been influenced by the strategic culture of both nations in response to the ever-evolving geopolitical dynamics in the world, especially the South Asian region. Through this chapter, an effort is made to trace the trajectory of this transformation and to understand the relevance of strategic culture in determining the future of the two most competitive nations, to tackle the situations in this changing geopolitical space.

Historical and Cultural Overview

‘The wise win before the fight, while the ignorant fight to win’
– Zhuge Liang

History and geography force India-China relations to contend with multiple realities: those of the distant past and the recent past, modern history and contemporary politics, their twin but disparate rises, and the future. This was the era of the true Silk Road, which was interconnected, pluralistic, and mutually beneficial. It took various routes that connected the two civilizations' heartlands, and its driving force was a powerful combination of ideas and trade. Buddhism was the vehicle that carried many passengers to the benefit of all the stops along the routes for much of this period.

Kuche and Khotan in today's Xinjiang were the hubs of a flow from India that reached the very center of China then. Kashmir was initially the focal point for shared knowledge and later paved the way for the great university of Nalanda. While this was the main artery between

India and China, it was not the only one. The valleys of Brahmaputra, Chindwin, and Irrawaddy were eastern connections and the chronicles of the explorer Zhang Qian testify to a Southern Silk Road that led from Sichuan to India. There was also a sea route, first through Tonkin and then to Canton, that connected directly from peninsular India. The presence of Indian temples as far east as the Fujian coast opposite Taiwan underlines how pervasive our contacts were with China.

This deep cultural association is reflected vividly in key cultural sites of China such as the Dunhuang Caves or the White Horse Temple in Luoyang. The tradition of contacts naturally had human expressions – from those like the monks Kasyapamatanga and Dharmaraksha who brought scriptures to Luoyang, to Kumarajiva who introduced many Buddhist texts into Chinese, and Dammo/Bodhidharma who is associated with the Shaolin tradition. That the two most famous Chinese travelers in history - Fa Xian and Xuan Zang - both came to India and speak of its salient place in ancient China.

With the steep decrease in the importance of Buddhism-inspired foreign Chinese trade and cultural contact with India via the Silk Road came a shift to a strictly commercial orientation of the exchanges. It came with a move from light-weight luxury goods such as China and India pre-1939 as silk and precious stones for the adornment of Buddhist sites (Liu 1996) to bulkier commercial goods such as Chinese stoneware and the new porcelain or Indian cotton for which the maritime route west from Quanzhou and Guangzhou in China's south was more suitable. The shift to a more strictly commercial orientation had been completed by the eleventh century. Characterized by a symmetry of exchanges, it connected all maritime parts of Eurasia and North Africa into an international maritime trade route with three overlapping trade networks. Their centres were in East and Southeast Asia, South Asia, and North Africa as well as the Middle East, respectively, from where land routes would also lead to Europe.

The near past initially held out some hope, expressed by the great scholar P.C. Bagchi, that the experiences of the Second World War would bring together the two peoples who had almost forgotten their common past. Interestingly, the Chinese elite after 1949 was quite conversant with this history with India. Yet, anti-colonial feelings did lead to strong and persistent advocacy of Indian independence by China's leadership of that period. It went to the extent of vitiating their relationship with the British, especially with Winston Churchill. The

role played by India as a rear base during the Second World War and the supply lifeline over the Himalayas enhanced this sense of affinity.

The afterglow of independence, which laid the groundwork for a Third World and lit up the Bandung Conference, was the pinnacle of this period. This narrative lasted a decade because it was politically advantageous for both countries to project a brotherhood. Its anti-imperialist message fit in with the Afro-Asian solidarity promoted by the 1955 conference to strengthen its position about the West. A shared sense of history contributed to close collaboration in international forums, as well as India standing up for China against the West. Its steadfast support for PRC representation at the UN was notable, especially given China's subsequent lack of reciprocal support for India's permanent membership in the Security Council. India served China well in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the Indian Ambassador in Beijing warned the Americans that China was preparing to enter the Korean War. Indian positions in global negotiations, such as the Japanese Peace Treaty, revealed its calculations toward China.

Idealist Foundation: Post-Independence Nehruvian Era

The period from 1947, when India became independent, (1947-1964, when Jawaharlal Nehru died is marked in modern Indian history as the 'Nehru era'. Nehru's era was a crucial period in the history of Sino-Indian relations, during which Sino-Indian relations underwent a tortuous course marked with dramatic ups and downs. Chinese scholars usually divide this tortuous course into two main stages: The Friendship Stage (1947-58) and the Hostility Stage (1959-64). The Friendship Stage is further divided into the Initiation Phase (1947-53) and Honeymoon Phase (1954-58). The Initiation Phase witnessed the beginnings of friendship between India and China over several major historic events and issues.⁷⁷

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the new government requested UN to remove the representation of the Guomindang government in Taiwan from the UN immediately and admit PRC in its place. Since then, India had consistently supported the admission of the PRC into the UN. In the Indian Parliament, year after year, Nehru reaffirmed his government's stand that the seat of China, a founder member of the UN and a permanent member of the Security Council, should legitimately go to the PRC, as Taiwan constituted only

⁷⁷ Sino-Indian Friendship in the Nehru Era: A Chinese Perspective Shang Quany

a small territory of China. Meanwhile, Nehru and the Indian government took the opportunity to make the same voice heard in the UN.

During the Korean crisis (1950-53), Nehru and the Indian government took a just stand and lent support to the PRC, which strengthened the Sino-Indian friendship (Zhao 2000: 35). From the very beginning, India tried to use whatever influence it had to solve the Korean crisis in cooperation with China. When the UN passed the resolution in favor of crossing the 38th Parallel, India opposed it and warned the US that any advance across the parallel dividing North and South Korea might lead to China's entry into the war. When PRC actually intervened in the Korean War in opposition to the UN forces and drove them back, India opposed the UN resolution branding China as an 'aggressor'. When the Korean war ended in 1953, at the insistence of China, India was made the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. India's support to China and her role as a mediator in the Korean crisis were generally welcomed and appreciated.

Despite some early dissension and controversy over certain issues, Sino-Indian relations continued to progress cordially and culminated in friendly exchanges. On 1 January 1951, the first rice-jute barter agreement was signed between India and China by which the latter agreed to supply 50,000 tons of rice to the former, who in turn would supply 16,500 packs of jute. Beginning with this trade contract, an extensive friendly relationship was established between the two countries. Several Indo-China Friendship Associations were set up in both countries and many cultural and other goodwill delegations were exchanged. The Honeymoon Phase (1954-58) witnessed high points of Sino-Indian friendship in Nehru's era over many national, regional, and international issues.

As early as 1950 when China asserted its authority over Tibet by military action, Nehru, despite the clamor of the press and the politicians in India, avoided a confrontation with China on this issue and accepted China's suzerainty over Tibet. In April 1954, after negotiation, China and India signed the famous agreement, 'The Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India'. Under this agreement, and the notes exchanged between the representatives of the two countries, India agreed to relinquish all her extra-territorial rights in Tibet as the inheritor of British treaty rights and recognized Tibet as an autonomous region of China Tibet Agreement or Panchsheel

Agreement, a political rather than trade pact, marked the beginning of a new phase in the Sino-Indian relations, i.e., the Sino-Indian Honeymoon.

With the end of World War II, France invaded Indochina, i.e., Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, attempting to reassert its colonial rule, which threatened peace in Asia. In April-July 1954, an international conference was held in Geneva to restore peace in Indochina. China and India-the former was an official participant in the Geneva Conference while the latter was not-supported and cooperated in helping solve the Indochina issue. As early as 24 April 1954, Nehru made a declaration, putting forward a solution to the Indochina issue. China lent support to Nehru's declaration by publishing the whole text in the People's Daily and speaking highly of it in a special editorial. The support and cooperation of China and India in the Indochina issue promoted Sino-Indian friendship and enhanced its position in the world.

In April 1955, the first Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia. This was another important international conference, following the Geneva Conference, in which the PRC participated and was marked by the mutual support and cooperation of China and India. It was because of the insistence of Nehru, along with Prime Minister U Nu of Burma, that China was invited to participate in the conference. Nehru and Zhou shared similar views on many matters Zhou Enlai supported Nehru's idea of putting the five principles of peaceful co-existence in the conference communiqué. Finally, under the concerted efforts of Nehru and Zhou and other delegations, a final communiqué was passed, including the Declaration of the Ten Principles that endorsed Panchsheel.

On the Taiwan and Goa questions, China and India mutually supported each other. As far back as 1949, the PRC had declared its determination to liberate Taiwan occupied by the Guomindang government and other off-shore islands. In 1954, the US entered into a mutual security pact with Taiwan and openly declared its intention to protect Taiwan and other off-shore islands. From the very beginning, Nehru lent support to the PRC on the Taiwan question. India consistently refused to accept the concept of two Chinas and never accorded recognition to the Guomindang government of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. China, on its part, supported India's right to liberate Goa, if necessary, by force. As far back as 1950, backed by the US, Portugal refused to continue talks with India on the Goa question and declared Goa as an integral part of Portugal.

During the Honeymoon Phase, the mutual visits of high-ranking leaders of India and China were very frequent and the cheers of 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai' were heard here and there. Zhou Enlai visited India twice and stopped by India four times from 1954-1957. Nehru made a return visit to China in October 1954. Being the first foreign head who had been received by the PRC, Nehru was accorded an overwhelming welcome wherever he went during his 12-day visit. In addition to the frequent mutual visits of high-ranking leaders of India and China, the official and unofficial exchanges between China and India became increasingly extensive and intensive. all, in the early Nehru era, Sino-Indian relations were characterized by friendship and cordiality that started from an initial friendship and evolved into a honeymoon and covered both bilateral and regional, and international issues, involving mutual support and cooperation. This phase reflected the idealist foundation and nationalist priorities that existed then.

Realist Turn: Post-1962 War

The Kongka La Pass incident of October 1959 became the turning point in India- China relations and was engineered by B.N. Mullick. This incident as explained by Mullik marked the end of the period of friendship between India and China, though he was accused by the External Affairs Ministry and Intelligence Bureau of 'Aggression' and 'expansionism'.⁷⁸ The idealist phase of India-China Relations ended with the 1962 war Post-Nehruvian phase marked the beginning of a realist approach to foreign policy. The Chinese perhaps don't realize how lasting the impact of the 1962 conflict has been on Indian public opinion. Indian minds do not have the same ability to move on that the Chinese have shown in respect of their conflicts with Russia or Vietnam. The loser in the 1962 conflict was not just India but the relationship itself.⁷⁹

S. D Muni⁸⁰ furthers the argument of Realism taking command in the post-Nehruvian period, by quoting the example of India's silence on the Tiananmen Square Massacre keeping in mind the prospects of improving relations with China. Further, he talks of Rajiv Gandhi overlooking the Tibetan uprising in 1987-88 and even later on, due to the existing Indian Dilemma, firstly on the fact the relations with China had improved considerably with a couple

⁷⁸ T.R. Ghoble, "Some Aspects of Sino-Indian Relations During the Nehru Era (1959)." *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* 56 (1995): pp.833-45.

⁷⁹ Jaishankar, S.2020. *The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World*, New Delhi, Harper Collins India.

⁸⁰ S. D. Muni. "India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension. Foundation Books," op.cit.

of confidence-building measures signed between the two countries. Secondly, the presence of Dalai Lama and the number of Tibetan refugees outnumbering 100,000. India's response was to play safe and maintain the cooperative momentum with China. He even explains an instance when Dalai Lama expressed dissatisfaction with India's "over-cautious" approach to Indian action to stop the Tibetan march in 2008. The Tibetan agitators have even said to have remarked that it was because "India is afraid of China".

Zhu further enlists the other constraint, the protracted boundary dispute is a major source of irritant between Beijing and New Delhi. India largely sticks to a de facto boundary based on the McMahon Line, drawn by the British Indian administration had imposed on the Tibetan authorities in 1914 under the Shimla Accord which the successive Chinese governments never recognized as a boundary. The unresolved border dispute is disappointing and frustrating, especially in light of China's flexibility in other territorial disputes. Another is the Nationalistic, hawkish forces, like elsewhere, tend to add fuel to fire in their public comments on China-India relations. There are two tendencies in the media and security communities of both countries to either magnify problems between the two sides or overemphasize future potentials of the relationship and deemphasize past troubles and present realities. They often misinform, mislead, and give people false hopes.

Kanti Bajpai⁸¹ says that the increasing complexity of the bilateral relationship is evidenced by the sometimes-contradictory signals that have been sent out by both governments. This further resulted in Realist Interactions between the neighbours. The emergence of strong and decisive leaders in both countries—Xi Jinping in China and Narendra Modi in India—sets the stage for a clash of increasingly assertive foreign policies. A notable example of this is the increasingly prominent role of third parties in the bilateral relationship—notably China's longstanding all-weather relationship with Pakistan and India's more recent rapprochement with the United States. Several third parties have contributed to the profound mistrust between China and India. India's dubious relations with the Dalai Lama and China's "all-weather" friendship with Pakistan are other major resources of tension for China and India respectively.

⁸¹ Kanti Bajpai. "China-India Relations If Narendra Modi Wins the Indian Elections," op.cit.

Harsh V Pant⁸² states that the current trajectory of Sino-Indian relations has left them ripe for rivalry. India now sits at a crossroads in its relationship with China and might be tilting in a more confrontational direction. The Sino-Indian competition extends beyond South Asia. Modi has tried to reinvigorate India's long-standing "Look East" policy by turning it into an "Act East" policy. Most of that campaign focuses on building economic links with the rest of Asia to fuel economic growth. He further suggests that the foreign policy goals of India and China vis-à-vis each other, likewise, are not static but evolving due to internal factors and external stimuli.

Pant elaborates that, India's China policy is in many ways symptomatic of a larger misunderstanding in the Indian political establishment about what the nation's foreign policy should be. For the left-liberal strand, foreign policy is merely an extension of domestic policy. As such since India is a secular, democratic, and peace-loving nation, India's pursuit of its relations with other states should merely reflect these virtues. At the other end of the political spectrum, the Indian right, because of its preoccupation with establishing a "Hindu" nation and minority bashing, has extended its narrow sectarian view to foreign policy. The consequence has been its obsession with Pakistan as evil incarnate in its foreign policy agenda and its inclination to view the world in black and white, friends and enemies, evil and noble. Then there is the great Indian bureaucracy which suffers from the same myopia that Henry Kissinger long back diagnosed for the US foreign service - that it views its role as merely a solver of concrete issues as they come about and a negotiating instrument rather than one of shaping events and conceptualizing strategy.

The greatest casualty of this larger foreign policy malaise has been India's China policy. From Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai to potential enemy number one to great friend, India just does not know how to deal with its neighborhood dragon that has played its cards so skillfully vis-à-vis India. There is nothing sinister about China's attempts to expand its influence and curtail India's. China is a rising power and as such will do its utmost to prevent the rise of other power centers around its periphery. In many ways, it is natural for China to view India as a potential rival: for foreign capital, export markets, political influence, and aspirations for regional leadership. India needs to recognize that appeasing China is neither desirable nor necessary even as a confrontation with China is not something India can afford, at least soon.

⁸² Harsh V. Pant (2006). Indian Foreign Policy and China. *Strategic Analysis*, op.cit.

cannot be laid by feigning total ignorance of Chinese activities that have adversely affected Indian national interests in the past.

It is the structure of global politics that by definition makes Sino-Indian competition inevitable. The best that India can do is to first put its own house in order. India needs to develop its economic and military might without in any way being apologetic about it. Despite all the talk of India as a rising power, on all indicators of power, economic and military, India remains behind China in terms of capabilities. While India's economic and military capabilities have no doubt increased substantially in recent times, with its GDP being fourth in the world in purchasing power parity and its military the third largest in the world, China's capabilities have continued to remain ahead of India⁸³. More importantly, India is yet to master the ability "to integrate the creation, deployment, and use of military instruments in support of national objectives."⁸⁴ It needs to clearly articulate its national interests and engage China on a host of issues, from the border problem to the alleged dumping of cheap Chinese goods in the Indian market.

Intersectionality: Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict

The India-China relationship is a roller coaster ride, with troughs and crests. A case in point: the tension of the 2017 Doklam military standoff that was followed by the bonhomie of the 2018 Wuhan summit. Against the backdrop of these fluctuating highs and lows, one consistent trend has been the transformation of the absence that used to characterize Indians in China into a diverse and exciting presence.

Although the idealist prospects continued in several interactions between the nation. It didn't remain purely idealist as Nehru wished for. Chietigj Bajpae⁸⁵ notes that the Sino-Indian relationship cannot be viewed as purely competitive or cooperative. Both countries' expanding military capabilities have also served to deter the outbreak of an all-out war, though this has also fueled the proclivity for limited stand-offs along their contested border. Growing economic interdependence has also served to deter open conflict between the two countries. China has emerged as India's leading trading partner, while India is China's leading trading partner in South Asia. India and China have a shared interest in maintaining open sea lanes,

⁸³For economic indicators, see *The World Bank*, World Development Indicators Database, July 2004.

⁸⁴ Ashley J. Tellis, "Future Fire: Challenges Facing Indian Defense Policy in the New Century", Lecture delivered at the India Today Conclave, New Delhi, March 13, 2004.

⁸⁵ Chietigj Bajpae. "China-India: Regional Dimensions of the Bilateral Relationship." *op.cit.*

given the strategic importance of major waterways as transit points for growing trade and resource imports and combatting the scourge of non-traditional security threats—including maritime piracy, terrorism, arms, narcotics, and people trafficking.

Despite growing trade and other exchanges, in security China and India are still stuck in the classic security dilemma. This spillover effect is captured in the concept of a nested security dilemma.⁸⁶ Chietigj Bajpae⁸⁷ gives the concept of a “nested security dilemma” based on the idea that security dilemmas involving major states have externalities beyond their bilateral relationship, with implications for regional and global security.⁸⁸ Employing the concept of a nested security dilemma as an explanatory tool demonstrates how China’s and India’s responses to each other’s actions can have impacts beyond their bilateral relationship, with implications for the wider regional security dynamic. Further evidence of this nested security dilemma in the Sino–Indian relationship is the emergence of Asia’s maritime domain as a platform for interaction and potential competition between both states.

Bajpae also emphasizes that, at the international level, both countries have cooperated on several issues of global governance through such forums as the Russia-China-India strategic dialogue and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where they have pledged to combat the threat of terrorism and called for the emergence of a “multi-polar world order”. Meanwhile, the G20 and BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) forums have emerged as key platforms for India and China to deepen regional economic integration, as evidenced by recent agreements for settling intra-BRICS trade in their local currencies and establishment of a BRICS New Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The BASIC group of countries (comprising Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) has also emerged as a platform for cooperation on international climate-change negotiations.⁸⁹

The Government of India does not view China or China’s development as a threat. Indian leaders have always unembarrassedly spoken of the need to develop a friendly and cooperative relationship with China, as a country with which we cannot afford to have a

⁸⁶ George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, *Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

⁸⁷ Bajpae, Chietigj. “China-India: Regional Dimensions of the Bilateral Relationship.” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (2015): 108–45. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271280>

⁸⁸ For definition of security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167–214.

⁸⁹ Kathryn Hochstetler and Manjana Milkoreit, “Emerging Powers in the Climate Negotiations: Shifting Identity Conceptions,” *Political Research Quarterly* 67, No.1 (2014), pp.224-35.

relationship of antagonism. Our relationship has since evolved to a point where we now have a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and an agreed 'Shared Vision for the 21st Century with China. Indeed, our relationships have become so multifaceted, strategic, and intricate that the nature of stakeholders in our relations has changed and broadened to include the wider civil society in both nations.⁹⁰

Trade has increased twelve-fold in the last decade, to an estimated \$73 billion in 2011, a figure that is more than 200 times the total trade between the countries in 1990, just twenty-two years ago. There are some 9000 Indian students in China. Tourism, particularly of Indian pilgrims to the major Hindu holy sites in Tibet, Mount Kailash, and Lake Manasarovar, is thriving. By and large, India is good at things that China needs to improve at, notably software; China excels at hardware and manufacturing, which India sorely lacks. In other words, the elephant is already dancing with the dragon. The potential for additional cooperation is immense and need not just be in each other's countries. Inevitably, our search for markets, technology, and resources to fuel our growth will be key drivers of our international relations. This is why we are both looking far afield, to Africa and Latin America, for opportunities.

The India-China relationship will always consider the larger context as they establish an equilibrium. World events determine not just China's overall attitude but its specific demeanor towards India. It is, therefore, necessary for India to continuously monitor this larger picture as it calibrates its China relationship. In setting the terms of interaction, we have also seen swings between textualism and realism, often to our detriment. Today, the bottom line for the relationship is clear: peace and tranquility must prevail on the border if the progress made in the last three decades is not to be jeopardized. The border and the future of ties cannot be separated.

Strategic Culture: Mighty Elephant versus Hissing Dragon

*Alastair Ian Johnston*⁹¹ argues that China has historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard realpolitik strategic culture that has persisted across different periods and continues to persist even in its present context when, according to him, China faces a threat environment that is most benign in several decades. China's strategic behaviour exhibits a preference for offensive

⁹⁰ Shashi Tharoor. 2012. *Pax Indica: India and the world in the 21st century*. New Delhi, India: Allen Lane.

⁹¹ Alastair Iain Johnston. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995.

uses of force, mediated by a keen sensitivity to relative capabilities and Chinese decision-makers seem to have internalized this strategic culture.⁹² Johnston also notes that Chinese decision-makers tend to see territorial disputes as high-value conflicts, due in part to a historical sensitivity to threats to the territorial integrity of the state.⁹³ This is of direct consequence to the future of India-China relations. This strategic culture provides Chinese decision-makers with a set of clear principles as well as a long-term orientation in designing foreign policy.

As China has become stronger, it has increasingly been abandoning non-provocative postures and seems today ever more willing to act like exactly the self-interested hegemon that official propaganda has denied it is culturally or even “genetically” possible for China to be. As its power continues to grow, so also will the country’s willingness to bully its neighbours and seize advantages for itself in the international arena just like any other rising power and would-be regional hegemon. China’s history of realist calculation and behavioural modulation in response to perceived shifts in power suggests that careful but firm and coordinated resistance from the other powers of the Asia-Pacific can persuade even today’s increasingly aggressive Chinese regime to moderate its behaviour.

Given a difficult bilateral history and now a complicated global context, India’s challenge is to manage a more powerful neighbour while ensuring its rise. In doing so, there must be an understanding on our part that this search for equilibrium is an infinite process. Some issues may be amenable to an early resolution but others may not. The current situation could change and strategic calculations must not be the monopoly of China. Neither should be the willingness to take initiative. In the sense of warfare strategies, Indian strategic culture did not develop during the Nehru period, believes this author. Nehru developed an autonomous course for Indian foreign policy, away from the influences of the superpowers. In a coherent sense, strategic culture is still in the process of making in India.

As noted by *JN Dixit*, Indian foreign and security policy is hybrid, encompassing both realist and idealist ideational lineages, which are both consciously and subconsciously efficacious. He argues that ‘Kautilyan realism’ is the predominant endogenous ideational feature of Indian strategic culture relative to endogenous ‘idealist’ and exogenous ideational

⁹² For sources of Chinese realpolitik strategic culture, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in Ronald Jepperson et al, No.14, pp.216-268.

⁹³ Alastair Iain Johnston, op.cit.

inputs. However, Kautilyan realism is not ‘pure power politics’ but intrinsically rooted in political normativity (*rajadharma*). While there is an idealist lineage of politico-strategic thought that can be associated with Buddhism grounded ‘Ashokan statecraft’ of prioritizing non-violent policies, peaceful coexistence, and diplomacy, Ashoka’s Empire possessed enormous power leverage in political, economic, and military terms.

India’s National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon says that “A simple realist theory is insufficient to explain or even describe the complex course and state of India-China relations”. When Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian PM to visit China after Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954, we had a mono-focal relationship. That is now transformed and it continues to change before our eyes. We lack a theoretical basis for understanding this change. We seem to use multilateralism for our values and bilateralism for our interests. India has shown a willingness to use force for clearly defined political ends when the cause is just, once it is clear that diplomacy’s potential is exhausted. In the choice between the imperatives of domestic politics and the demands of external engagement we have normally struck a balance which has stood the test of time”. This has been reflected in India’s growing role in multilaterals and minilaterals like BRICS, QUAD, SAARC, etc.

Geopolitical Dynamics

The Indo-China border standoff, which started in May 2020, continues to date at numerous friction points in the rugged mountains of the Ladakh region in the Himalayan ranges. A fatal skirmish took place between Indian and Chinese troops in Galwan valley in June 2020. This was, in fact, the worst fighting in the last four decades after the Indo-China war of 1962.

Both India and China continue to exert influence in the region and further their interests. For India, South Asia and the Indian Ocean are the first lines of defence against any invasion; having clout among its neighbours allows India the status of being a ‘regional power’.⁹⁴ For its part, China, beginning in the 2000s, has used military, political, economic, and cultural tools to expand its footprint in South Asia. It is aiming to solidify its status as an Asian power, gain access to the vast resources of the Indian Ocean, encircle India, secure

⁹⁴ See: Anasua Basu and Pratinashree Basu “India’s Connectivity with its Himalayan Neighbours,” ORF Special Report, July 2017, Observer Research Foundation;; Constantino Xavier, “Sambandh as Strategy: India’s New Approach to Regional Connectivity,” Brookings Policy Brief, January 2020, Brookings India.

important Sea Lines of Communication, and usher in economic growth, especially in its volatile regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet.⁹⁵

Applying the concept of the nested security dilemma, the rise of China and India as major maritime powers has implications beyond the confines of their bilateral relationship, fueling the potential for both competition and cooperation. This competitive dynamic is already evident with China and India challenging each other in their respective littoral spaces in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Meanwhile, India has voiced concerns over China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean under the aegis of its Maritime Silk Road (MSR) concept.⁹⁶ This "String of Pearls" strategy, which China has sought to rebrand as the more benign MSR, is evidenced by the development of ports along maritime trade routes, including Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

Launched in 2013, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as "One Belt, One Road (OBOR)," has been regarded by many China observers as China's new geopolitical strategy aimed at extending its sphere of influence, fostering new norms of international economic cooperation, and promoting a new world order. While Western countries tend to interpret the BRI as part of China's hidden geopolitical strategy to ultimately rule the world, Chinese and most developing nations see it as China's international cooperation strategy to enhance global connectivity, communication, and cooperation, to foster a more balanced and equitable world system.

As the trust deficit between these two nations runs higher following the Galwan clashes, the stakes have increased. South Asia has become a battleground. For the South Asian nations themselves, the intense competition has not only opened up new opportunities but has also heightened their anxieties. These countries view the rivalry as a means to exercise their agency, seek political and economic benefits, shed their overreliance on India, and mitigate the impacts caused by China's 'debt traps.'⁹⁷ With India, China, and other countries like the US casting their eyes on this region,⁹⁸ South Asian states are pursuing active balancing and bargaining, rather than being passive victims of the games being

⁹⁵ Sanjeev Kumar, "China's South Asia Policy in the 'New Era'," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 75, No. 2 (2019).

⁹⁶ Shannon Tiezzi, "China Pushes 'Maritime Silk Road' in South, Southeast Asia," *The Diplomat* (Japan), 17 September 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-pushes-maritime-silk-road-in-south-southeast-asia/>.

⁹⁷ Harsh V Pant and Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, "As India and China Compete, Small States are Cashing In," *Foreign Policy*, January 24, 2022.

⁹⁸ C. Raja Mohan, "Across South Asia, US and India pushback against China," *Foreign Policy*, April 6, 2022.

played by global powers. This has helped them acquire investments, grants, aid, loans, and agreements.⁹⁹

Findings and Discussion

A nation's foreign policy, to be effective, should ultimately rest on philosophical assumptions as to the nature of world order and the relationship of order to progress and national interest. In the absence of such a conceptual framework, incoherence would loom large as the diplomatic back and forth would become an end in itself, and rather than shaping events, the state would end up reacting to developments around it as in the case of Indian foreign policy. Indian foreign policy has merely been one of responding to events around it rather than anticipating them and evolving coherent long-term strategies to deal with them in the best interests of the country. This is where the Idealist conception of foreign policy comes into being as the wheels of the Realist vehicle. In so far as India's China policy is concerned, there is visible continuity in the official position of India. There is a consensus across the Indian political spectrum for improving bilateral ties with China and for resolving Sino-Indian differences through dialogue.¹⁰⁰ However, this official policy hides a broader debate in India about how to deal with China.

Towards a Grand Indian Strategy

In so far as India's China policy is concerned, there is visible continuity in the official position of India. There is a consensus across the Indian political spectrum for improving bilateral ties with China and for resolving Sino-Indian differences through dialogue.¹⁰¹ However, this official policy hides a broader debate in India about how to deal with China. It has been pointed out that there are three broad views in India on how to deal with China and they have been classified as the pragmatists, the hyperrealists, and the appeasers. The pragmatists view China as a long-term threat and as a competitor but argue that this competition can be managed by engaging China economically and balancing against China by emerging as a major power in the international system. The hyperrealists view China as a clear and present danger and would like India to contain China by for gin alliances around China's periphery and by strengthening

⁹⁹ Pant and Gowdara Shivamurthy, "As India and China Compete, Smaller States are Cashing In"

¹⁰⁰ "All Parties for 'Purposeful' Relations with China," Press Trust of India, September 8, 2004.

¹⁰¹ This typology of India's China Debate has been borrowed from Mohan Malik, "Eyeing the Dragon: India's China Debate", *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*, Honolulu, December 2003.

its military capabilities. The appeasers view China as a friendly and benevolent neighbour and would like India to engage it whole-heartedly since China, in their opinion, is not a threat to India in any way.

India is a rising power in Asia and it needs to demand its rightful place in the inter-state hierarchy. Even if a rising India does not have any intention of becoming a regional hegemon, China will try its best to constrain India as it has already done to a large extent. China's intentions vis-à-vis India may seem entirely peaceful at the moment but that is largely irrelevant in the strategic scheme of things. A nation's foreign policy requires the ability of its leaders to think in the long term. India cannot and should not wear rose-tinted glasses on Sino-Indian relations just because things seem to be going smoothly at present. Just as Alexander Wendt cogently said, "Anarchy is what states make of it" (1992). The future of the Indo-Chinese relationship is not condemned to rivalry and hostility; nor will a Chindia naturally result, just because it "makes sense." To return to the constructivist axiom, the future depends on the evolving structure of elite identities and preferences, informed by the three paradigms and socialized through interactions.

Jairam Ramesh,¹⁰² a member of the Indian Parliament and a former Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, coined the word "Chindia" in his 2005 book *Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India*. It denotes synergy between the two Asian giants. He views closer economic cooperation between China and India as the best way to build trust and friendship, leading to long-lasting peace between the two states. Shortly, India and China have to live with partially convergent and partially divergent interests. On environmental and economic issues, the two countries have much to share and learn from each other. On security and foreign policy, they may not always see eye to eye. While the two countries still seem to be more interested in competition in hard power - military strength, GDP growth rate, etc., they need to pay more attention to cultural diplomacy and soft power.

What does the future hold for Indo-Chinese relations? Generally speaking, there are three scenarios. The first is continued, ever-heightened rivalry, guided by the logic of the geopolitics paradigm. Indications of this are not difficult to find. China figures prominently in Indian defence planning. China's growing military and economic power may deeply unsettle India. China may enhance its support of Pakistan and increase its influence in the South Asian

¹⁰² Jairam Ramesh. *Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India*, India Research Press: New Delhi, 2005.

continent, the Indian Ocean, and Southwest Asia. The second possibility is "Chindia", driven by the logic of the geo-economics paradigm. Here, China and India would jointly promote a multipolar world and a more equitable global order (e.g., reforming the United Nations). The third possibility is pragmatic management of their relationship, seeking solutions to their unresolved disputes while exploring areas of cooperation. Compared to the hot war of 1969 and the cold war that ensued, the Indo-Chinese relationship has shown promise of normalization. However, irritants still exist.

China is not a malevolent, sinister international entity out there to demolish India but a state which is simply pursuing its strategic interests in a hard-headed fashion on its way to its status of great power. It is time for India to realize that India's great power aspirations cannot be realized without a similar cold-blooded realistic assessment of its strategic interests in an anarchic international system where there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. But for this to happen, the Government of India will have to formulate a clear China policy and, more importantly, a broader national security strategy, i.e., a clear strategic culture. One that has idealism at heart with realist means to meet its long-term goals. We need to move towards a Grand Strategy for India encompassing Multi-alignment and Strategic Autonomy.

Ad-hocism just won't do. This needs to be the top priority of the government if it wants India to emerge as a global power of any reckoning. India should recognize that a merely tactical foreign policy approach without the backing of a sound strategy will lead nowhere. In the book, *Rivals*, Bill Emmott quoted an unnamed senior Indian official as saying, 'both of us (India and China) think that the future belongs to us. We can't both be right,' Actually, they both can be right its just that it will two different futures. there can be room for both: the world is big enough for India and China, together or separately, to realize their developmental aspirations.

Chapter- III: Genuine Interest or Well-thought-out Strategy? Indo-US relationship

Vidisha Sharma

For 75 years, India's relationship with the United States has been one of a mixture of alienation and commitment. The two countries have never been entirely alienated, nor have they enjoyed the kind of deep engagement they had with the other countries of Russia in the case of India and Britain and Western Europe in the case of the United States.

India-US relations spanning seven decades can be divided into four brief periods: from 1947 to 1974; 1974 to 2001; 2001 to 2009; 2009 onwards. The first period encompassed the classic Cold War interactions between the two countries and Nehru's response to the East-West conflict. The second period marked the end and collapse of the Cold War and the beginning of a new phase in world politics in which the US became the sole superpower. The third period, to characterize it accurately, opened new horizons with the inauguration of the Bush administration, which typically unraveled the hyphenated India-Pakistan relationship. The fourth period is too recent to describe in detail, but the relationship has matured to a phase where both countries have forged new relationships and alliances on bilateral and multilateral levels.

1947-1975: Cold War or Cold Shoulder?

When India entered the international system, the war was just beginning. The polarizing effect of the Western division was evident, and Nehru feared being trapped by the constraints of colonialism by being maneuvered into diplomatic and security supreme powers seeking allies against each other. Non-alignment was Nehru's response. Since non-alignment was an old American strategy, Americans feared being caught between the 18th and 19th centuries. Even though, they were more sympathetic to Nehru, but were also suspicious and dismissive - wary of the possibility of leading others away from the United States into Cold War positions; and thinking with contempt that this is a sustainable position for the weaker countries.

As early as 1947, in a note to India's Ambassador-designate to China, K. P. S. Menon, he wrote:¹⁰³ Our general policy is to avoid entanglement in power politics and not join any

¹⁰³ Quoted in K.P.S. Menon "India and the Soviet Union" in B. R. Nanda ed., *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*. Vikas, Delhi, 1976, pp.134-135.

group of powers as against any other group. The two leading groups today are the Russian bloc and the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly to both and yet not join either. Both America and Russia are extraordinarily suspicious of each other as well as of other countries. This makes our path difficult and we may well be suspected by each of leaning towards the other. This cannot be helped. The Soviet Union, being our neighbour, we shall inevitably develop close relations with it. We cannot afford to antagonize Russia merely because we think that this may irritate someone else. Nor indeed can we antagonize the USA.

However, India's non-aligned policy suffered from two inherent weaknesses. While the policies of globalism and Asianism (a vision of a united Asia) gave India a high political position despite its military and economic weakness, success depended on the (great power) imperatives of support and goodwill of the new emerging countries over which India had a claimed influence. Second, Nehru ignored the need to develop a regional security concept. Political influence on a global scale was meant to offset the need for diplomacy and military might protect Indian interests (including territorial integrity) in South Asia.

India also opposed US actions to establish bases in Asia as part of its containment policy, as well as its military aid to Pakistan since 1954, denying such aid to India. It was also with the support of the United States that Pakistan was able to raise the question of Kashmir in the Security Council (1957, 1962, and 1964). In terms of perception, while India's worldview contained seeing the world as that of the members of military alliances and non-aligned nations, the US, on the other hand, viewed the world as that of the allies and others.

But these differences did not preclude occasional cooperation between the two countries when their interests coincided. This was evident in India's participation in the UN-sponsored solution to the Suez crisis (1956), in the Laos Neutralization Agreement (1962), and United Nations operations in Congo after 1961. The economic relations between the two countries were an interesting contrast to their political relations. US investment in India was significant compared to other countries. The US aid program has been described as having "motives ranging from pure humanitarianism to gross materialism." Between 1950 and 1965, the United States provided 50% of the foreign aid received by India. However, more than half of this was in the form of food aid under Public Law 480 (1954). For the United States, it was a politically convenient way to get rid of their food surplus. In 1957, the United

States set up a Development Credit Fund to provide credit to India to purchase capital goods from India. At the initiative of the United States, the World Bank also formed an Aid India consortium, which provided significant funding for India's third five-year plan. A contract for the construction of nuclear power plants was signed in 1963, starting with that of Tarapur near Bombay. A controversial aspect of economic relations was that the United States, with very few exceptions, refused to invest in or support Indian heavy industry. This could be seen as an attempt to prevent India from becoming self-sufficient in this sector and securing a market for American products.

This policy of non-alignment was finally tested in the India-China border dispute in 1962 and proved to be seriously flawed. After the India-China border conflict of 1962, India requested and received military assistance from the Soviet Union and the United States. Two points are being made in this situation. Only a small amount of 'emergency' assistance was made available. Additionally, the military aid offered was not long-term. The US offer was conditional on the successful resolution of the Kashmir dispute in which India was expected to make substantial concessions. The US provided Pakistan with military aid even though Pakistan did not always follow the US's wishes. The United States provided Pakistan with military assistance until 1965 when Pakistan attacked India. India retaliated by attacking Pakistan, and the United States stopped assisting. India was not happy with the way the US reacted to Pakistan's attack. India thought the US should have been more critical of Pakistan. India was also upset that Pakistan was using US-supplied military hardware.

Keeping all these altercations in mind, Jawaharlal Nehru, devised a policy of keeping the United States at a strategic distance while still cooperating with them whenever it was beneficial for India. He tried to be polite with the United States at all times. He was a great believer in the art of persuasion and debate. He never gave up on the possibility that India could talk the Americans out of bad policies and talk them into being a fundamentally better society. On the whole, the Nehruvian policy was a rational appropriate one, though admittedly not without cost. Nehruvianism the ideology, post-Nehru's death in 1964 was continued by Prime Ministers Shastri and Indira Gandhi within this matrix. India-US relations changed little for nearly 35 years as a result.

The relationship between India and the United States became worse after Richard Nixon became President and started to become friends with China. The United States and

China established relations with each other with the help of Pakistan. This resulted in interests between the three countries converging, which India saw as threatening. The crisis in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) that led to a war in 1971 resulted in the first steps toward what would emerge as an Indo-centric power structure in South Asia. India decided to make friends with the Soviet Union instead of the US because it thought a war with Pakistan was inevitable, thereby signing the 20 Years' Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union

India's victory in the 1971 war with Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh owed their success to Prime Minister Gandhi's primary policy objective: India's security goals ranked foremost in its foreign policy. (It was also an indication as to how far India's foreign policy goals had changed since the days of her father, Prime Minister Nehru.) India had now emerged as South Asia's pre-eminent regional power. This was further demonstrated by the fact that the Simla Agreement (July 1972) with Pakistan was arrived at without the involvement of any external powers. Further, the two countries agreed to resolve any future problems bilaterally and work towards the development of friendly relations. This trend towards bilateralism became fairly well entrenched in the 1970s. As an analyst has observed:¹⁴

From the Bangladesh war of 1971 to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan later that year, the development of Indo-Pakistani relations had been to a large extent insulated from the course of superpower rivalry. Trends and events that helped or hindered the evolution of a regional détente in South Asia were large, if not exclusively subcontinental in origin.¹⁰⁴

1975-2001: Nuclear Altercation

In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear weapon test at Pokhran. This was a major event for the US. India's nuclear test was a problem for the world because it showed that India was willing to break rules about nuclear weapons. This could start an arms race in south Asia, and make it harder for the world to control who had nuclear weapons. In the 1980s, the US-India relationship was obscured by the indirect superpower conflict in nearby Afghanistan and

¹⁰⁴ Mohammed Ayoob, 'India, Pakistan and Superpower Rivalry', *World Today*, vol. 38, no. 5, May 1982, p. 194

India's own political and economic problems. In short, India and the United States, yet again, found themselves to be on opposing sides of a big conflict. Subsequently, indeed, US attitudes towards the region changed. US policy did 'recognise as a fact of life that no matter what measuring stick one uses', as State Department South Asian expert Howard Schaffer explained, 'India is the most important power in the region.'¹⁰⁵

The 1980s was a time when the world slowly started to accept that India was becoming more powerful in the region. India tried to keep the peace in Sri Lanka and the Maldives (albeit unsuccessful). India and US worked together more in the areas of defence and technology. In 1989, the then-Indian Defence Minister, K.C. Pant visited the United States. This was the first time an Indian Defence Minister had visited the U.S. in over 25 years, and it was seen as a very symbolic event. The US Secretary of State visited in 1987 and 1988. President Reagan issued a directive in 1984 that told government agencies to try to improve relations with India and give India the technology it wanted. In 1986, the US agreed to supply some General Electric F404 engines and avionics for India's Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) then under development. In later years, the United States also agreed to sell a Cray XMP14 supercomputer to a country outside of the western alliance. This was the first sale of its kind.¹⁰⁶

From 1982 to 2000, India-US relations moved out of the grooves of the Nehruvian period, and India's suspicions of the US began to ameliorate. Why did this happen? The answer is that the world had changed, and Indian foreign policy had to change with it. In retrospect, we can see that by 1982 the Cold War was coming to an end. It flared and flamed dangerously for another five years or so, but these were the dying moments of the contest. Not surprisingly, both India and the US had to take account of this new reality in dealing with each other. The contest was almost over, but there was still some danger. In short, both India and the US had to take account of this new reality in dealing with each other. This meant that as the Soviet Union's policies changed in the later part of the decade, India's relationship with the United States improved a little bit. The United States started supplying arms to India again in 1986 after a long break. In 1988, the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, visited China in an attempt to improve relations between the two countries. India seemed to be trying out a new

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in Stanley Wolpert, *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Superpowers*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1982, pp. 186 187

¹⁰⁶ Mohammed Ayooob, *India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies*, Routledge, London, 1990, p. 80.

way of solving disagreements by being friendly and positive. India supported America in the 1990 Gulf War by providing logistical support.

After the end of the cold war, India-US relations in the first half of the 1990s have been described as one of 'missed opportunities and contradictory policies'.¹⁰⁷ This could be attributed to a slow acknowledgment of the changed international order both at the political and bureaucratic levels. India and the US continued to have differences on various issues including the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Another action that caused friction between India and the US was the passage through Congress of the Brown Amendment (November 1995) which allowed the US to supply Pakistan with military equipment worth \$658 million and including maritime reconnaissance aircraft and missiles. President Clinton supported this move because Pakistan had already paid for the equipment but refused to release the 26 F16s. As has been observed:¹⁰⁸ Indian policymakers responded as much to the symbolism as the substance of the decision. Above all, the Brown Amendment indicated that the United States did not have an India policy but rather a South Asia policy and that Congress and the president would continue to equate India and Pakistan. With the end of the Cold War, India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao took major steps to improve relations with the United States. His concerns were mostly about money and the economy in the wake of India's financial crisis of 1990-91. On the diplomatic front, India had to rethink its relationship with the US because there were some changes in the world. The US was now the only superpower, China was rising, and Pakistan was growing more confident after the Soviet pull-out from Afghanistan.

On the security front, India agreed to help sponsor a resolution at the United Nations (UN) to start negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This treaty would make it so that countries could not test nuclear weapons. Even though India did not eventually sign the CTBT, it continued to engage the US on nuclear issues [The Conference on Disarmament negotiations treaty called the Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)]. The Indian and United States militaries began working more closely together, with visits and exchanges of personnel between the two countries. This was a very big step for India, given New Delhi's suspicions of

¹⁰⁷ Arthur G. Rubinoff, 'Missed Opportunities and Contradictory Policies: Indo-American Relations in the Clinton Rao Years', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 4, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 499-517

¹⁰⁸ Francine R. Frankel, 'Indo-US relations: The Future is now', *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 4, Autumn 1996, pp. 145-146.

the US defence department. The links were broken only once when India conducted its Nuclear tests in 1998.

The next milestone in India-US relations was the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbot talks that were held from 1999 to 2001. The Indian and US governments held high-level talks to try and resolve their differences over India's nuclear programs. The talks ended with neither side achieving what they wanted. The US wanted India to sign up for the Clinton administration's non-proliferation agenda, but India did not agree to this. India wanted the US to accept India's nuclear weapons programme, but the US did not agree to this.

India became one of the first countries to support President George W. Bush's controversial nuclear missile defence initiative. After the September 11th attacks, India offered its full support to the United States in their war against terrorism. The US lifted all sanctions against India by September 22 and revived the bilateral defence policy group which had been suspended since 1998. The US pressured Pakistan into a commitment to curbing cross-border terrorism in India following a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. In 2002, the US began talking with India about things they both wanted to improve in South Asia. This included ending the civil war in Sri Lanka, promoting political stability in Bangladesh, and reconstructing Afghanistan. This was a big change from how things were during the Cold War era.

(2001-2009) New Horizons: Altering Relations

Under the new Bush administration, Indo-US relations have developed at a pace that few could have foreseen. In his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the then Secretary of State designates Colin Powell stated 'India has the potential to help keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to help them in this endeavor.'¹⁰⁹

The NDA government lost the elections of 2003 and there were questions about the future of India-US relations, on will, the Congress-led government, backed by the communist parties and various regional parties take little interest in external affairs, or would take a more Nehruvian stance on relations with the US or would it deepen relations, as the Rao and NDA

¹⁰⁹ Washington File, 17 January 2001

governments had done. The Indian government, led by Dr. Manmohan Singh decided to work closely with the American government, building on what earlier Indian governments had done.

Thus, in January 2004, India and the US signed the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) that outlined the strategic road ahead. On 28 June 2005, the defence minister, Pranab Mukherjee signed an agreement titled 'New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship. Three weeks later, on 18 July 2005, during the prime minister's visit to the US, the two countries issued a document called the 'India-US Joint Statement. The new framework explicitly stated that it was the successor to the Agreed Minute on Defence Relations between the US and India that was signed in January 1995. The new defence framework was to chart military relations between the two governments until 2015.

The two governments plus the March 2006 agreement on the separation of India's civilian and military nuclear programmes are the most far-reaching strategic accords between the two countries. In the New Framework, the two sides agreed that they stand for 'political and economic freedom, democratic institutions, the rule of law'. Their common interests include security and stability, combating terrorism and religious extremism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and protecting the untrammelled flow of commerce via land, air, and sea.¹¹⁰

India saw an opportunity at the end of the Cold War when the US needed allies. India stepped up to fill that role, advancing its interests in the process. To become a part of the global nuclear club, India cooperated with the US on key initiatives, such as the war on terrorism and nuclear missile defence. This allowed India to challenge and modify the global rules in ways that were beneficial to them.

2009-2021 - Obama to Trump: Great heights to deterioration

Former Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, arguably the progenitor of the new collaboration, once boldly declared the United States and India to be "natural allies."¹¹¹ The Obama administration's foreign policy orientations at the outset were crafted to emphasize a degree of contrast with those of the previous Washington team. Gone was assertive

¹¹⁰ Kanti Bajpai. "The U.S. and Us", *India International Centre Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3/4, Winter 2006- Spring 2007, pp.101-102

¹¹¹ Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "India, USA and the World: Let Us Work Together to Solve the Political- Economic Y2K Problem" (speech delivered to the Asia Society, New York, September 28, 1998)

international democracy promotion. In its place, President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advanced a wider approach to values, rooted in concepts of "smart" power, and a greater determination to engage allies and partners. Obama openly encouraged India to take a leadership role in Asia by stating, 'In Asia, Indian leadership is expanding prosperity and the security across the region. And the United States welcomes and encourages India's leadership role in helping to shape the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia.'¹¹²

This meant that when Obama became president, he continued doing what Bush had been doing. In 2009, Obama hosted the then-Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and his wife as the administration's first official state visitors. During his successful state visit to New Delhi in 2010, Obama became the first U.S. President to endorse India's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Despite having a promising start, Obama's India policy never hit full stride. The Obama administration was busy with other things when Clinton was secretary of state, so they didn't work together as much as they could have. A classic Washington story where near-term crises crowd out long-term ambitions. India is not a priority for the United States anymore and Indian officials are unhappy about it.

In 2010, the Indian Parliament passed a law that said suppliers of nuclear power plants were responsible for accidents. This was not a good idea because it was too much responsibility. The legislation, which gained support after the 25th anniversary of a horrific chemical spill at an American-owned plant in Bhopal, shattered investor confidence. The law made it so that Americans and other firms couldn't do business in India, which made it hard to do the civil nuclear agreement. The agreement was supposed to be a good thing for the relationship between the two countries, but because of the law, it didn't work out.

Under the Modi government, the relationship between both countries took a new turn towards a better and more robust relationship. Against the backdrop of a closer alignment between Russia, China, and Pakistan, the US-India national interest-driven Indian foreign policy is seen as a necessary step by the Modi government. Advances in the US India ties during the early 2000s notably the civil nuclear agreement, the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), and the 2005 Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement between the

¹¹² White House, 'Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India in Joint Press Conference' (24 November 2009),

two countries, all heralded a greater opportunity for India in terms of US cooperation. Later on, the renewal of the Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement and the signing of the Joint Strategic Vision in 2015, further solidified the gains that had been made.¹¹³

This growing strategic cooperation is not just geopolitical but both countries also share numerous areas of interest. These areas include defence, the space programme, technology, civil nuclear cooperation, etc. India's pivotal interest in developing its strategic relations with the US is to ultimately see itself elevated to a great power status in the region. The US also wishes to see the rise of India as a counterweight to China. Washington has also expressed its support for India to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which will enable India to benefit from global nuclear trade. This will boost India's nuclear power status and access to modern technology.¹¹⁴ Maritime security is another key area of cooperation between the US and India. In 2016, US-India Maritime Security Dialogue was launched; the second round of the dialogue took place in May 2017 in the US.¹¹⁵

The end of Obama's term made way for the next US President Donald Trump. The Trump administration was similar to the previous administration in terms of its relationship with India. They increased defense interoperability and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Trump's trade and immigration policies caused some problems. The man's approach threatened the good relationship between India and the United States, even though India is important to the US security plan and there is not a large trade imbalance between the two countries. Indeed, it is the Trump administration that encouraged the adoption of the 'Indo-Pacific' moniker, which links the fate of the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean region. The Trump administration also rechristened the US Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii to the 'US Indo-Pacific Command'. Although PACOM has had jurisdiction over India since the conception of US Combatant Commands in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the renaming of the command, albeit largely symbolic, signifies India's elevated role in the US security calculus.

¹¹³ "US India Security Cooperation; Progress and Promise for the Next Administration," Centre for Strategic and International Studies, October 2016,

¹¹⁴ Mahruk Khan, 'Growing India-US Strategic Cooperation', *Strategic Studies*, vol. 37, no.4, Winter 2017, pp. 5

¹¹⁵ "US India Maritime Security Dialogue," *Media Note*, Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State.

Chapter IV: Tracking the Trajectory: *India-Myanmar Foreign Policy Relations*

Sehajnoor Kaur

Past: The Dawn of Independence and Aftermath

India and Myanmar after Independence

Since the dawn of August 15, 1947, the day when India got its much-awaited status of being an independent country the task of managing a complex nation intertwined with its different cultural, religious and other internal affairs was on the shoulders of its then prominent leaders who were acting as torch-bearers in the days of pre-independence struggle. However, another equally concerning matter was how to approach India's relations with other countries. During this course of time then Prime Minister of India Jawahar Lal Nehru took the charge as India's External Foreign Affairs Minister and set the wheel of India's foreign policy relations with other nations in motion. Nehru's focus was on developing cordial relations with the neighbours and came up with the formula of non-alignment to prevent young India from taking sides with either of the then-proclaimed superpowers.

Meanwhile, in the span of a few months, Myanmar also became free of colonial rule in January 1948 and hence began the era of bilateral relations between two newly independent countries who were at the same time trying to cope with their internal matters. In this context, Myanmar was facing a lot of internal ethnic conflicts and India helped Myanmar to regain stability by providing financial help and lending \$46 Million to U Nu government.¹¹⁶ Nehru and Nu's friendship facilitated a friendly and cooperative relationship until Ne Win came at the helm under whom the relationship as Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit described once "correct but not close".¹¹⁷

Ne Win era is marked by anti-India policies and this strained India-Myanmar relations¹¹⁸ but the following period marked the complete turnover of India's approach towards Myanmar. India-Myanmar relations can be called complex because of their inherent characteristics like the cultural and historical ties before and during the colonial era and the geographical position of both countries which makes it impossible for either of the nations to

¹¹⁶ Rajiv Bhatia, "Myanmar-India Relations: The Way Forward", Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, July-Sept. 2011, p.317.

¹¹⁷ Ibid p.318.

¹¹⁸ Yogendra Singh, "India's Myanmar Policy: A Dilemma between Realism and Idealism", Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, No.37, March 2007, pp.1-5

exist in isolation from the other. Four north-eastern states of India (Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh) share borders with Myanmar which makes it indispensable for both countries to maintain cordial relations for the benefit of both.

Forging Friendship: Following the Ideals of Idealism

India and Myanmar have shared strong social and cultural affinity which is the result of thousands of years of the intermingling of people across borders.¹¹⁹ India has always been a country guided by its ethics and morals deeply rooted in its traditions and historical legacy and India tries to project the same in its orientation towards different internal and external matters. Reasoning his approach along similar lines, Nehru always advocated foreign policy guided by morals, peace, and mutual existence. Similarly, U Nu also maintained cordial relations with India and was supportive of India unlike the following leaders of Myanmar.

India-Myanmar has shared a long history and this acted as a helping block in establishing cordial relations with Myanmar initially. The first economic and cultural exchanges between the Indian and Burmese regions go back to the third century B.C. under the reign of Emperor Ashoka.¹²⁰ India and Myanmar share religious beliefs too predominantly related to Buddhism and Hinduism. This long interaction between the two countries is the fulcrum on which the long-lasting and ever-evolving relationship between India and Myanmar has been established.

J.L. Nehru and U Nu signed the Treaty of Friendship in 1951 whose Article II stated: “There shall be everlasting peace and unalterable friendship between the two states who shall ever strive to strengthen and develop further the cordial relations existing between the peoples of the two countries”.¹²¹ It was Nehru’s and Nu’s close friendship which made bilateral relations seem stable and cooperative but this took a turn when Ne Win led a coup d’état in 1962 and took over as the leader of the country by ousting U Nu during this India helped Myanmar to restore the democratic order in the country, Nehru even helped Nu to evacuate

¹¹⁹ L.K. Choudhary, “Indo-Myanmar Relations: Retrospect and Prospect”, *India Quarterly*, October-December, 2005, Vol. 61, No. 4 (October-December, 2005), p.143

¹²⁰ Renaud Ergreteau, 2004. *Wooing the Generals: India’s New Burma Policy*. Delhi: Authorspress. p.1

¹²¹ A Paode, “India’s Look East Policy: Relations With Myanmar”, *World Affairs: The Journal Of International Issues*, Winter (October-December) 2013, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter (October-December) 2013), p.4

from Myanmar to India¹²² which was not taken well by the heads of the new regime, hence the downfall in relations began thereof.

Ne Win's policies were seen as extremist in nature by the Indian government as there was a complete uphaul in policies in the name of the 'Burmese Way to Socialism' and the anti-foreigner policies which led to a large exodus of Indians¹²³ and the policies pursued by him were seen as economically disastrous for Myanmar itself. During this period several meetings were held between the delegates from both sides but the relations weren't at their best. Ne Win and his counterparts shared close affinity with China and Myanmar's military government signed border agreements with the Chinese in 1960¹²⁴ since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, India felt betrayed because of non-allegiance to the Panchsheel Principles by China and Myanmar's growing affinity with China only worsened the situation. Moreover, India being an idealist in its approach always supported democratic structure in its neighbor countries and Myanmar was no exception. The military regime in Myanmar has always excused itself from maintaining genial relations by accusing India of trying to export democracy in Myanmar which doesn't go well with them.

The visit by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1987 was supposed to act as a gentle push to reinvigorate the bilateral relations but the following year further worsened the relations and can be said to have hit the lowest bottom. In 1988, there was a massive protest by students in Myanmar to bring in a democratic setup which led to the formulation of the National League for Democracy under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, all these events transpired to overthrowing of Ne Win government by a military coup led by Saw Maung.

The following years were most crucial to India-Myanmar relations because these set the stage for a renewed foreign policy from India's side and Myanmar saw multiple regime transitions in just a short period marked by a period of acute political turbulence.

¹²² Tran Xuan Hiep, Nguyen Tuan Binh, Tran Hoang Long, Duong Quang Tra, Nguyen Quang Son, "India - Myanmar Relations (1948 - 1992): From "IDEALISM" to "Realism" in India's Foreign Policy towards Myanmar", *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol.10, No.3, May 2021, p.172

¹²³A Paode, "India's Look East Policy: Relations With Myanmar", *World Affairs*, Winter (October-December) 2013, Vol.17, No.4 (Winter (October-December) 2013), p.88

¹²⁴ Tran Xuan Hiep, Nguyen Tuan Binh, Tran Hoang Long, Duong Quang Tra, Nguyen Quang Son, "India - Myanmar Relations (1948 - 1992): From "Idealism" to "Realism" in India's Foreign Policy towards Myanmar", *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol.10. No.3, May 2021, p.173

India's Response to Coup in Myanmar

The coup by Saw Maung in September 1988 established the Army-led State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) which distorted any attempts to establish constitutional democracy.¹²⁵ India openly pressured the new regime to bring in the ideals of democracy in Myanmar and PM Rajiv Gandhi extended moral support to the pro-democracy movement and offered refuge to the people of Myanmar who migrated to India to flee military suppression.¹²⁶ Myanmar's opposition National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) was allowed to open its office on Indian soil.¹²⁷ All these events combined led to further deterioration of the relations which were at such a juncture that any further push by India to establish democracy in Myanmar combined with the blind eye by the USA and European Nations pushed it closer to China which became a major hurdle in India-Myanmar relations later on. Although the Indo-Myanmar relationship might have lacked the warmth of the 1950s, it never lost its salience during the military regime.¹²⁸

India, like aforementioned, has always been an idealist in its approach towards Myanmar till the 1990s onwards, its idealist policies perhaps have been inspired by its various historical traditions or the personal beliefs of the leader, and what sounds more practical is India's then 'status' of a young independent country who could not afford to take sides and displease either of the superpowers involved in Cold War and chose the path of non-alignment and took some other neighbours along with it in this journey who were facing the same predicament. But India was always trying to forge an ideal friendship with Myanmar by being a perpetrator of democracy in its neighbouring countries which cost it big time since other regional countries like China took the opportunity to build relations with them and exploit the vacuum created by deliberate isolation of these countries and in this case Myanmar. It was time for India to bring in a new game plan to counter certain forces and gain back its ground in the neighborhood for a variety of interests involved.

¹²⁵ H dissertation 204

¹²⁶ Yogendra Singh, "India's Myanmar Policy: A Dilemma between Realism and Idealism", *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No.37, March 2007, pp. 1

¹²⁷ Fahmida Ashraf, "India Myanmar Relations", *Strategic Studies*, Spring 2008, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring 2008), p.7

¹²⁸ L.K. Choudhary, "Indo-Myanmar Relations: Retrospect and Prospect", *India Quarterly*, October-December, 2005, Vol. 61, No. 4 (October-December, 2005), p.149

Present: A Volte-Face?

The Turn in Trajectory

The last decade of the 20th century proved to be a turning point for India in many aspects since it renewed its outlook towards not only external affairs but also internal matters be it related to economy, trade, or foreign policy. 1991 onwards India started with the economic policy of liberalization and privatization and the de facto result or perhaps the causation element was globalization. India understood that it needed to be realistic in its orientation and seek its self-interest first. Hence came the change in foreign policy from being idealist to realpolitik where India was overtly now prioritizing its interests before mending the internal situation of other countries and helping them to follow the idealist agenda of being an economically liberal and democratic society.

Broadly in 1993, India seemed to suffer from democratic-idealist-humanist-moralist fatigue. It seemed that India was unable to maintain its idealism of championing democracy for Myanmar. (Azman Ayob 2014). But before that in 1991 a firm change took place in India's foreign policy under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao who came up with a 'policy of rapprochement with the 'booming South-East Asia'.¹²⁹ This policy was named India's 'Look East Policy' through India aimed at connecting with South-East Asian countries to establish better and more close relations to take advantage of this region's economic vitality.¹³⁰ Myanmar plays a crucial role here since it is the gateway to South-East Asia for India, it can't afford to overlook Myanmar from the picture.

Certain factors made India reconsider its policy orientation and the first and foremost reason can be understood in the economic importance of Myanmar for India as a nation and specifically for its northeastern region. Myanmar has a good amount of natural resources, human resources, and other infrastructural development opportunities which can be exploited for the sake of development and both nations can gain merit from the same. The most important bilateral border trade agreement is still the initial one of 1994, which designates Moreh–Tamu on the Manipur border and Champhai/ Zowkhathar–Rhi on the Mizoram border as trade points. Connecting India's northeast states with Myanmar by opening up trade centres on the international border was a primary objective of the Look East Policy.

¹²⁹ Renaud Ergreteau, 2004. *Wooing the Generals: India's New Burma Policy*. Delhi: Authorspress p.102

¹³⁰ *ibid.*

High-level Deputation meetings have been held to strengthen mutual relations and to discuss various trade-related issues. In various meetings, the prospect of having trade cooperation in various areas like IT, tourism, food processing, human resource development, and pharmaceuticals have been expressed by the respective ministries.¹³¹ As a result, economic cooperation with Myanmar and interfacing with Myanmar did speed up the economic development of India's north-eastern states as Myanmar provides the shortest links to Southeast Asian markets by land, air, and sea.¹³² North-Eastern Region (NER) of India has always complained of being not represented appropriately in the nation's economy and because of the different terrain and cultural nuances associated with it, they have always felt ignored in the national policies so strengthening the trade relations become very important for having a stable and economically prosperous region. Myanmar owing to its geographical location and sharing of borders with Indian states and due to cultural affinity amongst them comes out as the best regional trade partner.

The most significant factor responsible for India's renewed interest is China's growing influence in South-East Asia and the increasing propinquity between China and Myanmar. China is a growing economy that has been vigorously trying to assert its dominance in the region by providing huge loans, helping political leaders of the country to gain ground in their countries, and supplying other goods and services. When the entire world including the USA, European countries, Japan and India withdrew help or stopped having any relations with the junta, China was making space for itself. China took the opportunity to establish even closer relations with the military regime and became one of its most important partners in Myanmar. Severe constraints on human and financial resources, especially technical expertise, by the western nations, forced Myanmar to rely on Chinese expertise and ODE-linked imports of machinery and equipment. This growing relationship between China and Myanmar concerned India because of India's not-so-good history with China and the cooperation between Myanmar and China was also not limited to only financial, indeed it involved security cooperation and this cooperation increased since 1988. Some significant deals were made in 1990 and 1994 involving weapons and military equipment and China not only provides

¹³¹ Yogendra Singh, "India's Myanmar Policy: A Dilemma between Realism and Idealism", *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No.37, March 2007, p.3

¹³² Rimli Basu, "Reconciliation and Redefinition of the Indo-Myanmar Relations", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.71, No.2, April-June, 2010, p.668.

Myanmar with conventional arms but also the latest advanced weapons which have increased Myanmar's military capacity exponentially.¹³³

Another concerning issue is that Myanmar facilitated China in setting up naval and communication facilities at Coco Island which is merely 45 kilometers away from Indian Territory¹³⁴ and China is also gaining a strong foothold in the Bay of Bengal area which India sees as a major threat to its security. Tint Swe has marked that the military junta is too weak to counter the strong Chinese influence and it is slowly turning into another Tibet.¹³⁵ New Delhi believes that "China's involvement in Myanmar could mean that India would find itself surrounded on three sides by Beijing and its area of influence - leaving no 'buffer states'" (Lall 2006). India wants to counter this deepening influence of China in South Asia including Myanmar and its other neighbours to prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon and wants to gain economic benefits from these countries by establishing bilateral trade cooperation. Myanmar is also rich in natural resources, especially oil reserves, and has Southeast Asia's largest gas reserves which both China and India are vying to get access to. Two Indian companies ONGC Videsh (a subsidiary of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (20 percent) and GAIL (Gas Authority of India Ltd. (10 percent) got the rights to explore Blocks A1 and A3, of the Rakhine state. But the Myanmar government has been favouring Chinese companies to gain control of the oil and gas reserve sites which has given a setback to India.

Thus, China is a major factor that India wanted to deal with utmost urgency, and to maximize its power and self-interest, it took the course of realpolitik policies, to gain influence in the region and establish itself as a dominant player. The most important factor which contributed to India's reconsideration of its foreign policy outlook is the geographical location of Myanmar and its geostrategic importance. Myanmar shares borders with 4 Indian NE states (Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram) and due to the difficult terrain of the region people from both countries share day-to-day contact, for some regions to access in India, Indians have to pass through the territory of Myanmar and there are examples of Pangsau Pass where there have been days designated as 'Burma Days' and 'India Days' when people from both the countries cross the border and go to buy or sell in the neighbouring

¹³³ Hong Zhao, "China and India: Competing for Good Relations with Myanmar", *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Spring/Summer 2008, Vol.22, No.1 (Spring/Summer 2008), p.182.

¹³⁴ Binoda Kumar Mishra, "Security Implications of Greater India-Myanmar Interaction", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol.4, No.2, April-June, 2009, pp.86.

¹³⁵ Tint Swe, "Burma/Myanmar: Its Strategic Importance". *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper 2316. 27 July, 2007.

markets. This shows how the daily lives of the common people living there are intertwined, they are thriving on these daily exchanges which help them to run their livelihoods. Therefore, India and Myanmar could never afford to overlook each other, both countries are deeply connected.

Moreover, Myanmar is located at a very strategic juncture where it shares borders with both India and China, this makes it a very important state from a security point of view since it acts as a buffer state but the growing affinity as discussed before is a cause of concern so India to tackle this it is pertinent for India to maintain cordial relations and stop badgering about the democracy in other countries because it was due to this that China took the upper hand and established its influence in the region. Therefore, it can be very well deciphered that it had become indispensable for India to get over its love for democracy and a liberal regime in its neighboring countries and work for the relative gains and self-interests which can be summed up as essential traits of realism. Hence, India from the 1990s onwards started a new journey of realpolitik foreign policy. That is a shift from “policies unrealistic” to a “realistic policy” (also called “neo-pragmatic engagement”). This new policy was later reaffirmed by the Narasimha Rao government in 1996 when then Foreign Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee confirmed that India would no longer interfere in internal matters of other countries and henceforth India recognized the democratic movements in Myanmar as their internal matter.¹³⁶

Counter, Compete and Cooperate

Since the neo-pragmatic engagement, India has been relentlessly working towards fostering better and cordial bilateral relations with Myanmar and has been exploring different avenues where cooperation can be ensured. This new pragmatism in Indian foreign policy was defined as looking at the world ‘in terms of a clash of interests and the pursuit of power by individual states. India has learned the lesson that to become a global power firstly it needs to begin from home ground and for that purpose influencing South and Southeast Asia is very important, therefore, India began its initiative of active engagement with the countries in its neighborhood.

¹³⁶ Renaud Ergreteau, 2004. *Wooing the Generals : India’s New Burma Policy*. Delhi: Authorspress p.133

India has been actively trying to come up with collaboration in the infrastructural projects in Myanmar like building roads, hydel plants, highways, etc. A significant example is the India-Myanmar Friendship Road known as the Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo Road.¹³⁷ India also engaged in the construction of Rhi-Tiddim Road in Myanmar, which will connect the Indian border state of Mizoram with Myanmar's Chin State to boost border trade.¹³⁸ Other than land connectivity focus has been on air, water, and railway connectivity too, for instance, a 110 km railway line from Assam to Imphal will be extended to Moreh on the India-Myanmar Border. In October 2014 the Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. launched a fortnightly direct container service connecting major ports in the Indian subcontinent with Myanmar.¹³⁹

There are 5 major ongoing projects which aim to link India to South-East and East Asia namely the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, the new India-Myanmar-Laos-Vietnam-Cambodia Highway, the Mekong-India Economic Corridor, the Delhi-Hanoi Railway Link, and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project. This shows the commitment of the two governments to foster greater collaboration in infrastructure development which will provide gains to all the countries involved.¹⁴⁰ The Mekong-Ganga Cooperation is an important project because it has boosted regional trade but also provided a platform for further engagements in the future.¹⁴¹ India has also invested in hydro projects like India's Exim Bank investing \$60 million in Thathay Chaung Hydropower Project in Rakhine State in 2007 and 2008 National Hydro Power Corporation continued to venture into the project along with a 600-megawatt capacity dam at Shwezaye.¹⁴² Through the Kaladan Project on the Kaladan river, India wanted to connect its northeastern states to the Bay of Bengal along with the construction of the new port in Sittwe.¹⁴³ This project also provides India an opportunity to "limit Chinese access to the listening posts in the Myanmar-owned part of the Coco Islands in the Andaman Sea" (Velloor 2007).

¹³⁷ Fahmida Ashraf, "India Myanmar Relations", *Strategic Studies*, Spring 2008, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring 2008), p.231.

¹³⁸ K. Yhome, "The Burma Roads: India's Search for Connectivity through Myanmar", *Asian Survey*, Vol.55, No.6 (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2015), p.1228.

¹³⁹ "SCI Launches India-Myanmar Service (IMS)," *Business Standard*, October 7, 2014.

¹⁴⁰ K. Yhome, "The Burma Roads: India's Search for Connectivity through Myanmar", *Asian Survey*, Vol.55, No.6 (November/December 2015), p.1228.

¹⁴¹ A Paode, "India's Look East Policy: Relations With Myanmar", *World Affairs*, Winter (October-December) 2013, Vol.17, No.4 (Winter (October-December) 2013), p.97.

¹⁴² *ibid.*

¹⁴³ Hong Zhao, "China and India: Competing for Good Relations with Myanmar", *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Spring/Summer 2008, Vol.22, No.1 (Spring/Summer 2008), p.183.

Midst exploring the different platforms where the cooperation could be enhanced, a very contemporary yet old factor is governing the international arena that is the energy geopolitics and the 'pipeline diplomacy. Energy is an indispensable unit of life, no nation, no individual can survive without it and hence it becomes pertinent to secure a stable and regular supply from nations who are rich in these resources. The majority of the nations import oil and gas from Middle Eastern countries but to have uninterrupted supply relations with their immediate neighbors have to be cordial, especially with Pakistan on the western front history hasn't been so kind to both countries therefore India needs to look for alternative sources and fortunately its immediate neighbors Bangladesh and Myanmar are rich in them so it automatically becomes crucial to have friendly bilateral relations.

India is a fast-growing economy and in the present context its pace has been unmatched so with increasing economic activities there is an increase in demand for energy for which India needs to secure more sources. Myanmar has the largest oil and gas reserves in Southeast Asia. According to estimates, Myanmar has oil reserves totaling "600 million barrels and gas reserves of 88 trillion total cubic feet(tcf). Recently, Myanmar also found reserves in three areas in the Bengal Bay — Mya, Shwe Phyu, and Shwe (aka Shwe project) with 5.7 to 10 trillion estimated cubic feet".¹⁴⁴ Two Indian companies - ONGC Videsh and GAIL along with a Korean company have been exploring A1 Block of Rakhine state and the site is known as Shwe which is believed to yield around 4.2 to 5.8 tcf. Parallely, explorations have been held in the A3 block too. But what came as a shock to India was that in 2006 Myanmar agreed to sell 6.5 tcf of gas from Block A1 to PetroChina over the next 30 years and also withdrew India's status as a preferential buyer in A1 and A3 blocks with the intent to sell the gas to PetroChina, therefore this came as a major setback to India's initiative of 'pipeline diplomacy'.¹⁴⁵

Thus, India has been trying to forge genial relations to maximize its interests but it has been facing competition constantly from China which has been gaining ground in the region with its lucrative offers and policies for the countries and since it is already a major leading

¹⁴⁴ Nguyen Tuan Binh, Tran Xuan Hiep, Tran Hoang Long, Vo Minh Hung. The Impacts of the Adjustment of India's Foreign Policy for India-Myanmar Relations (1992-2014). Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Asian and African Studies, 2021, Vol.13, Issue 3, p.443.

¹⁴⁵Hong Zhao. "China and India: Competing for Good Relations with Myanmar", *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Spring/Summer 2008, Vol.22, No.1 (Spring/Summer 2008), p.186.

economy, every small economy would go for a bigger economy's help and offer. But as C. Raja Mohan commented: "India's new regionalism is focused on self-interest, rather than mere sentimentalism that favours good neighbourly relations, and therefore is likely to be more effective."¹⁴⁶

Another very important area of cooperation is security; India has a great deal of interest vested in Myanmar for the sake of its internal and external security. Internally, NER has been constantly an unstable region due to continuous conflict between the government and the insurgency groups rooting for secessionist movements. Due to the porous border with Myanmar, there has been a continuous movement across the border and it's difficult to track them down therefore it becomes very important for India to coordinate with the Myanmar government and counter these insurgents. And externally as discussed before it acts as a buffer zone between India and China which China has been constantly trying to overpower but to counter this mutually amicable bilateral relation between India and Myanmar is important.

Due to the cultural, ethnic, and geographical proximity, a lot of insurgent groups operate from Myanmar and it has been alleged that Myanmar authorities help these groups too nevertheless, India and Myanmar have held numerous high-level meetings to discuss various security threats including traditional and non-traditional and few joint operations have also been held to counter these rebels. Myanmar has helped Indian forces by tightening the border security to prevent the escape of these rebels to Myanmar whenever Indian forces do something to take them down however after India presented Jawaharlal Nehru Award to Aung San Suu Kyi the security and military cooperation was stopped for some time.¹⁴⁷ But thereafter the cooperation has been strengthened.

Another associated threat is the smuggling of weapons by these insurgent groups which mainly passes through Myanmar but after Operation Golden Bird in 1995, there was a mysterious explosion in a weapons ship the following year. After this these groups have found a new way through Yunnan Mafia-like ULFA buys from them and then further selling to other groups in the Indian North East.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶K. Yhome. "The Burma Roads: India's Search for Connectivity through Myanmar", *Asian Survey*, Vol.55, No.6 (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2015), p.1228.

¹⁴⁷ Nguyen Tuan Binh, Tran Xuan Hiep, Tran Hoang Long, Vo Minh Hung. The Impacts of the Adjustment of India's Foreign Policy for India-Myanmar Relations (1992–2014). *Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Asian and African Studies*, 2021, Vol.13, Issue 3, p.454.

¹⁴⁸ Binoda Kumar Mishra, "Security Implications of Greater India-Myanmar Interaction", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol.4, No.2, April-June, 2009, p.89.

Few non-traditional threats persist in the vicinity of the two nations like drugs and HIV/AIDS. Myanmar is part of the infamous ‘Golden Triangle’ comprising Thailand and Laos in it which is believed to be amongst the biggest producer of drugs especially opium and heroin and India is believed to be the passage as well as a market for these drugs. There has been an increase in the production and consumption of synthetic drugs turning it into ‘Ice Triangle’ which is a matter of grave concern.¹⁴⁹ This has repercussions for the North Eastern Region of India too since they are nearby and there have been cases of increasing addiction which needs to be countered well in time. Myanmar authorities have time to time assured to tackle this drug nexus but it has sadly failed and been not able to achieve any big success.

Along with this, there has been the threat of transfer of HIV/AIDS, although there has been a decrease in the cases still HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Thailand and Myanmar and due to bad healthcare systems there are no proper measures in place. India's northeastern states have already been declared as high-risk zones for HIV.¹⁵⁰ and due to cultural affinity between the two countries and inter-region marriages there are chances of a rise in the cases, therefore there is a need to have some strong policies in place to tackle this threat.

There is nothing wrong in reckoning the fact that since the era of globalization swept the world and made the world more open, every country wants to assert its dominance to garner more resources and space in the international arena. India has been doing the same, it is prioritizing its interests before concerning itself with matters of other countries.

The Foreign Policy under Modi Regime

Since 2014, a new force has taken over India, the BJP-led NDA came into power with an astonishing majority and since then there have been some big changes – for good or bad to be decided by time. Narendra Modi took charge as Prime Minister of the country and has been actively pushing the ‘Neighbourhood First’ Policy under which India aims to have family-like relations. . According to Raja Mohan, ‘Modi is guided by an ‘enlightened-self interest’ who has heralded a ‘third republic’ in Indian foreign policy to make India a ‘vishwaguru’ (Mohan, 2015). India under Modi is attempting to act as an elder brother to all the small countries. India

¹⁴⁹ Binoda Kumar Mishra, “ Security Implications of Greater India-Myanmar Interaction”, *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol.4, No.2, April-June, 2009, p.90

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.*

is believed to be more pragmatic under the new government and India has been able to act independently of pressure from the West and is pursuing what seems to be right for it.

This can be attributed to India's status as a fast-growing economy where it has now become impossible to ignore India from the world scenario, now India can afford to take an independent stand to some extent. And the Modi government has been able to make merit out of it which has favored India's stature in the international arena. The dynamic move made by Modi at the 12th India-ASEAN summit, held in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, in November 2014 to change the 'Look East' to 'Act East' Policy showed that India now believes in actions and their proper implementation and moved past the rhetoric era. As Rajiv Bhatia puts it that it represents the 'consolidation, extension, expansion and diversification of India's policy.'¹⁵¹

The Modi government has re-emphasized the cultural and historical relations between the two countries and highlighted India's connection to Buddhism therefore have invoked soft power and Modi paid a visit to Shwedagon Pagoda too, which is the most sacred Buddhist place in Myanmar tradition. Both governments have been holding joint military exercises too to foster military cooperation. The new India under Modi has pushed its ideals of democracy to a corner and has been silent on many issues related to the Rohingya crisis and the recent coup which again brought the military regime to power. Although India has made few statements, critics believe that India has been mostly silently watching it over and this can be understood in the context of various factors that govern India-Myanmar relations.

Therefore, under Modi, India has revisited all aspects of its relationship with Myanmar, be it - economic, political, cultural, military, or religious, and has actively engaged in each aspect to foster a more stable and favorable relationship. India has become more pragmatic whether in its domestic dealings or international affairs and this has been manifested in India's bilateral relations with Myanmar.

Future: Accosting The Uncertainties

Taming 'The Dragon' and A Step At A Time: Path Of Pragmatism

Amongst all the factors that contribute to the dynamic relationship that India and Myanmar share, the most important factor is China. China is important for Myanmar, both share borders

¹⁵¹ Arshid Iqbal Dar, "India's 'Pivot to Myanmar': Towards a Pragmatic Shift in Bi-lateral Relations", *Mukt Shabd Journal*, Vol.9, Issue 7, July/2020, p.2706.

and over the years have developed closer bonds and have cooperation in almost every area. Whereas India on the other hand doesn't share very cordial relations with China and both are the biggest powers in the region, therefore, are in constant competition with each other.

China has an upper hand in terms of relations with Myanmar as compared to India because it took the advantage of engaging with the junta when the whole world was isolating the military regime. It helped the military generals then and gained favors. Although Myanmar has been treating India good too the latent bias is sometimes evident, for instance, in the preferential treatment given to PetroChina in 2006. In terms of trade and economic dependence too, China leads the space. China's investments in Myanmar are more diversified, covering not only the natural gas and oil sectors, but also light industries, infrastructure, and the technology sector. (Hong Zhao 2008) Hence, India needs to be more dynamic and show more readiness to take over China in Myanmar.

But the question arises does India need to counter or compete with China? It won't be wrong to say that at present China is at a higher level than India in terms of trade, economy, and investment but India is also picking up momentum and is on the way to becoming one of the global superpowers and for this to happen India needs to begin with Asia first and gain some regional validation so that it could smoothly interact with other countries outside the continent. But China and Pakistan prove to be hurdles in this endeavor. There have been excursions on the India-China Border and the relations have been stagnant or at least have made no positive progress which is not good news because stability in the region is important for uninterrupted growth. Therefore, to counter this growing influence of China, India has to take the lead in the spaces where China already exists and more importantly in those where it doesn't.

India's actions have always been understood as reactions to China's actions and somewhat this is true since India has tried to compete and gain upper hand in those fields where China already has dominance which is not wrong but there is a need for India to be more mature and pragmatic and explore new areas of cooperation like health, tourism, and education which can also help to increase the civil society engagement and can be a boon in future. There is a "natural" familiarity China cannot offer, particularly regarding a common Buddhist tradition (Myint-U 2012: 31). Therefore, it is not surprising that Minister Swaraj, during her visit to Myanmar in August 2014, pointed to Buddhism as an important link

between the countries that may foster people-to-people contacts and serve as a foundation for generally improved relations.¹⁵² This is something China can't claim to have which provides an edge to India to dominate in the domain of soft power, hence India needs to look for more opportunities where it can show its actual capacity.

India has already learned to balance its policies and place them somewhere between idealism and realism or more to say began its journey on the path of pragmatism, India is a very complex country and this is reflected not only internally but in its external relations too. It does not share one-dimensional relations with any country, India has multi-faceted relations with Myanmar too, it has to balance a lot of factors while making any move. It can be conjectured that in coming times, India has to be a lot more vigilant in its actions and policies considering the status it is acquiring in global politics.

Conclusion

India and Myanmar are two historically and culturally connected lands that share a very dynamic multi-faceted relationship that is balanced on a lot of factors and change in any one can directly lead to a change in the other, hence it is not only a very complex relationship but also very delicate. India and Myanmar began their journey as independent nations in the same decade and have managed to come so far without any major direct conflict, there have been ups and downs but there was never confrontation.

India began with its idealist notions where it believed democratic institutions can bring about the best results and this was the base for the initial friendship between the two nations which underwent a setback after the military took over Myanmar by a coup in 1962. The relations became stagnant because Myanmar's new regime wasn't fitting in India's image of an ideal neighbour and hence it didn't try to establish relations with the junta which paved the way for other countries like China to fill in the vacuum created by the isolation move by western countries and India too. This combined with other factors compelled India to reconsider its orientation and hence the foreign policy of India underwent a major ideological change in the last decade of the 20th century.

¹⁵² Pierre Gottschlich, "New Developments in India–Myanmar Bilateral Relations?", *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, Vol.34, No.2, August 2015, pp.139–63.

India which had taken the inspiration from its historical legacy of Asoka and followed the principles of idealism went back to history again but this time Kautilya was the inspiration in his book Arthashastra wrote “the only way for a king to survive in the world is the law matsya nyaya (big fish eat small fish) is to become a Vijigisu (country always aspire to conquer)”.¹⁵³ India understood that in this new era of globalization it has to maximize its interests first and hence adopted realpolitik as the guiding ideology for foreign policy.

India no longer claimed itself to be the champion of democracy and followed the policy of non-intervention in internal matters of other countries and wasn't concerned with criticism from the west, it began to work towards its power maximization which is a major characteristic of realism. But as time is passing, India owing to its growing economic power has been able to be more pragmatic and independent in its approach, hence the contemporary orientation can be called more pragmatic and a fine balance of realism and idealism. India in an actual sense never took extreme sides, it has been trying to balance both ideals but the time there has been a certain tilt towards either of them, but at present, the path of pragmatism seems to be the safest for India.

¹⁵³ Tran Xuan Hiep, Nguyen Tuan Binh, Tran Hoang Long, Duong Quang Tra, Nguyen Quang Son, “India-Myanmar Relations (1948-1992): From “Idealism” to “Realism” in India’s Foreign Policy towards Myanmar”, *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol.10 No.3, May 2021, p.174.

Chapter V: Soaking The Sunrise: How India Greeted Japan

Kshitij Kumar

Introduction

Historically, India and Japan have had a strong spiritual connection. The spread of Buddhism and the moral values it propagates have strongly influenced Japanese and Indian thought for centuries. In the modern era, Japan's unwavering support for India's freedom struggle, Japanese influence on Netaji Subhash Bose's Indian National Army, and Justice Radha Binod Pal's dissenting judgment at World War 2 trials have created friendly ties based on idealistic values of peace, harmony, and compassion. During the Cold War, while India's policy of non-alignment and Japan's engagement with the USA meant differences in the political realm, economically the relations grew. Japan's Official Development Assistance in form of yen loans, India's exports of iron ore, and joint manufacturing ventures like Maruti Suzuki kept the economic momentum going. During the 1990s, when India's economic approach moved from protectionism to liberalism, engagement between the two countries grew manifold. Countries no longer seek power, but security, both economic and territorial. This stood true for India and Japan too. There was a brief yet intense lull in ties when India conducted nuclear tests in 1998. However, with diplomatic efforts, the bonhomie was back on track. The decade is also significant for it heralded the rise of China. Chinese aggression, the need to restrict unilateral change of status quo, and the creation of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, have brought India and Japan further closer. While ideological principles continue to guide India's foreign policy, it has grown to be more realpolitik influenced, based on practical principles, and current situations. The signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (2011), Civil Nuclear Pact (2016), and Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (2020) is testimony to the depth of engagement and trust that the two countries have for each other. The announcement of "Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the world", further signals their long-term cooperation and mutual goals that strongly tie them together.

Sowing the seeds of Idealism: Ancient to Pre-World War connections

अयं निजः परो वेति गणना लघुचेतसाम्।

उदारचरितानां तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्॥

(This is mine, that is his, say the small-minded,
The wise believe that the entire world is a family)

When the world was not demarcated into distinct geo-political boundaries, and terms like foreign policy and international relations were not yet coined, this verse from Chapter 6 of Maha Upanishad spoke volumes about the values that guided the Indian school of thought. Centuries later, this thought still finds relevance, like a pebble that drifts into the sea, and then one day, washes ashore, engraved in the entrance hall of the Indian parliament.

The growth of Buddhism in India, a school of thought that promoted humanity, altruism, and noble paths to live life, spread to Japan in the sixth century. Tied with these values, the nearly 6000 kilometers of distance between India and Japan was bridged. As the world witnessed dramatic evolutions and revolutions, the spiritual connection diversified into trade and business when hundreds of years later, legendary industrialist Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata visited Japan in 1893 and set up an office there. In 1894, the two countries signed the Indo-Japanese trade convention, which began the opening of regular ocean transport between the two countries. Contacts on the cultural and literary front were also strong, as evident in the friendship that India's exceptional polymath Rabindranath Tagore and Japanese scholar Okakura Kakuzo shared. Tagore was so touched by Japanese culture that in his essay, Salute to Japan, he writes, "I have traveled in many countries...but never in my travels did I feel the presence of the human so distinctly as in this land. You see everywhere emblems of love and admiration. People whose heart has come out and scattered itself in profusion...". During India's freedom struggle, the Japanese were highly supportive and sympathetic. The ties were so strong that during Swadeshi movement, Japanese goods were exempted from the boycott of foreign goods. *Kesari* newspaper told people to choose Japanese goods over other foreign manufactured ones. Indian freedom fighter Subhash Chandra Bose helped in shaping Japanese sentiments. Japan captured Andaman and Nicobar Islands and handed them over to Bose's provisional government of Azad Hind Fauj. In 1948, when the eleven-nation tribunal convicted about 28 Japanese leaders for World War II and Japanese actions before the war, the lone dissenting voice of Indian Justice Radha Binod Pal, struck a deep chord with Japan.

Post-World War 2

As the clock struck midnight on August 15, 1947, India rose from the dark alleys of colonialism to the glorious dawn of independence. However, the country had a magnanimous challenge staring at her. The shackles of poverty, lack of adequate healthcare, sanitation, literacy rate at dismal 12 percent, highly underdeveloped infrastructure, and an economy waiting for upliftment, all ensured India's path to progress was not easy. The economic policies of the British government were more concerned with the growth of Britain than the development of the Indian economy. However, did it mean India lacked vision and capacity when it came to deciding its foreign policy? The answer is a strict No.

Non-alignment: India's unique contribution to foreign policy

India is the seventh largest country in the world and had a population of 340 million in 1947.¹⁵⁴ Our leaders felt that given the demographics, along with the multitude of resources, potential and strategic geo-political position, the country must have an independent approach to international relations. During the Cold War, when countries felt the pressure to align with either the capitalist American bloc or the socialist-communist Soviet bloc, India gave the world the policy of non-alignment. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Lok Sabha, "It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India...in the conditioning of the Indian mind during the struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today."¹⁵⁵ According to him, a realist, "looks at the tip of his nose and sees little beyond." He describes idealism as "realism of tomorrow."

It was a policy based on traditional Indian values of peace, tolerance, inclusivity, and non-violence (ahimsa). Non-alignment allowed India to take independent positions on international matters case-by-case. It helped India get economic aid from both blocs, which wouldn't have been possible by aligning with one particular bloc. Japan, on the other hand, signed the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan on 8 September 1951, which led to the establishment of the military alliance. Thus, Japan shared an intimate relationship

¹⁵⁴ brittanica.com/place/India/Demographic-trends

¹⁵⁵ Jawahar Lal Nehru. *Lok Sabha Debate*: December 9, 1958

with the United States. Nevertheless, did this divergence mean the two countries had nothing in common anymore? Article 51 of the Constitution of India (part IV Directive Principles of State Policy) states that the State shall endeavor to seek a peaceful settlement of international disputes. Interestingly Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan states: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”. The ideals of a peaceful world are enshrined in the constitutions of both countries. Despite finding themselves in opposite camps, the two countries signed a Peace Treaty in 1952 to establish a friendship.

Filling in the economic gaps

A developing country needs capital and technology to grow. This is precisely what defined India-Japan relations in those years. Japan and India despite being on different pages, came together on the economic front. The relations traditionally focused on financial assistance to various development projects such as Japan’s first overseas investment in 1951 to the iron ore development project in Goa. Multiple bilateral treaties and agreements were also signed, such as the Agreement of Air Peace in 1956, the Cultural Agreement in 1957, the Agreement of Commerce in 1958, and the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation in 1960. Following Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's visit to India in 1957, Japan started providing yen loans to India in 1958, as the first yen loan aid extended by the Japanese government.

Politics: warm to lukewarm

Despite economic exchange gaining momentum, matters on the political front were bleak. During the India-China war in 1962, and the India-Pakistan war in 1965, Japan took a neutral stand, much to India’s disappointment. Japan began to view non-alignment as an unrealistic foreign policy approach that was not capable of providing security to India. During the Bangladesh liberation movement in 1971, with both the United States and China extending support to Pakistan (US president Nixon even warned to intervene and support Pakistan in the war), India was left with no other alternative than to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971. The pursuit of security in an increasingly hostile neighborhood compelled the Indian government to rethink its foreign policy. India’s tilt

towards the Soviet Union became clearer and this was not congruent with Japan's international outlook, and hence the graph of ties between India and Japan was more or less a straight line, even plunging downwards sometimes.

The revival: Technological collaborations take the centre stage

However, a country cannot progress if it continues to dwell on the ghosts of the past. In the international arena, alliances form and break, and colours in the geo-political picture keep revealing different shades, as national interests take centre stage. The 1980s witnessed a turnaround with Suzuki Motor Corporation's path-breaking investment in India, in a joint venture with Maruti Udyog Limited. It not only revolutionized the automobile sector but also brought in technology transfer and opened doors for technical collaboration. Several other Japanese companies like Nippon Denso, Mitsubishi Heavy Electricals, Sony, and Yamaha sought to expand their market in India. The agreement on Cooperation in the field of Science and Technology was signed in 1985. Then-Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone paid a visit to India in 1984, followed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's subsequent visits to Japan in 1985, 1987, and 1988. In 1991, when India opened its doors to the world with sweeping economic reforms of liberalization, privatization, and globalization, Japan was one of the few countries that bailed India out of the balance of payment crisis. Moreover, India is the largest recipient of Japanese Official Development Assistance, first given in 1958. It is used in poverty alleviation, healthcare, rural development, natural disasters, population control, irrigation, ports, transport, power, AIDS control projects, and the environment.

The Times They Are A-Changin'

Ancient Indian political strategist Kautilya, in *Arthashastra* emphasizes that diplomacy is an art. He writes, "A weak king, should avert...invasion by making a treaty of peace, or by a treacherous fight on the battlefield. He may reduce the enemy's men by conciliation or by giving gifts..."¹⁵⁶ Moral principles can be followed only to a limit. And that national interest overcomes all. The decades of the 90s and 00s were testimony to this and brought sweeping changes in the way India interacted with the world, and Japan in particular.

¹⁵⁶ Kautilya. *Arthashastra*: Book VII

India's nuclear tests, the Japanese backlash, and the turnaround

The ship that sailed smoothly hit an iceberg in 1998, when India, which until then propagated the policy of non-alignment, peace, and disarmament, conducted nuclear tests at Pokhran, Rajasthan. APJ Abdul Kalam, who was a part of the scientific team, answers in his book, *Spirit of India*, “India needs peace for its progress. When...our neighboring countries have nuclear weapons, India cannot sit and do *tapas* (meditation). Strength respects strength...to defend our freedom”.¹⁵⁷ As India shifted its stance from idealism to realism, it met with stiff resistance from Japan. Japan, which had had a disastrous experience with Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombings, suspended yen loans for new projects, placed greater scrutiny on technology transfers, and froze grant aid, except for emergency and humanitarian. The keyword here is ‘except humanitarian’. Let us understand it. The canvas of India-Japan ties is idealistic white. As domestic, as well as international situations, change, various colors of realism are splashed. However, irrespective of the light or dark the colors are, the base remains white. As political scientist Henry Kissinger says, Idealism and Realism are not positive or negative, but opposite ends of a spectrum along which we act as circumstances require. Hence, when countries strongly disagree on certain issues, basic values like humanity and compassion remain intact. This is even truer for India and Japan, who have a history of cordial ties. There is always room for negotiations and adjustments, discussions and debates. The snow that had chilled India-Japan relations, melted in 2000, when then- Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India, and along with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, decided on the establishment of a ‘Global Partnership between Japan and India’.

Strengthening ties: Practical Realism

With bold steps like the economic liberalization of 1991 and nuclear tests in 1998, India shifted its moral and normative approach to international politics, to a more realpolitik-influenced outlook, which placed national security and economic growth at the topmost tier. Placing importance on long-term gains (even if it meant momentarily upsetting the international community), increasing multilateral diplomatic presence, and expanding economic cooperation despite political differences gained prominence in India's foreign policy. Both India and Japan are free democratic societies that endeavor to promote peace and

¹⁵⁷APJ Abdul Kalam. *Spirit of India*, Rajpal and Sons: Delhi, 2010, p.32.

stability in Asia and the world. Both understand the role of international institutions like the United Nations to promote peace, stability, and humanitarian programs. Not only that, several economic complementarities exist between the two nations. India, one of the world's oldest civilizations, is a young country with an average age of 29 years. Japan, on the other hand, has a sizeable aging population. India's richness in natural and human resources, along with Japan's advanced technological know-how, India's qualified and skilled workforce, and Japan's manufacturing prowess, or the huge market that India can potentially be to complement Japan's surplus capital for investment, the recent decades have been all about recognizing and enhancing these complementarities for maximum mutual benefit. Security, economic growth, and finding a strong foothold internationally have been the primary objectives of Indian foreign policy in recent years.

Bilateral visits strengthen ties

When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan in 2006, the two countries recognized the changing political, economic, security, energy, and nuclear needs and ambitions. Several fields and projects were recognized for cooperation. These included the development of Special Economic zones (SEZs), Delhi-Mumbai routes, using Japanese technology in locomotives, signals, and railway sector, development of a mega power project at Chayyur, Tamil Nadu, Lohit Hydroelectric project in Arunachal Pradesh, and the development of Indian Institute of Information Technology, Design, and Manufacturing at Jabalpur. These steps not only allow infrastructural overhaul in India but also allow Japan to strengthen its domestic economy through foreign trade and investment in India.

Enter the Dragon

The biggest factor that has helped transcend India and Japan's relations from purely economic to one focused on the balance of power and security is China's hegemonic rise and rising aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Though, why is China a reason to worry? Lack of belief in the neo-liberal international order, and a non-democratic regime are key reasons. It has an aggressive posture on territorial claims, both land and sea, and exercises dominance in the Indo-Pacific and South China sea. India on the other hand, is a democracy with free and fair elections, and a division of political power into legislative, executive, and judiciary to check

the misuse of power. It neither supports statism nor imperialism. It also does not seek to form a global coalition to challenge the existing world order. In his book *Pax Indica: India and the world of the 21st century*, Dr. Shashi Tharoor writes that India has never been a belligerent or an expansionist power and its rise is seen as non-threatening. However, the world community at large is apprehensive to say the same for China. While India and China have territorial disputes at Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh (Tibet being another friction point between the two), Japan also has disputes over Senkaku Islands in the East China sea and the Spratly Islands in South China sea. These disputes, coupled with the tussle to gain (or balance) regional power in the neighborhood have brought India and Japan together. Strategic partnerships are important as they offer flexibility in negotiation with adversaries, and allow substantial autonomy without being bullied by major powers. Border disputes between China and India, and China and Japan, fears of Chinese economic espionage in the US, increasing influence in Australian politics, the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and the aim for a peaceful maritime zone from Asia to Africa, led to the formation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) in 2007, consisting of India, Japan, US, and Australia. Naval exercises in the Malabar region and India's maritime exercises in the South China sea have been prominent features of QUAD. Naturally, China remains strongly suspicious of the QUAD as an effort to contain its rise. China has been a recurring factor in recent years. In the words of scholar Hayoun Rayu, "in the process of adjusting and re-structuring geopolitics, this cooperation (India and Japan) will influence China and at the same time, China will influence the shape of this relationship."¹⁵⁸

Maritime security

The Indian Ocean, which caresses the southern tip of India, gives the country an important strategic position. More than 80 percent of the world's seaborne trade in oil happens through the Indian Ocean and its vital chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. 80% of oil and 20% of ships bound for Japan, pass through the Strait of Malacca. The quest for maritime security and energy security has brought the naval forces of India and Japan to closely coordinate with each other.

¹⁵⁸ Hayoun Ryou. "India-Japan Security Cooperation: Chinese Perception", *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No.89, January 2009, p.4.

The decade 2010: Relations attain depth

The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, which was proposed in 2004, was finally signed between India and Japan in 2011. It aims to create economic partnerships that will enhance the vibrancy of their markets, improve industry competitiveness and promote sustainable development. It has eliminated 94% of tariffs within ten years.

A volatile neighborhood marred with border skirmishes with Pakistan and China (and minor friction on boundary disputes with Nepal and Bangladesh as well), makes it imperative for India to join hands with countries like Japan, and move from solely economic, to defense and security relations. Prime Minister Modi, elected to power in 2014, after a thumping mandate, made his first bilateral visit outside the subcontinent to Japan. The partnership was elevated to “Special Strategic Global Partnership”. Five pacts were signed for defense exchanges, cooperation in clean energy, roads and highways, healthcare, and bullet train projects. MoUs for cooperation in heritage, conservation, city modernization, art, culture, and academics. Plans to develop Varanasi on the pattern of Kyoto smart city were also created. Furthermore, in 2016, feathers of cooperation in nuclear energy, manufacturing skill transfer program, MoUs in the field of outer space, earth science and marine technology, agriculture, food industry, transport and urban development, and cultural exchanges, were added to the hat of thriving relations. The themes of MoUs like outer space, nuclear energy, and earth science reflect the adaptive nature of our relations, which are not stagnant, but all-encompassing, in tune with the changing paradigm of the world, its challenges, and needs. India-US-Japan trilateral, which represents 25% of the world population and 35% of the world GDP, was elevated to the ministerial level in 2015.

The year 2016 was a breakthrough in India-Japan ties with the signing of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Pact after years of deliberation. This treaty allows Japan to transfer nuclear technology-related components and help build reactors in India. The significance of this pact is highlighted by the fact that Japan has such treaties with 13 countries but India is the first non-NPT member. In 2017, keeping in mind the growing menace of terrorism, cooperation in dealing with terror groups like Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad was signed. Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and India’s Act East policy have found common ground in the setting up of the India-Japan Cooperation Forum for

Development of North-East, and the India-Japan Act East Forum. Capacity enhancement for sustainable agriculture, development of Agro-industries, promoting cultural exchange, disaster resilience, road network connectivity, and promoting Skill India are some of the scopes of cooperation underlined in these forums.

Economically, there have been deeper inroads too. Japan External Trade Organization has been set up in Ahmedabad, Bengaluru, Chennai, Mumbai, and New Delhi to promote mutual trade and promote Japanese small and medium enterprise investment. India chose Japan over China for its bullet train project. 81% of the cost is being financed by the Japanese government with a USD 13.8 billion soft yen loan at a 0.1% rate of interest. While India usually rejects proposals for outsider assistance in strategic locations, it partnered with Japan to develop a 15-megawatt diesel power plant in South Andaman Islands. India is also trying to counterbalance China's growing influence in the neighborhood with Trincomalee port and the development of Colombo port with Japanese help, in response to the Chinese hold at Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor is another example where India and Japan have come together. India's experience in the African market, plus Japan's technological prowess allows them to pursue joint ventures like connectivity, healthcare, infrastructure and manufacturing, capacity building, and people-to-people contact, in sync with Sustainable Development Goals given by United Nations.

In an article published in *Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia-Pacific studies*, the author argues that when it comes to Japan, India maintains a realist perspective of the balance of power as well as a constructivist perspective of non-alignment.¹⁵⁹ Truly indeed, no country can be either realist or idealist. Balance of views is an important requisite for the balance of power. In the year 2020, the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement were signed. This permits Indian Navy to use the Japanese base in Djibouti and Japan's Navy to access the Indian base in Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and also share fuel, ammunition et cetera. The Agreement came into force in July 2021. More recently, at the Japan-India 2+2 meeting held in Japan in September 2022, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida expressed his desire for India and Japan to work together to realize a 'free and open Indo-Pacific', and further strengthen the

¹⁵⁹ Astha Chadha. "India's Foreign Policy towards Japan: Special Partnership amid Regional Transformation", *Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies*, Vol.38, Issue 1, 2020, pp.19-37.

Special Strategic Global Partnership. Moreover, they are also cooperating in the first-ever bilateral air force exercise.

Both India and Japan strive for permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council. While India is an active participant in UN peacekeeping operations, a vocal proponent of nuclear arms control, and human rights, and has a large economy and population that goes unrepresented, Japan too, which makes the second largest budgetary contribution to the UN (12.5%), is under-represented. Given cordial ties, it is only natural that both countries, instead of competing, support each other's bids for the same. Platforms like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and East Asia Summit have brought the countries closer on several issues.

Challenges to India-Japan ties and the road ahead

Universal values like freedom, human rights, democracy, and non-violence define India-Japan relations. Nevertheless, there are challenges too. There are differences in policy priorities. India aims for multi-polarity, non-alignment, and a great power identity with the capacity to influence and build international order. At the regional level (Indo-Pacific), India aims for strengthened status as a maritime power, cooperation with ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), de-hyphenate itself from Pakistan, and secure access to energy resources from the Arab world. Japan on the other world aims to strengthen security alliances and improve its geopolitical calculations.

Indian foreign policy approach towards Japan must focus on further solidifying economic linkages by diversifying trade portfolios. The scope to invest in more sectors and geographical regions of India should be explored. While India has made a significant leap in the Ease of Doing Business Index (142nd in 2014 to 63rd in 2019), it must further remove any roadblocks, if any, for foreign investors while protecting its domestic interests at the same time. Corruption must be tackled with good governance that is not 'political politics' but 'development politics.'

When it comes to the China factor, in the words of Robert B. Zoellick, who has served as the President of the World Bank, "It is in our interests to welcome the rise of China as a 'responsible stakeholder. If we treat China as an enemy, we guarantee enmity. Integration plus a hedge against uncertainty is a better approach.'" Despite simmering political tensions, India-

China bilateral trade hit a record high of over USD 125 billion in 2021. Japan too had export worth USD 206.2 billion and imports worth USD 165.9 billion with China in 2021. Hence, to avoid the spillover of political tensions into the economic arena, soft balancing is imperative.

Media Influence

Moreover, it is not only the external geo-political and economic challenges that influence foreign policy. The influence of media, business, industrial groups, and social movements are often underestimated determinants of foreign policy. Controversial statements, which generate tensions must be avoided, and if spoken, should be urgently diffused using diplomatic means. India must ensure that internal developments do not spill over internationally and dominate and shape foreign policies.

Strong Personal Equation -Warm ties

Our leaders, like everyone else, are human beings with emotions. The bonhomie between political leaders at the personal level often helps break the ice and create breakthroughs in difficult situations. This amity is visible in India-Japan ties. The personal equations between Indian Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi, with the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has brought a touch of friendship into ties that were only concerned with economics and trade. As Modi wrote in a heartfelt blog post after Abe's death, "...Japan and the world have lost a great visionary. And, I have lost a dear friend. Right from our first meeting, our friendship went beyond the shackles of official protocol...he was full of new ideas and invaluable insights on governance, economy, culture, foreign policy, and various other subjects...". When leaders share such views with fellow leaders, the relations between countries are bound to strengthen, with love and compassion forming the base of their relationship.

People-to-people trust

When leaders interact in a healthy, friendly, and mutually respectful manner, the perceptions of the people about the countries change too. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama says, economic success does not depend only on competition, technology, and skills, but also on the culture of trust called 'spontaneous sociability'. Spontaneous sociability is the readiness to get along with fellow citizens in economically productive ways. The number of Indian nationals residing in Japan is 36,777 (as of June 2021) while the number of Japanese nationals in India stands at

9,313 (as of October 2021)¹⁶⁰. In a Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey by Pew Research Center, 44% of Indians hold a favorable perception of Japan, while 22% hold an unfavorable view. Since these statistics are not very encouraging, enhancing people-to-people trust is important.

Conclusion

Considering the geo-political mirror images that the kaleidoscope of the twenty-first century is reflecting, India and Japan must look beyond their mutual complementarities and elevate them to an asset for each other and the world at large, without much further ado. To quote the late Shinzo Abe, during his visit to India in 2015, he said, “A strong India is in the best interest of Japan and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.” Foreign Minister of India, S. Jaishankar said in 2016, “evaluating India’s advancement of its international interests will require...clearer assessment...objectives, progress made, and India’s continuing limitations. The challenge will be ...difficult in a fast-evolving and unpredictable world.” Indeed, the assessment will not be easy, however, once it is achieved, the sunrays from the land of the rising sun will continue to bring warmth into our relations.

¹⁶⁰ mofa.go.jp

Chapter VI: Analyzing India-Israel Relations through the Prism of Idealism and Realism

Priyanka Nautiyal

Introduction

India and Israel are the two oldest civilizations; both nations share a common colonial past under the imperialism of the British. Both nations gained independence in the years 1947 and 1948 respectively in the phase of decolonization. Both nations had to go through a traumatic and turbulent partition and mining the democratic spirit in such a situation was not an easy task for both country. Even though there are many similarities, it took many years to recognize each other. It took almost four decades to establish a very cordial relationship by having good bilateral ties and establishing trade relationships. But this relationship is not just limited to a small sphere but has extended to various other spheres also like the military, arms, and ammunition, agriculture, technology, etc. India has always had a strong ambition for a strategic rise and establishing a cordial relationship between India and Israel, this rise could be achieved as both nations have tried to build deep ties on all levels from intelligence to military and various other sectors and it reflects the long-term benefits that both the partners would be receiving.

Israel's Foreign Policy

Israel's foreign policy was shaped even before its formation as it is dominated by Zionist ideology and diplomacy. Foreign policy was viewed as state keeping, it included maintaining a Jewish territory with a significant Jewish population, developing a feasible economy, focusing on nuclear acquisition and strengthening military capabilities, seeking accommodation with neighbors, and neutralizing the regional threats. The end of the cold war era ushered a new phase for Israel's foreign policy as Israel got a strong strategic position; the disintegration of the Soviet bloc was also viewed as the collapse of one of its greatest enemies of Israel that were the Arabs. The world had become unipolar and the US had always supported Israel on every front possible. In the 1990s during the Gulf War the US-led coalition forces weakened the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization], these dramatic changes clubbed with changes within Israel really helped the country to move forward. In 1985 there was the restructuring of Israel's economy and any migrants from USSR returned to seize the opportunity all these

factors helped Israel to tackle the challenges posed by the Cold War. It can be stated that the strategic alliance between US and Israel was forged during the Cold War as the US identified Israel as a parapet against Communism.

India's Foreign Policy

India's foreign policy can be dated back to the era of British rule in India. On the eve of independence India's then Prime Minister Pt. Nehru was the founding father of Panchsheel and he was the one who had framed India's foreign policy at that time. India's foreign policy has been a blend of Idealism and Realism, post-independence it was more purely based on ideas or idealism but gradually, especially after India-Sino War, it became more realistic, and presently it is a blend of the two. India has been a staunch supporter of NAM and had denied assistance from any two blocs but in 1971, India chose to be a very good friend of the Soviet Union because of the threats coming from its neighbors. In the post-cold war era, India chose the policy of liberation and globalization also helped in changing the outlook towards other countries as India also started strengthening its relationships with other countries.

History of India-Israel Relations

India had voted at the UN in 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism and then establishing diplomatic relations with Israel in 1991 was seen as a major game changer or reversal in India's position towards Palestine. India's relations with Israel were criticized on many grounds and one such cause was the deviation from the country's long-standing values and commitment to Palestine was our leaders' vision. Many leaders since the beginning of the Indian national movement have supported Palestine over Israel. Mr. Jagdish P. Sharma¹⁶¹ stated that CPI feels that the Palestinians have been let down by India which had championed their cause over the years, India decided to upgrade its relations with Israel when the Palestinian issue was still unresolved. Even many prominent Muslim leaders and then Prime Minister of India Mr. V.P. Singh had also criticized the decision taken by Congress because it was a sellout of India's foreign policy and this decision was taken hastily because of the enormous amount of pressure coming from the IMF.

¹⁶¹ Jagdish P. Sharma. "India and Israel: A Study of Evolution in Relations (1948 - 92)." *Proceedings of The Indian History Congress*, Vol. 53 (1992), pp.593-597.

The Israeli factor has been very determinant when it comes to India's West Asia policy. India has always been sympathetic towards the Jews as they were not only oppressed by the Nazis but also by various other European countries too. India recognized the Jewish state in 1950 but full diplomatic relations were still not established. In 1947 India voted against the resolution of the UN partitioning Palestine. But as Israel began consolidating power a large number of Arab Palestinians were aggressively removed from their houses and Israel began occupying larger chunks of Arab Palestinian territory. The soft corner which India had for Israel was no more there and India began opposing to policies of Israel.

History of India-Palestine Relations

A new phase of India's Arab relationship emerged with the dawn of independence. Mr. Jagdish Sharma says that during the last five decades India and many of the Arab states forged the same understanding and a similar outlook on many international issues. Both Mahatma Gandhi and Pt. Nehru has been an ardent supporter of the Arab - Palestine struggle against Zionism as it was viewed as a part of Afro-Asian unity against the forces of colonialism and racism. India had very strongly supported the Arab Palestinian cause also recognized PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and saw its leader as the sole and legitimate representative of the Arab Palestine people. In the 1980s India granted full diplomatic support to the Palestine Liberation Organization and at the same moment unflinching support to the Arab people. Further realism and flexibility are part and parcel of conducting one's foreign policy. But it must not be at the cost of India's inherent socio-political imperatives as well as its cultural values. India in recent years has been following the policy of dehypenation as far as Palestine-Israel relations are concerned. As per this policy, India's relationship with Israel stands on merit which is separate or somewhat different from India's relationship with Palestine. It can further be stated that Palestine has been the bone of contention between India and Israel relations, many times India's democratic spirit has been questioned because of our support towards Israel because of the Human Rights violation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. India's defense ties with Israel make the relationship between India and Palestine even more complex, the Palestinian embassy officials in Delhi many a time have expressed their unhappiness and despondency over the strengthening of ties between India and Israel,

especially on the defense grounds. It is seen as a very challenging task for India to maintain good relations with Iran and other countries of the Middle East along with Israel because many of these nations deny the presence as well as the existence of Israel.

Analyzing from the Prism of Offensive Realism

As per offensive realism states should maximize power as much as possible to survive anarchy. The ultimate goal is hegemonic Status. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the major arms suppliers of India weakened, and Pakistan's activities on the border and India's hostile neighborhood forced India to search for new trading partners. This is how the defense relationship between the two nations started, the anarchic situation in the international system and the intentions and suspicious attitude of the other states forced India to become a dominant force in the Indian Ocean region as well as increase its military capabilities. In such an anarchic international system the best way to survive is to increase your security. There is always a threat of nuclear attack from Pakistan, to defeat this threat India has been researching nuclear technology and various other technology to keep itself safe from the enemy's eyes. Israel is one such ally that India trusts and sees as a good partner, especially in the field of defense and the arms race. The friendship between India and Israel will make India more powerful and will also help in playing a significant role in South Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia at the same moment the threats rising from Pakistan can be undermined. Israel's quest for India's friendship is based on a motive that is suppressing Pakistan's strong commitment to helping the Middle Eastern region. The India - Israel collaboration poses major threats to Pakistan also as the relationship between both countries has the potential to make an impact on global politics by altering the balance of power, not just in the region of South Asia but entire Asia and the Middle Eastern region.

Threats from Pakistan and China

The cordial relationship between India and Israel can be understood from the nature of Israel's foreign policy which seeks to invest in that country that can serve the goals of the national interest of Israel. India on the other hand wants to enhance its military capabilities to tackle the tensions posed by India-Pakistan relations. For India, the security threat emerges from the increasing nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and the issues in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In the

case of Israel, it is also threatened by the nuclear capability of Pakistan because of its constant support for Palestine. Israel's support towards India has been based on many grounds like in the 1960s India had established secret military and intelligence links with Israel. Israel's support for India was also based on the grounds to neutralize India's attitude towards the Arab and Palestinian cause, during the Indo-Pakistan war the Arab states had firmly supported Pakistan. Israel's wholehearted support towards India was because of its hatred towards Pakistan and considered it as its arch-rival. Adding to these the religious and ideological differences turn Pakistan and Israel into a foe. Whereas one of the objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy has been the anti-Zionist movement and it has acted as the main source of opposition to any actions which have been detrimental to the Muslims.

Israel has always helped India to fight the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley. It has been due to mutual trust, same views, and security issues that both the countries (India and Israel) have joined hands to fight against the common cause. The other major advantages of India-Israel relations have been the collaboration on space programs, research, agriculture, and manufacturing capabilities. One such India-Israel military agreement deal was signed which was meant to help India to develop a new strike. As both India nor Israel are not signatories of NPT and CTBT they have a common ground for the formulation of a defense policy. Even though both of them have officially denied the existence of any such treaty. Therefore, Pakistan is very much apprehended over the emergence of India-Israel Strategic and defense relations. Israel's policy toward China and Pakistan poses a few threats to India also. Even though there are disagreements in this relationship, it is stated that in the 1970s especially the Israeli- Chinese military cooperation involved technological transfers as well as the upgradation of the latest equipment. Such transfer of technology would be beneficial for China and indirectly beneficial for Pakistan. Therefore, it can be stated that India should not be concerned about Israel's relations with its neighbor and its rivals, henceforth it cannot be indifferent to such partnerships, but in the present context, Israel has more tilt toward India.

India-Israel Relations in Contemporary Times

India and Israel share the same outlook on regional disputes, both states are challenged by terrorism emerging from the hostile neighborhood. The states have also waged a war against their neighbors; it is also characterized by religious as well as some ethnic factors. For both

states, there have been chances for external interventions, in the case of India it is the conflict over Kashmir, and in the case of Israel, it is Palestine. But this external intervention is not always welcomed. The two nations' often feel that they are very perplexed because of the ways they are stuck as both of their rivals possess weapons of mass destruction. In the context of Arab Israeli relations, existential fear still exists even though there has been an overall improvement since the end of the cold war when it comes to the Arab Israeli peace process and there have been changes introduced in favor of Israel. Israel is still treated with hostility by a few Arab nations and Israel's quest for good friends such as India has not ended. Another source of threat for both nations is radical Islam having roots in the greater Middle East. It is one of the threats where both nations converge. India has often regarded a few regions of the Arab world as the hub of extremism and fundamentalism. India became suspicious when Saudi Arabia and Pakistan's relations became cordial. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Arab world are a constant threat to Israeli security. This combination of fanatic hatred and the possession of a nuclear weapon is a constant threat to both nations.

After the cold war, the two states differ when it comes to global orientation, the world became more pro-Israel while in the case of India the vulnerability increased as the Soviet Union collapsed, and India one of the major arms suppliers was not there and India had to look for other alternatives. Israel is a silent supporter of American Hegemony because the US has always been interested in and suspecting the Israeli stance on the politics of the Middle East. India Israel's Strategic engagement had taken place after the Kargil War when Israel provided India with laser-guided bombs, unmanned Aerial vehicles, and other arms and ammunition with the latest technology.

Terrorism and the issue of Infiltration

In the year 1992, the then-Indian Defense Minister admitted cooperation with Israel on the issue of counterterrorism. Both countries had a very long history when it comes to the issue of counterterrorism. This cooperation was hidden from the public eye. It involved the exchange of information on terrorist grouping, financing, recruiting, etc. It also involved drawing a comparison between the national doctrines as well as operating experiences. Since the 9/11 Attack, counterterrorism has gained a lot of significance and is viewed with a lot of importance in the context of international cooperation. The 2008 Mumbai Attacks also reflected that India

should be prepared for better counterterrorism preparations and devices and that there should be better cooperation with Israeli agencies.

Both nations face the issue of infiltration at their borders which raises very big security concerns. Both nations have exchanged their viewpoints on doctrine and the availability of types of equipment. There is always a fear of terrorism springing from the camps situated in Pakistan; the Indian army has also deployed troops inside the enemy lines to combat it. As India wants that the infiltration which comes from the other side of the border needs to be stopped the only way is good monitoring equipment like battlefield radars, night warfare equipment detecting sensors, etc. These types of technological devices have already been developed by Israel and they are providing them to India.

Radical and Fundamental activities affecting both the Nations

India and Israel have faced the issue of radicalism in their nation as well as in their neighborhood. The Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979 had given legitimacy to Islamisation, it was during this time that this impacted India also and many radical individuals in India also got energized by this movement. Pakistan has always supported the activities of such groups and used them to suit their foreign policy goals in the context of India and Afghanistan. Although the fear of Israel is twofold one is through the transferring of nuclear weapons from Pakistan to the Arab world and the second from nuclear-armed Iran.

Organizations like ISIS are bringing more ramifications beyond their control in Syria and Iraq. It also threatens the peace of Jordan, Israel's neighbors, and various other nations. India and Israel have Muslim minorities even if a small faction gets radicalized it will have a dire impact on the security of the nation. But a large part of the Indian Muslims are very well integrated into the society and in Israel, 20 percent of the population comprises the Arab Muslim population out of which most of them are law-abiding and Israel is fearful of the Muslim organizations that are appealing to their Arab counterparts in Israel to fight against the state.

Impact of India-Israel Partnership on the Indian Ocean

The India-Israeli partnership has many implications related to the Indian Ocean. It is implicit that India is a major international player in the Indian Ocean. Due to Israel's flourishing

strategic partnership with India and its growing concern about Pakistan and Iran, the Indian Ocean has also become an area of growing interest for Israel. Even India bolstered its presence in the Indian Ocean due to the power projection strategy of China in the form of a 'string of pearls.'

The Indian Ocean has been a kind of transit area for Israel for its connections with eastern countries because it was unable to use the land routes which were obstructed by its unfriendly neighbors in the form of Arabs. Israel was focused; in particular, on one of the critical points of the Indian Ocean through which all the exports of Israel to East and South Asia pass which is the 'Bab El Mandeb Straits.' Jerusalem's acts of being friendly with Eritrea and Ethiopia had these straits in focus. The Israeli strategy is not only limited to these states but even states on the Indian Ocean littoral; South Africa and Kenya are a part of its focus.

After the elimination of the threat of Iraq (2003), Israel's main concern is Iran which lies adjacent to the Indian Ocean waters. Israel has strengthened its strategic air and sea reach in response to the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran to its existence. Since the early 1990s, Israel has evolved an ability to project the power of its navy and air force to a distance as far as 1500 km including the expansion of its air refueling options for further extension of its military outstretch. In addition to its air strength, Israel also developed an ocean-going navy with Iran in consideration. The Saar-5 corvettes of Israel can stay at sea for a long period and be also spotted in the Indian Ocean. Not only this, Israel has even ordered larger ships from Germany.

The Submarines that Israel has are even equipped with the ability to launch long-range cruise missiles. The reports of Indo-Israeli cooperation in the naval sphere surfaced when one such missile was tested in the Indian Ocean waters. And even India is not against the existence of Israel in the Indian Ocean. The strategic community of Israel is also inclined towards achieving a strategic depth in the sea and the formation of a submarine-based nuclear second-strike force. Such capabilities are being built by Israel to counter any potential threat of Pakistan against the Israeli state. Israel also requires a large naval force to safeguard its gas fields in the Mediterranean.

How India's Proximity with Israel affects its Relationship with Central Asia

India competes with its regional rivals, Pakistan and China, for influence in Central Asia which is seen as its 'extended strategic neighborhood'. India also has time-honored cultural and strategic relations with the newly accessible and energy-rich Central Asian region. Along similar lines, Israel also shows interest in the region which has assimilated into Greater Middle East. Similar to India, Israel has also maintained a humble business and diplomatic existence by selling defense equipment to Central Asian states. Saudis and Iranians contribute to the expansion of radical Islamism and hence both India and Israel aim at controlling their impact. Both states are also alarmed at the Islamic inclination of the foreign policy of Turkey from 2002 onwards, and its presence in Central Asia. They also want to maintain stability in the region for the smooth flow of gas and oil. There might be differences over peripheral issues like the direction of planned pipelines but both states support low prices of energy. India is concerned about the 'Belt and Road Initiative of China on the lines of the ancient 'Silk Route', which will increase and improve China's influence. Israel's pro-US inclination guides it to think about Chinese initiatives with suspicion. Israel is lately more vigilant toward Chinese initiatives in the region of the Greater Middle East and even in Israel itself.

US Intervention in India-Israel Relations

The greater cooperation between India and the US, especially after the 9/11 attacks, doesn't mean that India will come under American enclosure and some differences are bound to remain. The Indian relations with Jerusalem will be complementary and beneficial to the relations between Washington and New Delhi.

There is generally an exaggeration of the influence of the Jewish lobby in America but it does hold importance. During the 1990s, the American Jewish organizations were smart enough to realize the importance of the US and India for Israel and also the benefits of fostering cordial relations with the flourishing Indian community in the US, which also is increasing its influence in Congress. Being small, but affluent, highly educated, and attached to democratic homelands, cooperation among both communities has the potential to increase their influence.

The various lobbies like The American-Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC), American Jewish Committee, and the Jewish Institute on National Security Affairs (JINSA) nurture ties with the Indian lobby in the US. The US-India Political Action Committee

(USINPAC), an Indian lobby has members that desired to be as good as American Jewish groups and are also keen to foster cordial relations with them.

Indian and Israeli communities are closely working on issues like anti-terrorism legislation and supporting favorable candidates. An example of their cooperation is that both communities worked towards getting a nod from the Bush administration about Israel selling Phalcon AWACS to India. Also, both communities were successful in adding an amendment to the bill giving aid to Pakistan which called upon Islamabad to prevent militants from infiltrating India's borders and also to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Jewish support was also essential in passing the Indo-US nuclear deal in the US Congress which permitted access to India to nuclear technology for civilian uses even when India was not a part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

India and Israel also showed cooperation concerning the international arms control regimes sponsored by America. Both India nor Israel did not yield to the pressures of the US to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both nations also cooperated against the US initiatives in that area which were revived during the Obama administration.

Post-2014 India-Israel Relations

Since the year 2014, there has been a remarkable change in the India-Israel relationship as earlier both countries have signed various agreements, especially on defense and technology. Presently India is the largest purchaser of Israeli weapons. The present government has always been willing to build political and commercial ties with Israel. The Israeli industries have become the focus of attention. It also presents India's policy in the sphere of economic pragmatism. The present-day Modi government has established India's relations with the world having expertise in agriculture, technology, and security.

Conclusion

The bilateral relations between India and Israel have strengthened especially after the end of the cold war and the reasons associated with it include the convergence of interests, especially on regional grounds, and the global issues that have further brought these countries together. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the region of South Asia and the Middle East have been posing challenges to global order and security. To meet the growing demands of

upgradation as well as modernized defense weapons, India needs to achieve self-reliance. At the same point in time, Israel is also getting the opportunity to sell its weapons and arms, and ammunition in the Indian market. Henceforth India and Israel's relations have received tremendous importance as far as the security aspect is concerned any constructive relationship between the countries is more likely to cover joint production and transfer of technology.

Chapter VII: Scope For Cooperation or Continued Conflict: India-Pak Relations

Harshita Sawhney

The Tragic past: Pre-independence scenario

The collective history of these two nations can be traced back to the Indus Valley civilization, some 2500-1700 BCE. This geographical landmass is one of the oldest, socio-culturally rich human inhabitations, and the southern part of our prodigious continent in modern times is quite famous for its geopolitical spacing involving the two historically bound nations - India and Pakistan. Their stories continued to be the same until the most horrendous partition happened. On the night of 'Tryst with destiny,' India got its Independence and this independence gave birth to a new Theocratic nation of Islam-Pakistan.

From the beginning, both countries do not share any cordial relations though before they came into being it was assumed that the neighbors despite being ideologically and fundamentally different will continue to strive together because of their long-shared ancestry and lifestyle. Now the major question kicks in that are 'What has led to the partition and the pain it has brought?' If civilization is thriving together for so long then what is responsible for such a divide and always bitter relations? The case is so worst that at present no side is ready to tolerate anything coming from either side, peace is like a distant dream. Today's populist politics of nationalism happening at the domestic level in both countries in turn transforms the basis of foreign policy in India and Pakistan.

Before we move any further to discuss India's foreign policy towards Pakistan or let alone what foreign policy is we need to dive into the historical past of what led to the stepping stone of this divide.

Two Nation Theory

Quite an infamous demand has been rose by the Muslim League, to brief Muslim league was established in 1906 to struggle for the constitutional safeguards of Muslim rights and interests by Nawab Khuwaja Salimullah. Although at first the party was formulated to present the demands of Muslim elites against the rainbow-like Congress which with time has grown more towards the inclusion of all classes and their demands. Two nation theory which calls for the demand of a separate nation for the Muslims of British India was an extreme step taken by the

then leaders of the Muslim League which are solely based on the religious divide between Hindus and Muslims.

In one of his speeches, M. Ali Jinnah said “Hindus and Muslims belong to two religions, philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither intermarry nor interdine and indeed belong to different civilizations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions, they have their homeland, their territory and their state”¹⁶² Proponents claim that Pakistan is a state founded on an ideological basis and not on territorial grounds. Its foundations have been laid on Islamic ideology based on the Quranic teachings and Sunnah. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, a Muslim poet, and philosopher was the one who for the very first time put forward the idea of a separate Muslim state at a meeting of the All-India Muslim League in 1930 at Allahabad.¹⁶³

Hindus and Muslims for centuries were living together, adjusting and accepting each other's values and customs and for this reason, some believed that it was the colonizers who were fearful of this cooperation that could pose an unopposed rebellion against them to keep their reign intact the very politics of divide and rule was adopted making the two forces realize how incompatible their wishes and demands are together.

It was the partition of Bengal in 1905 which was considered to be the 1st act of the British toward breaking Hindu-Muslim unity. With almost a year later Muslim league was formed and in 1909 with Morley Minto's reforms underlay the everlasting series of insecurity between the two religious camps. During these reforms, the Muslim league put forward the demand for separate electorates, one-third representation at the center, and a quota in civil service and government jobs in a united India. Although these demands were not accepted in the Indian council Act of 1909 it surely reflects the outlook of Muslim ruling elites and landlords regarding their position in the Independent Hindu majority nation. At the time of the Non-cooperation movement everyone witnessed the great Hindu-Muslim unity for a brief period, Muslim league supported Congress in this to show discontent over the removal of the caliphate in turkey but the movement met its abrupt end because of the Chauri Chaura incident. Mahatma Gandhi had to call off the movement after the violence broke out and the Muslim League unable to fulfill their demand of restoring the caliphate took back their support and the relations kept going downhill.

¹⁶² M. S. Hussain, (1997). *Hindu Muslim Conflict Asia 712-1947: A Case Study of the Genesis of Pakistan*. Lahore: University of Punjab.

¹⁶³ A Jamil-ud-Din. (1970). *Final Phases of Struggle for Pakistan*.

After the 1937 provincial elections in which Congress formed its government in 7 major provinces out of 11 and the Muslim League was unable to do so in any province things started to radicalize on this front. The feelings of alienation and negligence spurted out and Muslim league leaders started to consolidate their support over the demand for a separate nation. For them losing their political significance under the majority of elite Hindu leaders was a driving force to fulfill their aspirations. This first election experience even made moderate liberal leaders like Muhammad Ali Jinnah start vocalizing for Pakistan. When the time of the Cripps Mission in 1942 when India was granted dominion status under the British Empire, they did not accept the demand for Pakistan and prospects were all under the talking stage, these turned out to be a big failure and consensus cannot be achieved. An outburst in Calcutta from 16th -20th august proved to be a dead end, “The Great Killing” which was a series of sporadic rioting, murder, and looting, completely deteriorating hopes of Hindu Muslim unity in any case, and finally, both political parties involved agreed on accepting the theory that led to ‘vivisection of India.’

Mr. Jinnah has stated, “Pakistan is a state which has been deliberately created not on an economic, linguistic or racial basis but religious unity.”¹⁶⁴ This overgeneralization of a diverse community has led Pakistan to suffer from an identity crisis. Pakistan was born from the womb of fear and generations have spent their lives awaiting affirmation or negation of the Two-Nation Theory.¹⁶⁵ What happens to them is something Rolf Dobelli in his book ‘The Art of Thinking Clearly’ calls the “sunk cost fallacy”. It is like a gambler’s addictive tendency to bid on losing hands one after the other with a false conviction that the chances of victory would be higher the next time.

Post-Independence Developments

From the day the two nations gained independence, their relations have faced one or the other challenge - The great pain of partition, to begin with, and since then a lot of water has been flown down to Indus and Ganges. The agony of partition was not over yet and an intermediate clash took place over the Kashmiri territory, as early as October of 1947. A British lawyer, Cyril Radcliffe, who had never before set foot on Indian soil, presided over the partition of

¹⁶⁴ Afzal, M.R. *Selected Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah*

¹⁶⁵ P. R. Shehab. (2001, 09 11). *Origin of Two Nations Theory*.

British India's two largest multicultural provinces, Punjab and Bengal. Due to the hustle, lack of knowledge and awareness regarding the ground realities, and willingness of the common masses the unresolved feelings remains. The basis of drawing the lines on our map was the majority of the population and those independent areas, the princely states were given open choices either to merge with India or Pakistan or remain independent. The state of Kashmir was one such state bestowed with this choice.

Now to talk about Kashmir, a haven on Earth with its beautiful lakes and aesthetic gardens with people of every faith: Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, and Christian. Their craftsmanship and artistry blended to create a uniquely tolerant, beautifully harmonious eclectic culture called 'Kashmiryat', a microcosmic reflection of South Asia's complexity. Its ruler's history is diverse too but not go into it much, before partition it was under the kingship of Hindu ruler Hari Singh with 77% of the population being Muslim it was Pakistan's hit list. Hari Singh shared a close bond with Mountbatten and was solely given the ascendancy to decide the leap of faith of Kashmiris and he was indecisive. Pakistani leaders were sure of Kashmir's ascendancy to their state but became impatient and infiltration was done by Pathan tribes in Kashmir quickly seizing Muzaffarabad. This incident marked the beginning of India's diplomatic relations with Pakistan.

Geopolitics in South Asia

Geopolitics is an often-used word in the discourse of international politics. The word signifies how geography and space influence foreign relations.¹⁶⁶ In the case of India and Pakistan, the geographical proximity and territorial dispute shape the direction of foreign policy. Foreign policy is again a fancy yet intriguing term it's how a nation tries to interact with other countries of the world and establish political, economic, sociocultural, etc. relations. We can infer it as a set of political goals or policies that provides an outline for fulfilling national interest, here likewise India's foreign policy has the end goal of serving India's national interest at the most and since ours is a globalized world with unimaginable linkages and dependency foreign policy has become every nation's backbone.

¹⁶⁶ J. Agnew & S. Crobridge, *Mastering Space. Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, Routledge: London. 2003.

Focusing specifically on India's foreign policy towards Pakistan we can assume it to be a certain course of our actions – diplomats, political leaders, policies providing us with the direction, an aiding tool dealing with our complex relations with our associate neighbor. Here, as the chapter signifies, we have to cater a specific aim of categorizing India's foreign policy approach towards Pakistan in the broader division of two very famously advocated theories of International Relations – Idealism & Realism, two competing traditional approaches, each of which wants recognition as the sound approach to the study of international relations. Each advocates a particular view of the totality of international reality and believes that it can be adopted as the means for understanding and explaining all aspects of international relations¹⁶⁷. Dr. John H. Herz defines "realism" as a thought that "takes into consideration the implications for the political life of those security and power factors which are inherent in human society"¹⁶⁸ rather than just attributing it to what ought to be, the reality, the political doctrine of expediency given by Machiavelli or the philosophic doctrine of empiricism by Locke.

Political idealism, according to Dr. Herz, is the type of political thinking that "does not recognize the problems arising from "the security and power dilemma," or "takes notice of them only in a perfunctory way, and concentrates its interest upon rational conditions or rational solutions." This one is just one person's perspective if we want to get a clear idea of what these theories are then we have to dissect our understanding of them by the core ideas that they pose.

The question here is What is the nature of India's foreign policy toward Pakistan, is it idealistic or realistic or is there any third way we can follow? Now that we are well acquitted with the pre-independence scenario, now the chapter only follows and scrutinizes India's approach and actions in dealing with Pakistan. The theory of realism has been propounded and supported by many prominent thinkers, from E.R Garr, Hans J. Morgenthau (a renowned classical realist), Kenneth waltz's structural realist to John Mearsheimer, a neorealist, it's indeed complex but what all these thinkers talked about in common is what forms the core of this theory these are Security and Power dilemma, the idea of relative and absolute gain, structure of the international system and Balance of power.

¹⁶⁷ Ch. Kegley & E.R. Wittkopf, *World Politics. Trend and Transformation*, 12th ed., Thomson/Wadsworth 2008, p.77.

¹⁶⁸ Perer Stirk. "John H. Herz: Realism and the fragility of International order." *Review of International Studies*. Vol.31, pp.185-306.

Whereas the main supporters of idealism have been Mahatma Gandhi, Bertrand Russell, Woodrow Wilson, Aldous Huxley, William Ladd, Richard Cobben, Margret Mead, and others. The idealist concept for some is Utopian in reality because Idealism stands for improving the course of international relations by eliminating war, hunger, inequality, tyranny, force, suppression, and violence from international relations for which it accepts the possibility of creating a world free from these evils by depending upon reason, science and education and as Bertrand Russell said: “A world full of human happiness is not beyond human power to achieve.” In the present times, Liberal idealism has taken over the classic one the approach derives strength from the general idea of evolutionary progress in society and the spirit of liberal idealism which was at the back of American policies, particularly during the inter-war years. During the inter-war years (1919-39), U.S. President Woodrow Wilson became its most forceful exponent.

Now after getting some idea about the basis for this theory, we come back to our assessment, from 1947 to present-day India and Pakistan have indulged themselves in almost 3 wars, a nuclear arms race, terrorism, extremism/ Islamic radicalization, never-ending cross-border firings, not obeying ceasefire and of course long-standing territorial dispute. Well, it's not just these conventional and unconventional issues but also internal factors such as the makeup of the political structure in both countries. Pakistan has been an abnormal or hybrid state, neither a democracy nor authoritarian military dictatorship or Islamic theocracy but a disproportionate combination of all three.¹⁶⁹ Our relations are defined by mistrust, broken promises, unresolved issues, and unending conflicts.

K. Natwar Singh, India's former Foreign Secretary mentioned that the India-Pak relationship is 'chronically accident prone' for Pakistan and is too changeable and unpredictable which makes normalization impossible.¹⁷⁰

The Quest for Kashmir

The Idealist Overtone: Nehruvian Era

PT. Nehru became our first Prime Minister as well as our first Foreign Minister. He indeed has the most charismatic aura of all and had built quite a reputation to admire his time the

¹⁶⁹ K. Bajpai. “Pakistan and China in Indian strategic thought.” *International Journal*, Vol.62, 2007, pp.805-822.

¹⁷⁰ N. G. Jayal & P. B. Mehta (eds.), *The oxford companion of politics in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Nehruvian era is considered to be India's majority of Idealistic phase in foreign policy and relations. Kashmir has truly been a defining bone of contention for the intense relationship between India and Pakistan since the inception of these nations. The matter is not only about religion or religious divide among people it's a lot more complex and deep-rooted issue as it involves strategic geopolitics, control over resources, and maintenance of the status quo. Kashmir has a very strategic location for without Kashmir Silk route to China will be greatly endangered and there will be no link with China for Pakistan. Also, three rivers namely Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus originate from Kashmir and Pakistan's agricultural life depends upon them. Kashmir is the only link between India and Afghanistan though the route is not serving directly right now also for India Kashmir is about preserving the territorial Integrity as we have not annexed it but rightfully made it our integral part by signing the Instrument of Accession with the then ruler of the state, Hari Singh. If now we let it slide then demand further succession can be raised by some radical groups in the whole country also granting it complete independence is not a feasible option for us as this will make the state more vulnerable to its neighbors like Pakistan and China who are ready to devour it in and this can further be posing a great danger to our national security.

The 1947 attack of annexation sponsored by Pakistan made it capture almost one-third of the state calling it 'Azad Kashmir', irony spotted. This unprecedented move left the then ruler in fits of fear and response he looked up to India for help we also played diplomatically and in return for the help signed the Instrument of Accession making the state part of the Union of India. The clash went on for 2 months and India decided to present the issue in front of the United Nations in the belief that this will lead the agony to come to an end as there will be pressure and monitoring from an international forum, this particular step can be perceived to be an idealistic one and it did not do as any good. We experienced that the US was very much inclined towards Pakistan and the cold war era just began so the only conclusion close to peace was to have a plebiscite be done for the people and let them choose for themselves but here are the conditions from both sides. India demanded that Pakistan should first release the captured one-third territory and Pakistan wanted India to back off from Kashmir with all of its forces as a result, the plebiscite never happened.

The peak was the Nehru government while accepting Maharaja's Instrument of Accession, unilaterally offered, even before Pakistan or the UN thought of it, that after

removing Pakistani aggression, the question of the state's accession would be "settled by a reference to the people."¹⁷¹ he wanted to make sure to the Kashmiri people and the leaders there that nothing is being forced on them and everything will be done rightfully with consent, it was Nehru's democratic temperament that prompted him to provide extra proof but this constitutional and political blunder of the Nehru government¹⁷² was cleverly exploited by Pakistan and by the anti-India forces at the UN and till now. What he offered was also constitutionally invalid because the British Act on Indian Independence gave all the Maharajas full and unquestionable authority to decide on accession to India or Pakistan.

Restoring Peace and Cooperation (1950-1964)

In 1950 Nehru called Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime minister after Jinnah to restore the hostility that had been created after the series of events that took place a year ago, and successfully Nehru-Liaquat Pact was initiated under this agreement both sides decided to protect the rights of minorities after partition. A major effort for further peace and cooperation was made in 1953 when Nehru met his counterpart Mohammad Ali Bogra in August in New Delhi. They decided to deal with the Kashmir issue through peaceful negotiations. This clearly shows Nehru's commitment to his principle of peace and no conflicts. But Pakistan being Pakistan was very well aware of its military capabilities and strength, it has no confidence in what was agreed between the two countries so, in 1954 he joined SEATO (south Asian treaty organization) and got military assistance from the US.

Another such event showcasing India's willingness to have friendly terms with Pakistan is the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 moderated by the World Bank. Sharing of river waters was also one such area of tension but after 6 years of negotiations, Prime Minister Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed it. So much has happened after 1960 but the treaty despite it all still validates itself and presents the success of the bilateral track. Nehru always believed in peaceful co-existence according to Nehru those nations who rejected that idea, also rejected democratic principles which almost all the nations of the world were following. Thus, Nehru remarked, "The person who rejects the idea of coexistence rejects the

¹⁷¹ Rikhi Jaipal, "Nehru and World Peace: A Personal View", in S.J.R. Bilgrami, *Nehru: Indian Polity and World Affairs*, p.154.

¹⁷² Nalin Anandkad, "Nehru's Strategy of Peace", in S.J.R. Bilgrami ed., *Nehru: Indian Polity and World Affairs*, p.128.

democratic outlook. One could not live in compartments and be democratic inside a country and not so outside internationally.¹⁷³

Not just it a comprehensive bilateral push to address the Kashmir imbroglio was made from December 1962 to May 1963, six rounds of conferences and talks were held between the foreign ministers, Swaran Singh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The efforts were indeed appreciated but the process was not successful as the two sides could not agree on common ground.¹⁷⁴

To the Realist Beginnings

After the demise of Pt. Nehru in 1964, Lal Bhadur Shastri, home minister during the last term of Nehru became the 2nd Prime Minister. His term was short-lived but impactful with him the next on the timeline is the 1965 war, in April 1965 skirmishes occurred in the vicinity of the salt marsh, Rann of Kutch, in western Gujarat. This time situation was pretty different India was defeated severely by China at the North-eastern borders in 1962 after that it committed itself to the creation of a million-strong army with ten new mountain divisions equipped and trained for high-altitude warfare, a 45-squadron air force with supersonic aircraft and a modest program of naval expansion.¹⁷⁵ Nehru's idealism with China, the Panchsheel Pact, failed miserably proving that only the ideal of peaceful co-existence and respecting each other territorial boundaries won't be the only feasible action and balance of power is a reality for sustenance.

As after its Independence India chose to remain non-aligned while Pakistan joined SEATO and from that time onwards rely heavily on the US for its defense sector. On one side Pakistan was supported by SEATO and on the other India-China war recently happened and going with the saying, "your enemy's enemy is a friend" Pakistan-China relations were established very well. India during this war was very aloof even though USSR was still an ally but direct help cannot be predicted. Putting the world in awe India defeated Pakistan swiftly, On September 6 in 1965, the Indian Army launched an attack in the Lahore sector of Pakistan taking the Pakistan Army by surprise and advancing to the outskirts of the second-largest city of the country, Lahore.¹⁷⁶ The war is presumed to be started from situational factors like India

¹⁷³ N. Gupta, "Jawaharlal Nehru and Co-operative Movement" in Verinder Grover ed., Political thinkers of modern India, Vol. X, p.552.

¹⁷⁴ Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflict Since 1947*. Colorado: Westview Press. 1994.

¹⁷⁵ Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations*. London: Asia Publishing House. 1966.

¹⁷⁶ M.V. Naidu, *War, Security, Peace*. Oakville, Ont.: M.I.T.A. Press, 1996. pp.360-62.

preserving its Status quo and Pakistan its *raison d'être* about the Kashmir issue.¹⁷⁷ From this confrontation onwards India's outlook towards Pakistan changed forever and they understood that it cannot be trusted.

The Tashkent Agreement of 1966 signed after the declaration of the cease-fire by the leaders of both countries is a prime example of how even after having the edge we didn't completely let things slide in our favor. According to the agreement both sides decided to return to their initial position which was before 4th August 1965 but I believe this was the chance with which we could have claimed the captured territory of Kashmir back and Pakistan was at a state where he couldn't even deny the demand completely. So, agreeing to the mentioned ceasefire and not grabbing the opportunity shows the Idealistic nature which was still there at that time also as all we wanted was peace and no war rather than focusing on the absolute gain, we could have out of this.

The Indira Phase - Shift Towards Complete Realism

Indira Gandhi became the Prime minister after the mysterious death of Shastri in Tashkent in 1966 and with her, a new era began both at the domestic and international levels. India's foreign policy remained non-aligned but our friendship with the USSR made the world question our stance, which further complicated our relations with the US.

The Bangladesh War of Independence in which India played a primary role and liberated East Pakistan from West Pakistan in 1971 marks the third full-fledged confrontation between the two armies. Here I wanted to highlight an incident that has showcased India's keen diplomacy - The Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation. The treaty was caused by increasing Pakistani ties with China and the United States, even though it was very loose, but sent a strong signal to Washington and Beijing.¹⁷⁸ This was a means to secure India's interest once it enters the war if in any case, Pakistan can convince the US or China to stand against India, it too has a superpower to counterbalance.

Coming back to BWI, the elites from West Pakistan had been treating the masses in the East poorly, exploiting them and their resources without giving them anything back just like a colony. East Pakistan had almost 60% of the population of the whole of Pakistan and except

¹⁷⁷ Ijaz Hussain, *Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective*. Rawalpindi: Services Book Club, 2000. pp.203-204.

¹⁷⁸ Laskar, Rejaul Karim. *India's Foreign Policy: An Introduction*. New Delhi: Paragon International Publishers, 2013. p.173.

for the religious commonality, nothing was similar between the two parts things got worse after the 1971 election in Pakistan when Mujib-ur-Rehman of Awami League from East Pakistan won the democratic elections but was denied his place and even allegedly arrested. India took a firm stand and supported the cause of Bangladesh getting itself directly involved. That was necessary though because India in South Asia has a very important geopolitical position and being a democratic country repulsing East Pakistan's authoritative actions was essential. To show its dominance in the South Asian region and to restore order in India's favor, India got itself involved in the matter against its policies of non-interference in other nations' domestic and territorial disputes. These actions manifest India's stand on placing its national interest and security at the foremost, a very real thing to do.

After the 1971 war in July 1972, the Shimla Accord was signed between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and as Pakistan lost terribly which it has not expected at all, the request has been made through the US for standoff and bilateral dialogue. The agreement made the Indian forces retreat to their normal position and the captured territories were returned by us along with 92000 POWs.¹⁷⁹ Again nothing could have been done for the demarcation of the borderline because ceasefire positions were already accepted in the Tashkent agreement but a positive was Pakistan got agreed and pledged to resolve all differences, including Kashmir, through bilateral means which signifies that after this Kashmir issue has become a matter between the two respective countries and no interference from any third party will be entertained. No pressure from the UN or US could impose anything on us.

When we talk about the prism of realism Brahma Chellaney suggested that inter-state conflicts can only be managed by threat and use of violence which require states to accumulate military power and be prepared to use force for achieving peace with their adversary. More radical ones, the hyper-realist consider Pakistan not only a dangerous state but also essentially a threatening phenomenon for the Indian state and its interests.¹⁸⁰ From this perspective, India should focus on maximizing its hard power capacities to the extent that it could dictate terms to Pakistan. This thought process is closely in line with John Mearsheimer's offensive realism which talks about states being power maximizers.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947-2005*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.94.

¹⁸⁰ E Sridharan. *International relations theory and the India-Pakistan conflict*. *India Review*, Vol. 4 (2), 2005, pp.103-124.

¹⁸¹ Mearsheimer. J. J. *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.

Tyranny of Balance of Power

Mohammad Ali Jinnah once said, "A weak Pakistan and strong Hindustan will be a temptation for the strong Hindustan to try to dictate. Pakistan must always be sufficiently strong as a balance vis-à-vis Hindustan."¹⁸² As we know that the relative distribution of power among states is both equal and unequal thus, Balance of power refers to a policy of promoting a power equilibrium on the assumption that unbalanced power is dangerous. Prudent states that are at a disadvantage in the balance of power will (or at least should) ally against a potentially hegemonic state or take other measures to enhance their ability to restrain a possible aggressor.¹⁸³

From the above, we can clearly understand the dynamics between India and Pakistan on the security dilemma front. The unequal power presence in political, economic, and military domains eventually presented India as a possible aggressor, and to counter its forces Pakistan joined SEATO and strengthened its relations with China. All of this tightened the position for India because now our two neighboring giants have started to exhibit too close relations. China 1964 tested its first weapon of mass destruction this raised security concerns for India and we started working towards our nuclear program in 1974 with 'Smiling Buddha' we marked our first peaceful nuclear explosion.

In an interview with a Japanese daily named Asahi Shimbun Indira Gandhi said, "India had never threatened Pakistan. We are not starting any nuclear arms race; Pakistan has continuously been raising a lot of dust needlessly about India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (NPE) while it had warmly welcomed the Chinese nuclear explosion."¹⁸⁴ Bhutto dismantled the statement completely and pursued vigorously the nuclear programme mainly with the United States. Pakistan was even aided by China in technology and raw material. Pakistan's nuclear program and weaponry support from the US in the name of fighting against the Soviet invasion in Afghan became a huge paradox for India.

During former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the US in 1985, he expressed his view that the United States was not doing enough to stop Pakistan from making the bomb. India was worried about the United States' arms supply to Pakistan because India had to counter this and spend more of its scarce resources on arms purchases by diverting funds

¹⁸² O.N. Mehrotra, "Pakistan's Strategy", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.5, No. 5 & 6, August-September 1981, pp.222-22.

¹⁸³ Z.A. Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*. London: Oxford University Press, 1968. p.45.

¹⁸⁴ *The Times of India*, 24th January 1975.

intended for developmental projects.¹⁸⁵ India in counterbalancing China's power inflicted Pakistan's fear and Pakistan's policy being always reactionary to what India does start an arms race in the subcontinent. The Pokhran-II tests of five nuclear bombs by the Indian army in 1998 gave Pakistan an open opportunity and just after a few days it tested its first nuclear weapon the reason Pakistan gave to the world was 'Deterrence'.

Despite efforts at de-escalation such as the Lahore Agreement (1999), the nuclear issue means that many in India and Pakistan who may like to have better relations between the nations are not able to do so. The risk of a nuclear strike, no matter how slight, means that both the Indians and the Pakistanis need to adopt the 'realist approach' while the rest of the world adopts a liberal approach to diplomacy and increasingly cooperates with their neighbors.¹⁸⁶

Unconventional Threat to India's Security

Just after a few months after the Lahore Agreement, large numbers of Islamic militants seized a strategic area known as Kargil, a district of Kashmir taken back from Pakistan by India in the 1971 war. An armed conflict occurred at Kargil fought in the summer of 1999 which began with the movement of insurgents and plain-clothes Pakistani soldiers into Indian-controlled Kashmir.¹⁸⁷ This was an attempt by Pakistan to re-capture this strategic area that ultimately failed. This action was widely seen as a Pakistani invasion and many regard it as the fourth Indo-Pakistan war. India believes that while Pakistan will not commit to a full-scale assault on Kashmir, it will continue to use terrorists and insurgents to seize the region.¹⁸⁸

Terrorism in recent times has become a major point of contention between India and Pakistan. For India, Pakistan has been waging what Kautilya called *Tusnim Yuddha* (silent war) against it, by employing unscrupulous means, including rebellions, uprisings, and spreading dissatisfaction in the ranks of the enemy. India on several occasions highlighted the problems that Pakistan tactfully was creating including the secessionist movements in the Indian part of Kashmir, In the north-eastern region before East Pakistan's partition, and even from the 1980s in the Punjab-Khalistani movement. Several hijackings by Sikh and Kashmiri

¹⁸⁵ "Spotlight on Pakistan's Bomb-Stage set for Political Debate", *Deccan Herald*, 24th May 1984.

¹⁸⁶ B. Chellaney, "Rising Powers, Rising Tensions: The Troubled China-India Relationship", *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, Vol.32, No.2, 2012, pp.99-108.

¹⁸⁷ Kuldip Nayar. *Wall at Wagah: India-Pakistan Relations*. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2003, pp.266-67.

¹⁸⁸ S. Mohindra. *Terrorist Games Nations Play*. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1993, p.16.

separatists who took flights to Pakistan, mostly Lahore airport, became a major irritant in the normalization of relations.

This was the main reason why India discontinued further meetings in May 1984, but, Pakistan has not changed its policy. Similarly, in an interview with Dawn, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi outlined factors responsible for difficulties in the resumption of the dialogue with Pakistan which, he said, were the alleged support of Pakistan to one of the hijackers at Lahore airport and Pakistan's failure to try the Sikh hijacker.¹⁸⁹ The series of hijackings continued till the late 80s and from the 90s onwards planting bombs and causing unrest became the tool. Some of the incidents that strained the relations were: on 2 March 1993: Bomb blasts in Bombay, killing 250, injuring 1400; on 8 December 1995: An Air India Dubai-bound flight made an emergency landing at Karachi airport after a bomb threat; Between 1996-1998: Number of bomb blasts happened in Kashmir killing almost 100 civilians over the time and in December 1999: Hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane allegedly by Kashmiri separatists to Kandahar airport. The passengers and plane were exchanged with the Indian government after the release of a Kashmiri separatist who was none other than Masood Azhar, leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed. After these repeated ups and downs, India and Pakistan held the Agra Summit in July 2001, amidst great optimism about peace in South Asia. Briefing newsmen after the failure of the talks, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee gave the main reason behind the disagreement: 'Pakistan's adamant attitude against making any reference to cross-border terrorism in the draft document which they repeatedly termed as a freedom struggle.'¹⁹⁰ Situations in this domain changed frequently after the 9/11 attack and New Delhi's genuine concerns got recognition internationally.

The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 was the peak incident portraying the audacity of these terrorist organizations, providing momentum to our government while dealing with this irritant. When the western countries finally recognized terrorism and Islamic extremism as a real threat to the world India's policy while dealing with it changed drastically. Now we became more vocal than ever and started calling out Pakistan for supporting and not acting against these fundamentalist groups even at the international level. Terrorism and countering its forces have drastically helped us to improve our relations

¹⁸⁹ Ishtiaq Ahmad and Aamir J Bashir. *India and Pakistan: Charting a path to peace*. Islamabad: PanGraphics, 2004, p.39.

¹⁹⁰ 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy', Staff Study, *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), Vol.50, No.3, July 1997, pp.20-24.

with western countries, especially USA, and gave us a boost to stricter our policies against Pakistan on this front without getting us much bothered by the China factor.

This is for sure the reality of Pakistan that it is a 'safe heaven' for these terrorist organizations and that is the reason why it has been grey listed by UNSC talks have been initiated several times with high officials of Pakistan but a pattern has been noticed that whenever there is a militarily authoritative or installed government is formed in Pakistan these activities of infiltration and attacks increase significantly compared to a democratically coming civilian government and after hundreds of talks failing to solve the prospects of terrorism India and Pakistan no more stand eye to eye on this issue.

Some Pakistani scholars believe that India had started a policy of 'Isolating Pakistan' at the international level that is creating a hostile image of the country and portraying it as responsible for not doing and promoting such threats in the world and this has negatively impacted the image of Pakistan altogether and affected it both economically and politically by hampering its relation with the western world. I believe that India has been subverted doing so in recent times and this has given us quite an advantage when it comes to dealing with and putting our national interest first, a realist perspective is adopted as negotiations are in no position to keep Pakistan in line when it comes to terrorism. India even goes to the extent and publicly stating at if Pakistan won't recognize terrorism as a serious threat and issue between both countries then India too won't negotiate with Pakistan on Kashmir any further.

Recent Realities (2016 Onwards)

With the coming up of the Modi government, India's politics has shifted to a very Populist regime with the dominance of Nationalistic ideas and this India-Pak rivalry has got a big boost with 'NAYA BHARAT' which is not tolerable to anything anymore and has become offensive in recent times. The hyper-realists have gained an upper hand in influencing India's Pakistan policy and Nehruvians as well as neoliberals were pushed into a tight corner. This happened primarily because the ruling elites started taking the masses for granted whereas the right-wing outfits toiled hard to get their narrative mainstreamed.¹⁹¹ India's toughened position on bilateral relations with Pakistan and its aggressive posture on terrorism is directly linked to the increasing hyper-realist influence. Phrases such as 'talks and terror cannot go together and 'blood and water cannot flow together' have come into prominence. The September 2016

¹⁹¹ Ashish Shukla, "Theoretical underpinnings of India-Pakistan relations", *India Quarterly*. Vol. 76 (2), 2020, pp.294-312.

surgical strike and February 2019 air strike in Balakot are cases of the above manifestation. These actions in one way or another other were driven by popular perceptions and in a democratic society, it is always difficult for policymakers to ignore popular public perceptions.

What we can analyze out of this is that India has become radical in its stand and her outlook has transformed over the years to a more '*real politics*' one and all these solely do not depend upon the happenings of the past but also shift in the governance and International political scenario. The world we live in today has made the ideals of idealism not applicable to practical scenarios but in a way, it is always idealist thinking and realist actions. A human mind will always dream of a perfectly peaceful world but the helm of politics is not that perfect and hence we cannot let our idealist will gush out our existence in a realist world.

Way Forward

We can't sum up India-Pakistan relations in any compartments as the complexities of nation-states states is indefinite and putting them and their relations into a defined framework is of no use rather, we should accept this dynamism and be open to reactions on a situational basis as nothing remains permanent in IR and similarly, India and Pakistan are neighboring states part of the same history and lineage but a world apart when they stand. Both countries do not idealize their realities and not interacting much in any domain be it economic, social, or cultural. Politically hostility is there recently the top Prime ministers of both of them met in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meet after more than 3 years of interaction so, the future is still uncertain when it comes to India-Pakistan relations. Initiatives of the Kartarpur corridor slightly sparked an opportunity for interactions but it has not been taken forward. At times we have also tried cricket diplomacy as the craze for this support was mutual on both sides but after the 2008 Mumbai attack, India and Pakistan have not hosted each other in their respective countries.

With the recent Indian government is no way forward for the improvement of relations because the nationalist factor is really strong and after the abrogation of article 370 from Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has strictly denied resuming any talks with India and it only demands the restoration of Article 370 which India will no way going to agree. Thus, right now both countries have completely cut themselves off from each other. The only ray of hope is if Pakistan in the future limits its friendship with China understands its debt trap politics and

starts initiating joint efforts with India on countering terrorism which seems a dream only but even if Pakistan ever starts to have a stable civilian-ruled government and would be able to curb military dominance then chances of interaction could extend as after two nation theory it's Pakistan's rivalry with India that has kept its politics going and all the successors in power completed harassed it to their benefit. Now it's interesting to see what course will the two nations take and how India's foreign policy will ever change towards Pakistan or continued to be what it is now.

Chapter-VIII: Strategic and Security Aspects of India-ASEAN Relations

Archit Kandula

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations which was formed in 1967 is a regional grouping of 10 southeast Asian countries. India's relations with ASEAN have become a cornerstone of its foreign policy. This has happened especially under the purview of the recent developments in the Indo-Pacific region and the rising centrality of Southeast Asia in the entire region's geopolitics. India's relations with Southeast Asia are age-old, yet the robustness in the ties which is seen from the mid-2010s onwards is unparalleled, especially in the field of defence, security, trade, and connectivity.

Historically India has had close relations with Southeast Asia due to its cultural and geographical proximity to the region. India's cultural imprint is visible in most ASEAN countries. Religion, history, politics, and shared colonial experiences made the two regions natural allies. India was instrumental and a strong voice for the decolonization of the third world, especially for the colonies in southeast Asia. The establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the mid-20th century and the active role of India, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian states in the later years further increased the political and strategic proximity between the two regions. However, it was only in the 1960s that the relations between the two started souring. India perceived ASEAN as an extension of SEATO thus a US/NATO ally in the region and not truly non-aligned. In the following years, India's growing proximity to USSR became an issue of concern for ASEAN. Furthermore, India's support of Vietnam in the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict further distanced it from the southeast Asian nations. India and ASEAN found each other on opposite camps in the cold war. India's closed economy, nuclear tests, and unsaid negligence of the region further deteriorated the ties between the two sides.

In 1991, India launched the Look East Policy (LEP) (later rebranded as Act East Policy (AEP) in 2014) which resulted in developments that rejuvenated India's relations with ASEAN. The Look East Policy led India to become a Sectoral Partner of ASEAN in 1992, a Dialogue Partner in 1996, and a Summit-level Partner in 2002. Ultimately, it was in 2012 that

this partnership was upgraded to Strategic Partnership considering the robustness of the growth of relations between the two sides in two decades.

This chapter tries to analyze the strategic and security relations of India and ASEAN from the lens of an idealist-realist debate. It further goes on to highlight how the relations between the two sides have transitioned from idealism to realism with realism gaining ultimate prominence in their contemporary relations. This analysis would be done by focusing on the Look East/Act East Policy, the strategic relations, the China factor, and finally the recent developments in QUAD and Indo-Pacific.

Evolution of Look East Policy concerning India's Approach Towards ASEAN

The evolution of India's Look East policy can be traced to the changing context of the international system in the early 1990s. Look East policy was launched as part of a concerted effort to accentuate the strategic importance of Southeast Asia in the nation's foreign policy agenda.¹⁹² The goal of the policy was to strengthen the nation's long-standing historical, cultural, and ideological ties to the region by participating in more concrete political and security cooperation along with a focus on economic interdependence.¹⁹³ Thus, it can be said that the initial character of the policy was influenced by idealist elements. The end of the Cold War, which followed the fall of the Soviet Union, served as the impetus for the genesis of this policy.¹⁹⁴

The relationship between India and Southeast Asia has come a long way since the 1980s when mutual mistrust was fuelled by concerns about India's naval ambitions. Following its establishment in 1967, India saw ASEAN as "an instrument of neo-colonialism and a reincarnation of SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization)".¹⁹⁵ Chietigj Bajpae has tried to categorize India's LEP into some broad phases. The first phase corresponds to the Congress government under PM Narasimha Rao in 1991. The second phase was spearheaded by PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led BJP government in the early 2000s and continued in the UPA I and UPA II governments of PM Manmohan Singh. Most recently, in 2014 Prime Minister Narendra Modi rebranded the policy as "Act East" to signify a shift towards a more proactive

¹⁹² Chietigj Bajpae. 'Dephasing India's Look East/Act East Policy'. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 39 (2). (2017): p.348.

¹⁹³ Chietigj Bajpae. 'Reinvigorating India's "Act East" Policy in an Age of Renewed Power Politics'. *The Pacific Review*. (2022): p.3.

¹⁹⁴ Thongkholal Haokip. 'India's Look East Policy: Its Evolution and Approach'. *South Asian Survey*. 18 (2). (2011): p.239.

¹⁹⁵ Chietigj Bajpae. 'Dephasing India's Look East/Act East Policy'. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 39 (2). (2017): p.349.

and action-oriented approach to the region.¹⁹⁶ Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India recognized the need to reorient its external economic interactions, as the disintegration resulted in the loss of a key market for the country. (Gupta 1995)¹⁹⁷

The conclusion of India's sectoral dialogue status with ASEAN in 1992 is often cited as the origin point of the LEP. Furthermore, India's elevation to the status of a dialogue partner in 1996 further institutionalized its relations with ASEAN. India later became a summit-level dialogue partner in 2002. The Look East Policy was continued as a matter of state policy by successive governments after the end of the Narasimha Rao regime. Singapore played a prominent role in enabling India to enter into dialogue with the regional grouping. India's historic and geographical proximity to the region was another reason for the rapid cementing of ties with ASEAN. Additionally, Myanmar's entry to ASEAN in 1997 provided India with a land border with ASEAN, further reducing any distance (literal and figurative) between the two parties. Look East was viewed in this context as a "recalibration rather than a reincarnation" of India's engagement with Southeast Asia, emphasizing actual involvement above idealistic claims of "third world solidarity"¹⁹⁸

The conclusion of three important agreements at the 2003 Bali Summit - a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation; a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism; and India's accession to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation - signifying India's deepening relationship with ASEAN at the economic, security, and political levels - is generally regarded as the beginnings of phase two of the ASEAN-India summit-level partnership.¹⁹⁹ Commercial and security issues overtook solely economic ones during the second phase of India-ASEAN relations. The second phase was characterized by the expansion of dialogue to political, defence, economic, strategic, defence, economic, science and technology, and cultural areas of cooperation.

Notably, due to the backlash against India's nuclear tests, which are covered below, there was a noticeable loss of momentum in India's relationship with ASEAN during the late 1990s. India agreed to sign the protocol of the 1997 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear

¹⁹⁶ *ibid.* pp.349-350

¹⁹⁷ SP Gupta. "India's increasing Eastern orientation in trade and investment: Context and challenges." In *India looks east: An emerging power and its Asia-Pacific neighbours*. Eds. S. Gordon & S. Henningham. (pp.71-91). Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (1995)

¹⁹⁸ C Raja Mohan. *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: *Penguin Books India*, 2003): p. xvi.

¹⁹⁹ Chietigj Bajpae. 'Dephasing India's Look East/Act East Policy'. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 39 (2). (2017): p. 352

Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) after the negative effects of its nuclear testing on relations with ASEAN were mostly mitigated.

The official “third phase” of India's Look East strategy began with the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014.²⁰⁰ This was formally stated in November 2014 when Modi launched the Act East policy during the 12th ASEAN-India Summit and East Asia Summit (EAS) in Myanmar. Modi referred to ASEAN as the "anchor of our Act East Policy" during his visit to Singapore in 2015.²⁰¹ By renaming "Look" to "Act," it was indicated that India would be approaching the region more proactively and with a focus on security, connectivity, and regional integration. A perceivable change can be observed from this moment as the forthcoming developments reflected India's tilt towards more realist policies which would help bolster its relations with the grouping. India appointed a dedicated ambassador to oversee ties and was stationed at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. This was also reflected in the establishment of a distinct Indian Mission to ASEAN and the EAS in April 2015. Additionally, India had extended invitations to the leaders of all ten ASEAN states to attend India's Republic Day Parade as chief guests.

A key objective of the Look East policy has been to improve connectivity, including commerce and people-to-people ties. Due to its emphasis on regional connectivity, India developed links with other multilateral institutions and forums, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), among others.²⁰²

Amitendu Palit identifies three features of India's engagement with southeast Asia under its Act East Policy - Respecting the significance of ASEAN as the cornerstone of the regional economic architecture; Engaging the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) members of ASEAN as a strategic priority; and establishing bilateral connections with the rest of Southeast Asia. Modi's emphasis on ASEAN serving as the "anchor" in Act East is understandable given the strategic importance India places on the region's current institutional framework.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p.358

²⁰¹ Palit, Amitendu. “India's Act East Policy and Implications For Southeast Asia.” *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2016, pp.81-92. (2016): p. 84

²⁰² Chietigj Bajpae. “Dephasing India's Look East/Act East Policy”. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 39 (2). (2017): p.359.

²⁰³ Palit, Amitendu. “India's Act East Policy and Implications For Southeast Asia.” *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2016, 81–92. (2016): p. 85

Defence, Security, and Strategic Relations

Despite close religious, cultural, and ideological relations, it would be a mistake to believe that India's early engagements with Southeast Asia were solely motivated by idealistic notions. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru negotiated two friendship treaties with Indonesia and Burma, both of which included provisions for security consultations whenever they were needed. The provisions of these agreements established a system in which representatives from both sides could meet regularly to discuss matters of mutual interest and to expect cooperation on security issues. Because of the two parties' strong and substantive security and defence cooperation, these agreements worked well during India's early engagements with these states. They were reflective of the realist tilt in India's engagement with the region. However, the deterioration of relations in the 1960s limited bilateral cooperation with both of these countries until the 1990s.²⁰⁴

The attempt to restart dialogue between India and ASEAN in the early 1980s failed due to New Delhi's decision to support Vietnam in the Cambodian conflict. India's inward-looking economic policies had also gradually severed the historic commercial links between India and Southeast Asia. In the final years of the Cold War, India's growing defence capabilities—particularly those of its Navy—as well as its readiness to assert itself in the region and its strategic alliance with the USSR drew heavy criticism.

The nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1990 jeopardized some of the gains made in India's relations with ASEAN. At the fifth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting and the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting in Manila that India faced international condemnation for its actions. Eventually, the ASEAN backlash subsided, aided by India's willingness to sign the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, which generated goodwill for India in ASEAN.²⁰⁵ ASEAN further recognised India's compulsions for its military advancements due to hostile neighbours on its land borders. Further, a nuclear India was also projected as a reliable option for maintaining the balance of power against aggressive China in the region. The absence of any territorial aggression for India in the past also helped India's case to a great extent. India's rejection of the CTBT and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) did not hinder India from joining the ARF and becoming a full dialogue partner in 1996.

²⁰⁴ C. Raja Mohan. 'An Uncertain Trumpet?: India's Role In Southeast Asian Security'. In *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*. ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2013): p.13

²⁰⁵ Chietigj Bajpae. *opcit.*, p.355

Since the early 1990s, India steadily increased bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation with Southeast Asian nations. However, neither party prioritized defence cooperation. For India, concentrating on institutional and economic integration into East Asian structures was more crucial. On the defence front, India's immediate priority in the 1990s was to remove the distrust that had built up in the region during the Cold War by restoring high-level exchanges and gradually exploring the prospects for deeper cooperation.²⁰⁶

Despite all, India-Singapore defence relations are the closest. Both countries hold the annual military exercise SIMBEX – Singapore-Indian Maritime Bilateral Exercise since 1994 and have renewed the Airforce Bilateral Agreement in 2012 which allows for the training and exchanges with Indian forces in India.²⁰⁷ India's other defence agreements with Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Philippines have drastically improved the bilateral cooperation and relations between these countries with India. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and *Milan* along with some other confidence-building measures are some other initiatives through which India has sought to multilaterally engage with the Southeast Asian states.²⁰⁸ One of the objectives of the benign role is to project India's soft power.²⁰⁹ The soft power projection through joint exercises and military assistance and training ultimately results in the building of hard power capabilities for all the parties involved. According to the 2009 Indian Maritime Doctrine, "Naval diplomacy entails the use of naval forces...to build 'bridges of friendship' and strengthen international cooperation on the one hand, and to signal capability and intent to deter potential adversaries on the other."

India worked its way up from being a dialogue partner in the 1990s to becoming a founding member of the East Asia Summit in 2005, regaining its importance in the region's geopolitics. As great power relations deteriorated and the regional conflict intensified since 2010, ASEAN members hoped for a stronger Indian contribution to the regional security order.²¹⁰

²⁰⁶ C. Raja Mohan, 'An Uncertain Trumpet?: India's Role In Southeast Asian Security'. In *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*. ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2013): p.14

²⁰⁷ Ajaya Kumar Das, 'Introduction'. in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*. ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2013): p.2

²⁰⁸ *ibid*

²⁰⁹ Ajaya Kumar Das, 'Soft and Hard Power in India's Strategy Towards Southeast Asia'. in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*. ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2013): p.65

²¹⁰ C. Raja Mohan, "An Uncertain Trumpet?: India's Role In Southeast Asian Security." in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*. ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2013): p.15.

In the year 2012 India and ASEAN elevated their ties to the level of strategic partnership and stressed deepening security cooperation, especially in the maritime domain. However, despite calls from some ASEAN member states for explicit support from India in the regional territorial disputes in Southeast Asia, India ruled out its intervention in external disputes. This move was reflective of the difference between the expectations of ASEAN states from India and India's inability to move beyond the rhetoric of security cooperation.²¹¹ ASEAN still hopes for a stronger Indian security role in Southeast Asia.

The realist facets of India's approach in the region are exemplified by its efforts to maintain the balance of power, something which was unthinkable in India's foreign policy for decades. India's policy of facilitating ASEAN leadership in building the East Asian order is also rooted in its foreign policy's realist tendencies. Realists are skeptical of ASEAN's likelihood of achieving a stable Asian order. For them, it is almost like weak states disciplining stronger ones. In the face of China's rapid rise, India has a strong incentive to contribute to the strengthening of ASEAN as a whole and to maintain its primacy in building a regional order through the EAS.²¹²

India has time and again emphasized ASEAN's centrality in the evolving regional geopolitics and has made concerted efforts not to appear as a threat to ASEAN-centric regional order.²¹³ In 2003, India signed a bilateral defence cooperation agreement with Singapore, which pushed for vigorous security diplomacy in the region. At the end of 2004, the Indian Navy was quick to respond to the tsunami disaster in southeast Asia which further accentuated its soft power. Political values like democracy have also contributed to India's attraction to ASEAN states. In recent years, India has signed security cooperation treaties with several Southeast Asian countries, including Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Cambodia. These also include military training and arms exports. India is eager to fulfill some of Southeast Asia's security needs.²¹⁴ It is already training its military personnel, servicing its fighter aircraft, expanding defence cooperation, and more recently considering exporting indigenously built Brahmos and Tejas. In the ambit of the ASEAN

²¹¹ C. Raja Mohan, "An Uncertain Trumpet?: India's Role In Southeast Asian Security," in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2013): p.15.

²¹² *ibid.* p.21.

²¹³ Ajaya Kumar Das, "Soft and Hard Power in India's Strategy Towards Southeast Asia", in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2013): p.75.

²¹⁴ C. Raja Mohan, "An Uncertain Trumpet?: India's Role In Southeast Asian Security," in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2013): p.29.

Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) activities, India had already been taking part in joint military drills for non-combat tasks such as disaster relief, peacekeeping, and other humanitarian measures.²¹⁵

The China Factor

The "China factor" poses a particular and escalating challenge to India's eastward involvement in the context of the revived "Great Power" competition. China's expanding power projection capabilities pose a threat to India's strategic space by weakening it. This became clear in 2012 when China protested Indian activity in the South China Sea and India withdrew from an oil exploration block it was surveyed in collaboration with Vietnam. India's Look/Act East Policy and the Sino-Indian relationship are intertwined, as seen by debates about how to counterbalance China's intrusions into South Asia by bolstering India's ties with East Asia.²¹⁶

With claims that the partnership is an "anchor" of India's strategic engagement with Southeast Asia and "may most closely be compared with China's connection with Pakistan," the India-Vietnam relationship is a prominent illustration of this narrative within India-ASEAN relations.²¹⁷ India is gradually treating Vietnam in the South China Sea and the Eastern Pacific similarly to China considers Pakistan in South Asia.²¹⁸

The strategic community in India has also criticized Beijing for its hypocrisy in opposing Indian oil exploration activities with Vietnam in waters in the South China Sea that are claimed by China while ignoring New Delhi's worries about Chinese investment in disputed territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. To balance China's assertive stance along the Sino-Indian land border, there have been calls to increase India's strategic presence in the maritime area near the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. This is due to the perceived parity between Chinese actions in South Asia and Indian actions in Southeast Asia. Given China's enormous logistical and general prowess on the Himalayan borders, Admiral Arun Prakash had stated that "there is a view that India needs to look seawards for a countervailing

²¹⁵ Mely Caballero-Anthony. 'Asean's Strategic Perspectives Of India'. in *India-ASEAN Defence Relations*. ed. Ajaya Kumar Das. (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2013): p.34

²¹⁶ Chietigj Bajpae. "Reinvigorating India's "Act East" Policy in an Age of Renewed Power Politics." *The Pacific Review*. (2022): pp.18-19.

²¹⁷ Dinesh Yadav. "Look East" to "Act East": India's policy shift or "old wine?" In *India and China: Constructing a peaceful order in the Indo-Pacific*. Eds. G.S. Khurana & A. G. Singh. New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation. (2016): p.55.

²¹⁸ Harsh Pant. "India and Vietnam: A "strategic partnership" in the making", *RSIS Policy Brief*. (2018). pp.7-8.

maritime strategy, using its peninsular configuration, island territories, and growing maritime power to dominate Indian Ocean Sea lanes and exploit China's putative "Malacca Dilemma."²¹⁹

Quad and Indo-Pacific

The representatives of India, the United States, Japan, and Australia met informally for the first time as the Quad on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila in August 2007. They talked about the Quad members' cooperation in security, paying particular attention to matters like transnational security, combating terrorism, and sea piracy. Abe was succeeded by Yasuo Fukuda, who was eager to forge diplomatic ties with China, but the project swiftly wilted as a result of Australia caving into Chinese pressure and a "lack of American fortitude."²²⁰ Nearly ten years later, the Quad reconvened in 2017 in Manila during the ASEAN Summit.

Revival of Quad

When PM Abe discussed "Asia's democratic security diamond," a plan supported by Japan, Australia, the United States, and India to protect the maritime commons from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean, the Quad concept made a comeback. When the plan started to stir up controversy, it was abandoned. India was hesitant to support the idea as well, but Japan persisted in advancing it through Abe's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) lobbying.²²¹ Each nation reaffirmed the significance of the ASEAN-led architecture in the developing concept of the Indo-Pacific in November 2018. The four Quad partners came out in favour of an ASEAN-led mechanism in the regional architecture for the Indo-Pacific region during the fourth meeting, which was held in Bangkok in May 2019.

There have also been some worries expressed by regional actors, especially ASEAN, who feel that the Quad is ignoring its importance to regional security. In a declaration titled "The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific," the member states of ASEAN made an effort to describe a shared vision for the Indo-Pacific area. One interpretation of this is that it is an attempt by ASEAN to "reclaim the strategic narrative in its favour to highlight its relevance in

²¹⁹Arun Prakash. "Crafting a strategy for India's maritime security". in *The New Arthashastra: A security strategy for India*. Ed. G. Kanwal New Delhi: HarperCollins. (2016). p.178.

²²⁰ Daniel Twining, "Asia's New Triple Alliance," *Foreign Policy*, February 24, 2015.

²²¹ Brian Lee Crowley, Shuvaloy Majumdar, and David McDonough, "Responding to China's Rise: Japan and India as Champions for the Rule of Law in the Indo-Pacific" (ORF Occasional Paper 120, Observer Research Foundation, August 2017), pp.15-16.

the evolving regional order."²²² Defending regimes that place other countries under "impossible burdens of debt", PM Modi made clear allusions to China's contentious BRI project and growing assertiveness in the contentious South China Sea.²²³

Modi also emphasized the importance of ASEAN in any Indo-Pacific strategic decision-making and stated that New Delhi places a high focus on regional inclusivity. It is crucial to realize that ASEAN plays a significant role in India's overall strategy for the Indo-Pacific. India has been attempting to support ASEAN's vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific by highlighting ASEAN's centrality. India benefits from projecting an image of a regional partner rather than a regional hegemon by announcing its ASEAN centrality.²²⁴

Conclusion

India and Southeast Asia are two lands connected through the bonds of their social, cultural, and historical roots and more recently through their close bilateral relations – both as a group and on a bilateral basis with each member state individually. The relations between India and ASEAN are based on mutual respect and trust, common regional interests, and, a shared vision for the transformation of regional order. Both sides accord significant importance to improving cooperation and deepening relations with each other, and this has only increased with time.

India's initial engagements with southeast Asia immediately after Indian independence were perceived to be idealistic. This was mainly because India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was an idealist and his idealism was reflected in the policies of his government. However, despite the popular belief, Nehru's approach to Southeast Asia did have some realist elements too which were reflected in the policies on military cooperation and security consultations with some states in Southeast Asia. Critics argue that these policies had no real weight as they were vaguely framed. Regardless, the Nehru years were important in India-southeast Asia relations as the relations were being built on the foundation of shared history, culture, and heritage²²⁵. The 1960s were turbulent times for the relations between the

²²² Harsh V. Pant, "Reclaiming the Indo-Pacific Narrative," *The Hindu*, July 8, 2019.

²²³ Vinay Kaura. "Incorporating Indo-Pacific and the Quadrilateral into India's Strategic Outlook." *Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India* 15 (2), (2019) p.22.

²²⁴ *ibid.* p.8

²²⁵ M Ganapathi. 'Act East in India's Foreign Policy: India-ASEAN Relations'. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 14 (3). 2019: p.198.

two as India started perceiving ASEAN as an extension of SEATO and a strategic threat to its interest in the region. This is when the relations started to sour.

It was only in the 1990s that India decided to recalibrate its ties with ASEAN by giving it renewed importance in its foreign policy through Look East Policy. India set out on a quest to improve its economic relations with the regional grouping which was one of the major hindrances in their bilateral relations. From being a Sectoral Partner of ASEAN in 1992, India gradually climbed the ladder and became a Dialogue Partner in 1996, a Summit-level Partner in 2002, and finally a Strategic Partner in 2012. This culminated in the rebranding of LEP to Act East Policy in 2014. India recognizing the strategic importance of ASEAN and making policies for greater cooperation in defence and security fields with it to maintain the balance of power in the region vis-à-vis China reflects the realist tilt in its approach to the grouping. India signing military pacts and participating in numerous military drills in the region is reflective of the same.

The China factor is an important impetus in giving a realist push to Indian foreign policy in the Southeast Asian region. Both countries perceive each other as threats to each other's interests in the region. India's improving ties with ASEAN states are further rebalancing the unequal balance of power in the region. The formation and rejuvenation of QUAD and the popularisation of the concept of "Indo-Pacific" have only benefitted India's position and interests in the region. It is now on India to capitalize on these strategic opportunities and use them to strengthen its position and strategic interests in the region.

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